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This dissertation aims to accomplish two major goals: 
1. To provide a theoretical framework for studying and evaluating justice in 
sanctions by modifying and expanding the Just War Tradition (JWT); 
2. To apply this theoretical framework, Just Sanctions theory (JST), in order to study 
justice in sanctions on Iran. 
Accordingly, first I introduce a new theoretical framework: Just Sanctions Theory (JST), 
and then I use the theory to explore the degree to which the authorization and 
implementation of sanctions against Iran have been just. In this analysis, it is important to 
distinguish, compare and contrast the sanctions authorized by the United Nations (UN) 
from those authorized by the US and the EU. I carry out this analysis realizing fully that 
the contexts of UN and non-UN sanctions on Iran are deeply intertwined. 
 
The findings of this research substantiate my hypothesis that the authorization of non-UN 
sanctions against Iran has not been just and that non-UN sanctions have not been 
implemented justly. In contrast, I argue that both the authorization and implementation of 
UN sanctions on Iran were less unjust. At the same time, however, I show that the 
impacts of sanctions against Iran from all three sources, in general, have been 
overarching and indiscriminate. 
 
Furthermore, I   examine the degree to which the rapid globalization of transnational 
economic connections facilitates to this day the deep and destructive living conditions of 
the citizens of Iran. Such conditions have emerged as a consequence of the sweeping and 
crunching impositions of sanctions. Lastly, given the recent developments in Iran’s 
nuclear case and the partial sanctions relief Iran has received, I briefly analyze “Just Post 
Sanctions” in the case of Iran. 
 
In carrying out the necessary research, I have conducted both field research (in Iran) and 
library research (primary and secondary sources); in addition, I have devoted a portion of 
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my research to the content analysis of statements by both sides (sanctioner(s) and target) 
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Introduction 
Sitting in the Dana Porter Library at University of Waterloo, looking out of a window, pretty white clouds 
are dancing softly and peacefully on the blue floor in an absolute silence. I follow their pathway in my 
thoughts for a few seconds. They spin over and over, their layered white skirts circle and abruptly make 
vague and dark loops of fear. No longer is there a trace of charming clouds; they have all turned into gray 
smoke and the silence is replaced by the sounds of echoed explosions nearby and in the distance. A 
composed orchestra of anxiety. I am pulled into my childhood and my memories of the 8-year Iran-Iraq war 
(1980-1988) when Tehran was under missile attacks and I would be awakened in the middle of the night not 
only by my childish nightmares, but also by the reality of vicious adult hallucinations: they wanted to win the 
war by dropping bombs on innocent civilians. My mother would hold my hand tightly and drag me under the 
stairway, thought to be the safest place in our home. I would close my eyes and press my palms against my 
ears. Silence. 
I am back in the library again, looking at the white clouds, and then at their shadows on the ground. They are 
strutting from one rock to another, moving to embrace the buildings one after the other, kissing them 
harmlessly. The buildings are still there, reminding me of our home that endured the bombardments. The war 
is over, but the sanctions’ octopus is creeping into peoples’ lives, like the shadow of the white clouds. 
Buildings are still standing; there is no bloodshed; there are no casualties, and no amputated limbs. The war 
is over, but sanctions are conquering strategic economic ramparts. The sanctions octopus is creeping to 
cripple the economy and as it moves forward, more and more people are starting to suffer. I can no longer 
close my eyes and press my palms against my ears, as I used to do in my childhood during the shelling.  I am 
questioning justice as many have also questioned it throughout history. My personal observations of the Iran-
Iraq war and the effect of sanctions along with my concern for justice have constituted my inspiration 
triangle: war, sanctions and justice. 
 
War, Sanctions, and Justice 
From my studies on the implementation of sanctions on Iran, I have been inspired the most by the principle 
of the Just War Tradition (JWT). Is it possible to imagine the world without war? Or will war always remain 
in our future? Are sanctions a new alternative to war or are they an extension of war? Should sanctions be 
rejected completely, or should sanctions be implemented to their full capacity to meet their objectives? 
JWT stands between the two extremes of Pacifism (under which war is morally rejected under any 
circumstances) and Realism (under which war is not about morality but self-interest, survival and increasing 
power) (Orend 2006 , 5). Likewise, when it comes to the different types of sanctions, I think that all types 
cannot be totally overruled; there are conditions and situations under which certain sanctions would be 
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reasonable policy choices. For instance, comprehensive or sweeping sanctions are never morally justifiable; 
in contrast, there are conditions under which some forms of targeted sanctions may to some degree be 
justifiable. However, if a type of sanction is to be authorized, there should also be criteria to prohibit 
sanctioners from misusing this authorization. I believe that JWT provides the point of departure for a new 
perspective on studying and assessing sanctions. 
The first question concerns the relationship between war and sanctions and the applicability of the 
JWT to the study of sanctions. The debates about sanctions and war can be classified into three main 
categories: 
1. Sanctions as an alternative to war 
Pro-sanctions arguments depict sanctions as an alternative to war which can reduce the possibility 
of conflict with far less harm and costs than war (Drezner 2003; Gartzke, Li, and Boohmer 2001; 
Morgan and Schwebach 1977; in Lektzian and Sprecher 2007, 415-431). Sanctions are supposed 
to be a nonmilitary alternative to other disastrous options such as war or indifference in times of 
aggression or injustice (Haass 1998, 2). 
 
2. Sanctions as an extension of war 
Contrary to the first approach, Fisher believes that those who assert that sanctions are always 
preferable to war clearly overlook two things: the level of harm experienced by civilians and the 
inefficiency of sanctions, especially when sanctions are protracted and/or implemented on 
tyrannies and undemocratic regimes (Fisher 2011, 73) Joy Gordon describes UN sanctions on Iraq 
as an invisible war (Gordon 2010)and calls sanctions “modern siege warfare” (Gordon 1999, 387-
400). Some others view sanctions as a kind of war tactic (Köchler 1994), the UN’s weapons of 
mass destruction(Halliday 1998, 3; Mueller and Mueller 1999, 43-53) and even a tool of genocide 
(Simons 1999; Bisharat 2001, 379) . In some cases, war can be even better than total embargo, if 
the war is understood to be in the framework of just war (Winkler 1999, 133-155). 
 
3. Sanctions as an option between war and diplomacy 
In the third approach, sanctions stand between diplomacy and war, or statements and soldiers 
(Lektzian and Sprecher 2007, 415-431; Van Brabant 1998). Sanctions are also described as a tool 
of coercive diplomacy (McGillivray and Stam 2004, 154-172) or a tool of statecraft between war 
and commerce(Lenway 1988, 397-426). 
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I believe that based on the type and the context of their implementation, different sanctions can be identified 
under each of the above mentioned categories. However in all the cases, whether sanctions are an alternative 
to war, an extension of war, or between war and verbal exchanges, the sanctions can be judged with the same 
logic as war:  any sanction, like any war, has to be judged at least twice—once in the time of authorization 
of sanctions and once in the time of implementation of sanctions. These two judgment levels are logically 
independent from one another which means that just sanctions can be implemented unjustly and unjust 
sanctions can be enforced according to the rules. There is also another stage of judgment, post-sanctions, 
which provides us with a more comprehensive assessment of sanctions. 
 
Research questions and hypothesis 
In this dissertation, I explore whether the authorization and implementation of sanctions against Iran have 
been just by examining the application of  “Just Authorization of Sanctions” and “Just Implementation of 
Sanctions” in the case of Iran. Hence, I have two main research questions: 
1. Have the authorizations of sanctions against Iran been just? (Just authorization of sanctions) 
2. Have the sanctions against Iran been implemented in a just manner? (Just implementation of 
sanctions) 
 
In considering these research questions, it is also important to distinguish sanctions authorized by the United 
Nations (UN) from those authorized by the US and the EU. The contexts of UN sanctions and non-UN 
sanctions on Iran are deeply intertwined. It is therefore important to compare and contrast the authorization 
and implementation of UN and non-UN sanctions on Iran.  My hypothesis is that the authorization of non-
UN sanctions against Iran has not been just and that non-UN sanctions have not been implemented justly. In 
contrast, both the authorization and implementation of UN sanctions on Iran were less unjust (it is a matter 
not simply of just and unjust, but of the degree of justice involved). In my research, justice is a continuous 
variable rather than a discrete variable. The degree of justice in the authorization and implementation of 
sanctions is determined in accordance with the criteria of “Just Authorization of Sanctions” and “Just 
Implementation of Sanctions”. These concepts are elaborated in Chapter 1(on Theoretical Framework). 
In sum, the modification of JWT would provide us with new criteria to assess sanctions based on the new 
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Research Plan 
Before an elaboration of the research plan of my thesis and the presentation of the content of each chapter, I 
will briefly explain my chosen writing format and style mainly for the first three chapters in my introductory 
chapter.  I acknowledge that the format of this component in the dissertation is not a common one. Instead of 
the longer discussion paragraphs as is usually found in academic essays or theses in the political and other 
social sciences, I present my arguments in a category-based writing style. There are several reasons why I 
decided that this writing format would serve as a better tool for my dissertation: (1) clearer presentation of 
the comparative quality of my research topic, (2) enhanced ability to apply simplifying techniques with 
complicated case studies and arguments, (3) helping to follow more clearly the broad scope of the issues 
under study, and (4) to maintain fairness and objectivity in the researcher and the presentation of the 
research. Below, I briefly explain what I mean by each of these points and why they help understand more 
clearly the clarity of my dissertation. 
 
Firstly, as my dissertation is fundamentally a comparative study, the use of a category-based style more 
effectively expresses the intricacies of the research and arguments. I compare and contrast the authorization 
and implementation of UN, U.S. and EU sanctions on Iran by utilizing the theoretical tool, the “Just 
Sanctions Theory (JST)” that I introduce in the first chapter. A category-based writing style provides me as 
the researcher, and will provide the readers, with a comparative tool. It allows me to explain each sanction 
and to compare in depth the different types of sanctions made by different sanctioners through the use of sub-
categories and factual evidence. At the end of each section, I further clarify the arguments that were made in 
tables that clearly express the differences and similarities in discussion in the given chapter. In this way, the 
reader is able to comprehend and follow my research better because more arguments and information are 
added with each chapter. 
 
Secondly; the technical and complicated nature of Iran’s nuclear case and the nuclear-related sanctions 
require simplifying techniques. A significant portion of my dissertation is allocated to studying the nuclear-
related sanctions imposed against Iran. Accordingly, I have chosen the category-based writing style as a 
simplifying technique to study one of the most technical and complicated cases of authorizing sanctions and 
their implementation in the world’s history. This writing technique allows me to assess various criteria of the 
Just Sanctions theory based on facts and evidences and then by explaining each in detail. Admittedly, such 
facts can be lost in a long discussion paragraph. But my category-based writing approach allows me to 
discuss and dissect a number of different complicated issues in an organized manner. Consequently that the 
chapter and as well as the thesis as a whole remain comprehensible to readers. 
  
     6 
 
Third; the broad scope of the issues under study are better presented and addressed through discussing 
individual sanctions one by one. The Just Sanctions Theory (JST) encompasses many criteria. Given the 
different sanctions that have been imposed on Iran by various sanctioners, the assessment of justice is best 
addressed through my category-based writing style. With this approach, I am able to delve into each sanction 
and to study its particular implications while also being able to continually broaden the links back to the main 
argument and compare a given sanction with other sanctions and with the theory of just sanctions. Again, this 
approach allows me to discuss many topics in depth while keeping the thesis moving in an intelligible way. 
 
Lastly, the approach assists me in maintaining fairness and objectivity in the presentation of my research. A 
category-based writing style constantly prompted myself as the researcher, to be watchful and to respect 
objectivity throughout my research. I found this style to be a just writing style, as it facilitated an equal space 
allocation to the sanctioners’ and the target’s arguments. 
 
Therefore, this writing style has aided me as the researcher to categorize and to argue in some detail about 
the research topic of Just Sanctions theory (JST) and the case study of Iran. In short, I provide to a very 
minute degree a way toward the objective of making the research more comprehensible for all readers. 
 
My research analysis is organised into eight chapters. In Chapter 1, I first explain the primary theoretical 
framework of my research: Just War Tradition (JWT), where I describe how this framework is applicable to 
the study of sanctions. Accordingly, I introduce a new theoretical framework: Just Sanctions Theory (JST).  
I then operationalize the key concepts of the JST: (a) “Just Authorization of Sanctions”, (b) “Just 
Implementation of Sanctions”, and (c) “Just Post Sanctions”. Each concept contains its own set of criteria. I 
end the first chapter by identifying my research methodology and by explaining how my research will 
contribute to the existing literature on sanctions and studies about Iran. 
 
In Chapters 2, 3,and 4 I examine the “ Just Authorization of Sanctions” in the case of Iran. In order to keep 
the coherency of my argument while at the same time avoiding lengthy chapters, I have divided the criteria of 
this concept into three chapters and parts under a single title: “Just Authorization of Sanctions” (Part I, II and 
III). In Chapter 2, I examine the most important criterion, ”Comparative Just Cause”. I discuss the 
justification of each side (opposing countries and Iran) concerning their course of actions, in a one-to-one 
correspondence approach.  Chapter 3 covers four other criteria, largely using the same approach: “Right 
Objective”, “Last Resort”, “Proportionality in Authorization” and “High Possibility of Success”. In Chapter 
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4, the remaining three criteria will be examined: “Legitimate Authorizer”, “Unambiguous Resolutions” and 
“Well-defined Termination Mechanism and Requirements”. My analyses in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are mainly 
based on library research (primary and secondary sources), the content analysis of statements by both sides 
(sanctioners and target), and sanctions-related resolutions and documents. 
 
In chapters, 5, 6, and 7, I examine the “Just Implementation of Sanctions” in the case of Iran. I take a similar 
approach to the organization of chapters 2, 3, and 4 by splitting the criteria of the concept into three chapters 
and parts under a single title: “Just Implementation of Sanctions” (Parts I, II and III). The two most important 
criteria, “Target Discrimination Principle” and “Civilian Immunity Principle” will be discussed in Chapters 5 
and 6 respectively. The focus of these two criteria is to discuss the effects of the implementation of sanctions 
on Iran and its citizens from multifaceted angles.  This part of my research mainly rests on field research: my 
observations in Iran, interviews with well-informed scholars and officials, and domestic media and 
publications. In Chapter 7, I examine the remaining criteria: “Proportionality Principle”, “Prospect of 
Success Principle”, “Negotiation Principle”, “Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism” and “Judicial Review 
Mechanism”. 
 
Chapter 8 concludes my thesis by dividing my analysis into two different parts: (a) Sanctions, and (b) Iran. In 
the first part I describe the implications of my research for the use of sanctions as a global governance and/or 
foreign policy tool. In the second part, I provide an overview of some of my important findings in an 
assessment of justice in the “authorization” of sanctions against Iran. Furthermore, I take an alternative 
standpoint to review the “implementation” of sanctions on Iran by studying the role of globalization in the 
comprehensive implementation of sanctions. More specifically, I will be looking to assess how the rapid 
globalization of transnational economic connections facilitates to this day the deep and destructive living 
conditions of the citizens of Iran that have emerged as a consequence of sweeping and crunching impositions 
of sanctions. Lastly, given the recent developments in Iran’s nuclear case and the partial sanctions relief Iran 
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Addressing the Argument: Theoretical Framework, Contribution and Literature Reviews, and 
Methodology 
The present chapter is the building block of the research. It introduces Just Sanctions Theory (JST), which 
the rest of the work will be built on (the existing literature on Just Sanctions, its strengths and weaknesses 
will come on pp.28-32). In fact, this chapter plays a continuous central role throughout the entire thesis, as 
the focus of other chapters is applying the Just Sanctions Theory to the case study of Iran. In short, the 
presented theoretical framework for Just Sanctions will be developed through examining the case study. 
In order to propose the Just Sanctions Theory (JST), first I will elaborate on the Just War Tradition (JWT). 
The core argument of this dissertation is that the Just War Tradition (JWT) can be modified and expanded to 
construct a theoretical framework, Just Sanctions Theory (JST). This theory, in turn, provides a means to 
study justice in sanctions. 
To develop this argument, I have organized the chapter around five components as follows: 
1. Just War Tradition (JWT); 
2. How is the theoretical foundation of JWT applicable for studying sanctions?; 
3. Just Sanctions Theory (JST): How the key concepts will be organized; 
4. The contribution and innovation of my theoretical framework in the context of the existing literature; 
5. Methodology for the empirical study of the justice of sanctions in situations like that of Iran. 
 
1. Just War Tradition (JWT) 
 
It would be more precise to call just war a “tradition” rather than a theory; it has involved in a series of steps 
that are not necessarily coherent but in the end of its development it is a useful tool for assessing justice. , 
The tradition of just war has Greco-Roman roots, mainly in the writings of the triumvirate of Aristotle, 
Cicero and Augustine (Orend 2006, 10) It was Aristotle (384-322 BC) who, living under the influence of 
wars between the Greeks and Persians and also among Greek city-states, coined the term “just war”, in 
contrast to the notion of “holy war”.  After the classical Greek period, Cicero (106-43 BC) and Augustine 
(AD 354-430) made the Roman contribution to JWT (Orend 2006, 10-12). Although Christian theologians 
(such as Augustine) had a profound role in shaping JWT, this tradition is, at heart, a secular concept which 
deals with the rightness and wrongness of wars without referring to holy books (Orend 2006,10). 
In the 20th century, three outstanding works have had the most influence in redefining JWT with regard to 
modern wars: 
• The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility (Paul Ramsey 1968) 
• Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (Walzer 1977) 
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• U.S. Catholic Bishops “The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and our Response” (Catholic 
Church, National Conference of Catholic Bishops 1983) (Farrell 2013). 
 
Nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence, terrorism, preventive war, preemptive war, humanitarian 
intervention and examples of modern wars such as those in Vietnam and Iraq are among the new issues that 
have entered the JWT.  According to JWT, justice should be assessed at three major levels: (a) justice of war, 
(b) justice in war, (c) and justice before and after war. 
 
1.1. Justice of War (jus ad bellum) 
The Latin phrase, jus ad bellum, alludes to having the right conditions to go to war. There are a number of 
criteria for the justice of war: 
1. Just cause: 
Just cause is the most important and also the most challenging criterion of jus ad bellum. Some 
believe that nothing but self-defense can constitute just cause. However, there are a number of 
other causes asserted by different writers in the JWT that are believed to justify a war. Michael 
Farrell lists them as: 
• A nation’s territorial right is being threatened. 
• A nation violates international treaties and agreements. 
• A nation resorts to non-violent aggression (e.g. economic sanctions or embargos) 
• A nation declines to give right of passage or trading rights to other nations. 
• A nation does not punish its own members who have committed crimes against another 
state (Farrell 2013, 16). 
The “just cause” criterion would be excessively broad if it encompassed all of the sub-criteria 
listed above. In sum, the criterion of “just cause” is highly controversial because both sides of a 
dispute can claim that they have just cause and indeed each side may have some correct claims 
and some incorrect ones (Fisher 2011, 678). 
2. Right intention: 
The just cause needs to be accompanied by the right intention even if intentions are always mixed 
and not identifiable. The genuine intention of a state that launches a war should be towards just 
cause (Orend 2006, 46). 
3. Last resort 
War should be the last resort after all peaceful options have been exhausted and have failed 
(Orend 2000, 87). 
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4. Competent authority and public declaration: 
Only a competent authority can decide to go to war. Additionally, the decision of waging a war 
should be publicly declared both to the citizens of a state that launching the war and the enemy 
(Orend 2000, 87). 
5. Proportionality principle: 
A state that wages a war should assess the “expected universal benefits” (not only its own 
benefits) against the “expected universal cost” and consequences of war. A state should not go to 
war if the benefits are not proportionate to the costs (Orend 2006,59). 
6. Probability of success 
It is the responsibility of a state that wages a war to assess the probability of success before going 
to war. If the prospect of victory is low, it would not be acceptable to put lives at risk (Orend, 
2000, 87). 
 
1.2. Justice In War (jus in bello) 
“Justice in war” refers to following the rules for fighting (conventions of war) (Walzer 1977). These rules are 
classified into two categories:  first, external rules (how a state in war should treat the enemy state/non-state 
actor), and second, internal rules (how a state in war should treat its own citizens) (Orend 2006, 106). 
The external rules consist of: 
1. The Discrimination principle or non-combatant immunity: 
Non-combatants and civilians should not be deliberately harmed (Orend 2006, 112-115)1. Non-
combatant immunity encompasses the distinction between combatants/non-combatants, and 
between legitimate and illegitimate military targets (Kaufman 2007, 99). 
2. The Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) or collateral damage: 
Double-effect reasoning is at the heart of JWT. According to the doctrine of double effect, 
secondary harm to non-combatants and civilians is justifiable if it is not directly intended.  Walzer 
asserts that this doctrine needs correction and reformulation. In fact, if there is the possibility of a 
secondary effect, there should be a second intention and a responsibility to minimize and reduce 
the foreseeable harm (Walzer 1977, 153-6). 
3. Proportionality principle: 
There should be proportionality between means and ends in war (Farrell 2013:18). In other words, 
“Do not squash a squirrel with a tank, or swat a fly with a cannon” (Orend 2006, 119). 
                                                
1 Regarding intentionally killing the innocent, two approaches are recognizable in JWT: absolutism, which holds that the 
intentional killing of civilians is always wrong (“The Challenge of Peace”, National conference of Catholic Bishops, and Ramsey 
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4. No “means mala in se”: 
“Means mala in se" or “methods evil in themselves” refers to the means that are intrinsically 
terrible, like using rape as a tool of war (Orend 2006, 123). 
5. “Benevolent Quarantine” 
Prisoners of war (POWs) should not be exposed to any kind of torture. The letter and spirit of 
human rights should be respected in regards to captured enemy soldiers (Orend 2006, 110-111). 
The internal rules can be narrowed down to the state’s obligation to realize and practice its own citizens’ 
human rights during wartime (Orend 2006, 137). 
 
1.3. Justice Before War (jus ante bellum) & Justice After War (jus post bellum) 
The two stages of just ante-war and just post-war were added to the traditional literature of JWT. However, 
post-war, or “justice after war”, has attracted more attention than just ante-war (justice before war). Eric 
Patterson believes that JWT cannot be comprehensive without including “jus post-bellum” (Brough, Lango, 
and Van der Linden 2007, 49).  Brian Orend introduces three propositions for “jus post-bellum”: 
1. Roll back 
Any achievement by the aggressor should be taken back. For instance, the aggressor should 
withdraw from territories that it has occupied, and the sovereignty of the victim of aggression 
should be retained and respected (Orend 2006, 164-165). 
2. Two-fold punishment 
The aggressor should not only compensate the victims, but also should be held accountable in war 
crimes trials (Orend 2006, 165). 
3. Deterrence 
The aggressor may face deterrence measures such as demilitarization (especially WMD), political 
rehabilitation (a regime change), or creation of a demilitarized “buffer zone” between the victim 
and aggressor to reduce the threat that the aggressor may impose in the future (Orend 2006, 165-
169). Orend also draws attention to the proportionality principle in just post war by asserting that 
proportionality should be respected during demilitarization of the aggressor. In other words, 
demilitarization should not endanger the aggressor’s security and self-defense capabilities (Orend 
2006, 169). 
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Patterson summarizes the principles of jus post-bellum in the following stages: 
1. Order (stop killing), 
2. Justice (compensation and punishment), 
3. Reconciliation (Brough, Lango, and Van der Linden 2007, 39-41). 
Punishment has been largely neglected in the literature of JWT, although it has a significant role in deterring 
future wars. The Nuremberg Trial is a symbol of seeking justice after war (Brough, Lango, and Van der 
Linden 2007, 45) 
 
2. How Is the Theoretical Foundation of JWT Applicable to Studying Sanctions? 
The JWT is appropriately applicable to studying sanctions for two major reasons: 
 
a) The logic of judgment 
The “logic of judgement” of both war and sanctions is the same. 
Any judgment about justice in war and sanctions should distinguish, at the very least, between the 
two stages of (a) starting a war and  (b) conducting a war. This “logic of judgement” has been 
accurately developed in JWT. In fact, justice should be broken down into different stages and these 
should be assessed and judged independently. 
 
b) The criteria of justice 
There are “criteria of justice” both for war and sanctions. There is a relationship between war and 
sanctions (sanctions as an alternative to war, an extension of war, an option between waging war and 
exchanging harsh words). Hence, as there are “criteria of justice” for war, there are “criteria of 
justice” for sanctions as well. Since sanctions are not the same as war, the “criteria of justice” are not 
the same. Thus, it is wrong to apply war’s criteria of justice to sanctions, while these criteria would 
be useful in developing sanctions’ criteria of justice. In sum, JWT provides basic grounds for the 
development of JST. 
 
3. Just Sanctions Theory (JST): Operationalization of Key Concepts 
Just sanctions theory (JST) is constituted by three major stages, or three key concepts: (a) just authorization 
of sanctions, (b) just implementation of sanctions, and (c) just post-sanctions. 
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3.1. Just Authorization of Sanctions 
Although it is perhaps impossible to achieve perfect justice, just authorization of sanctions refers to the 
conditions under which authorizing sanctions approaches justice. Accordingly, there are criteria of justice to 
authorize sanctions: Comparative Just Cause, Right Objective, Last Resort, Proportionality in Authorization, 
High Possibility of Success, Legitimate Authorizer, Unambiguous Resolutions and Well-defined Termination 
Mechanisms and Requirements. Following, I provide further analysis of these sanctions factors. 
 
1) Comparative Just Cause 
Both the imposer and the target of sanctions can claim to have just causes. However, it is the 
responsibility of the sender to ensure it has the most just cause. The just causes of sanctions 
revolve around self-defense, facing sufficient threat and the breaking of international norms: 
• Self-defense (between and within states): 
The just cause of a sanction is valid when there is a real offense (Gordon 1999, 387-400). 
When there is a war of self-defense, resorting to sanctions along with military force would be 
justified. This set of rules are also the case when there is a real offense inside a country such 
as genocide or ethnic/religious cleansing. 
• Sufficient threat (preemptive self-defense): 
Authorization of sanctions is closer to justice when a state or a non-state entity becomes a 
sufficient threat. According to Walzer, “preemptive self-defense” is justified when there is a 
threat of war or what he calls “sufficient threat” (Walzer1977). He identifies three conditions 
which turn a threat into a sufficient threat: 
A. An apparent intention to harm; 
B. An active preparation which supports the intent to injure; 
C. A condition under which not taking countermeasures to diminish the threat would result in 
mounting danger (Walzer 1977). 
 
Walzer also outlines some examples of what conditions are not considered to be real threats: 
A. Military preparation (i.e. advancing and boosting of military forces); 
B. Blustering by enemies (Farrell 2013, 38). 
• International norm-breaker: 
When a state or non-state entity violates international treaties and agreements, it becomes an 
international norm-breaker which becomes therefore subject to sanctions. The apartheid 
regime in South Africa was a clear example of an international norm-breaking state. 
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2) Right Objective 
The just authorization of sanctions requires a right objective and intention although it is always 
difficult to identify mixed intentions. Sanctions are not always enacted based on a true claim, 
instead they are sometimes motivated by domestic and international interests. Despite the 
ineffectiveness of sanctions in many cases there is a strong tendency to use them. The American 
government frequently resorts to sanctions as an instrument of domestic policy and foreign policy. 
By implementing sanctions, U.S. politicians acquire domestic support and also present strong 
leadership on the international scene, both at a low cost(Whang September 2011, 787-801) 
..Sanctions with a right objective and a wrong intention are definitely not just; however, sanctions 
with a right objective and right intentions are not necessarily just. Right objective and intention 
constitutes only one of the criteria of the “just authorization of sanctions”. 
The right objectives and intentions of the authorization of sanctions are 
a) Promotion of human rights; 
b) Restoration of peace and security. 
Additionally, there are some objectives that are not right: 
• Regime change: 
The political system of each state is something that is decided by the citizens of that state. A 
regime change is not a right objective of the authorization of sanctions even if paired with a 
right intention. 
• Balance of power change: 
Changing the balance of power at regional and international levels is not considered to be a 
right objective of the authorization of sanctions. 
 
 
3) Last Resort 
Are sanctions being considered only after other less drastic means are used to resolve the issues or 
disputes at hand?  The definition of appealing to sanctions as a last resort suggests “the imposition 
of sanctions must be preceded by other, less-coercive instruments (Amstutz 2005, 188). There are 
other options before resorting to sanctions. These include: diplomacy, covert measures, incentive 
measures, legal referrals and threats of the use of military force or sanctions. In general, the states’ 
tools can be graded as: “secret diplomacy, speeches, public condemnations, mild sanctions, 
comprehensive sanctions, and military action.” (Amstutz 2005) 
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4) Proportionality in Authorization 
There are two fundamental questions regarding proportionality in sanctions: (1) what is 
proportionality about? , (2) how should proportionality be measured? 
In general, proportionality is one of the most unclear criteria in international law, particularly 
when it comes to sanctions. . The rule of proportionality suffers from “inherent indeterminacy ” 
(Cannizzaro 2001, 916). The UNSC has not paid enough attention and consideration to 
International law norms and standards, especially the proportionality norm, in appealing to the 
sanctions tool (Reisman and Stevick 1998, 126). Only the two cases of Haiti and Iraq sanctions 
regimes and their humanitarian consequences triggered the UNSC to review the proportionality 
and discrimination standards in enforcing sanctions (Reisman  and Stevick 1998, 126). 
Mary Ellen O’Connell, Professor, Moritz College of Law and the Mershon Center for 
International Security and Public Policy Studies, Ohio State University, identifies two 
weaknesses of countermeasures proportionality in appealing to the sanctions tool: 
a) Indeterminacy of proportionality (at the time of sanctions authorization); 
b) Retaining proportionality (during sanctions implementation) (O'Connell 2002, 63-79, 77). 
Thus, not only is there no legally agreed upon framework for identifying proportionality in 
appealing to the sanctions tool, but also there is also always a risk of losing proportionality 
during the implementation of sanctions. Consequently, there is a need for a mechanism to 
hold the responding party in their commitment to appeal to sanctions when it is by all 
means an equivalent tool to committed wrongs and also a mechanism for maintaining 
proportionality during the implementation. 
 
In spite of these indeterminacies, it is suggested that proportionality in the authorization of 
sanctions is based on the following definition, logic, and measurability: 
a) Definition: 
Proportionality refers to the equivalence between the breached rule/norm and its 
consequences on one hand and the nature and scope of the countermeasures on the other 
(Cannizzaro 2001, 891). The proportionality rule constrains the responding actor’s 
countermeasures from surpassing the magnitude of the original violation. In fact, 
“proportionality would require that the intensity of constraint be appropriate to the gravity 
of the breach” (Cannizzaro 2001, 894). 
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b) Logic: 
The standard of countermeasure proportionality is unconnected with standards of 
effectiveness (O’ Connell 2002, 78). Therefore, it would be unjust to authorize or 
implement sanctions disproportionately in order to increase their effectiveness. In other 
words, sanctions may be authorized and implemented disproportionately in order to be 
effective and successful. But in such an instance, they would no longer be just. 
c) Measurability: 
Proportionality can be measured against (a) wrongdoing/violation, and/or (b) hypothetical 
threat. 
Proportionality is measurable against a wrongdoing or a violation but not against a 
hypothetical threat.   In fact, it is possible to measure proportionality between a wrong and 
a countermeasure, but proportionality would be irrelevant when a countermeasure is 
adopted against a hypothetical threat. For instance, any countermeasure that could deter the 
threat of nuclear war would be acceptable. Thus, it is important to examine the narratives of 
both sides’ as well as other criteria of justice (in particular comparative just cause) in order 
to verify the validity of the threat and ultimately the proportionality of a countermeasure. 
Proportionality is not only about the respondent’s chosen means (countermeasures), but 
also the respondent’s aims. In other words, proportionality is measured by equivalent 
countermeasures (means) to the breach and the respondent’s aims in accordance with both 
the chosen means and the aim itself2 (Cannizzaro 2001, 891). For instance, if someone 
slaps another person’s face, it would be disproportionate if the respondent shot the other in 
the head (disproportionate means). Likewise, if a driver violates the driving rules by driving 
through a red light, it would be disproportionate if the police put the violator in jail 
(disproportionate means, but connected aims), Furthermore, it would be disproportionate if 
the police impounds his educational diploma (inappropriate and unconnected aim)3. Thus, 
the proportionality principle encourages the respondent to aim for seeking compliance with 
the breached rule and/or norm and not seeking its own interests or motivations (Cannizzaro 
2001, 893). 
 
5) High Possibility of Success (Sanctions Efficacy) 
                                                
2 The common understanding of “proportionality” is based on the link between the means and aims of the responder, however it is important that 
the aim itself be appropriate in the context of the breached rule (Cannizzaro 2001, 897) 
3 Cannizzaro claims that the case of hostage taking by Iran after the Islamic revolution is an example of disproportionate countermeasures as 
acknowledged by the International Court of Justice. The act of taking US diplomatic and consular staff as hostage by Iran was not a proportionate 
response to the U.S. interference in Iran’s domestic affairs (Cannizzaro 2001, 898).  
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A high possibility of success should be predictable before resorting to the sanctions tool. 
Sanctions’ success depends on many elements including the following factors: 
a) Core objective of sanctions 
The possibility of sanctions’ success is higher when their core objective is minor rather 
than major, whereas the target’s resistance would be greater in the face of fundamental 
changes or demands 4(Amstutz 2005). 
b) Number of sanctioners 
The greater the number of sanctioners there is, the higher the possibility that sanctions 
would be achievable. In other words, international and multilateral sanctions would be 
more efficient than unilateral sanctions. (Amstutz 2005). 
c) Type of sanctions 
Comprehensive sanctions have more of a possibility of success than targeted sanctions 
unless targeted sanctions would be in place along with other types of targeted sanctions or 
in the framework of comprehensive sanctions (Hufbauer and Oegg 2000). 
d) Type of target regime 
As a general rule, the possibility of the success of sanctions is more likely when they are 
imposed on democratic regimes rather than autocratic governments (Amstutz 2005). 
Robert A. Pape, an American political scientist, claims that the main reason for the failure 
of sanctions is the modern state itself, since modern states are not fragile. He argues that 
the nature of the target regime is far more important than sanctioners and the cooperation 
among them when it comes to sanctions’ success., It was so in the case of  Iraq’s sanction 
regime. It was not defeated by sanctions even when sanctions eliminated 48 percent of its 
GNP (Pape 1997, 106). 
The personality and psychology of the target regime’s leaders is also a critical factor in 
calculating the possibility of the success of sanctions, particularly in regimes in which 
individual political leaders have prominent and major roles. 
e) Ability of the target to circumvent sanctions 
The possibility of sanctions’ success is higher when the target is unable to circumvent 
sanctions. On the contrary, targets with high ability of adjustment, a diverse economy, and 
capability to circumvent sanctions would hinder the possibility of sanctions’ success. 
f) Symmetric issue perception 
                                                
4 According to Mark Amstutz, Professor of political science at Wheaton College, the political success of economic sanctions depends on three 
factors: (a) the type of sanctioned government (b) the issues- that sanctions are imposed to, and (c) multilateral support (Amstutz 2005). 
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The degree of saliency of the issues of dispute for both the sanctioner(s) and the target(s) 
of sanctions is an important factor of success. Adrian U-Jin Ang and Dursun Peksen claim 
in their article entitled “When Do Economic Sanctions Work? Asymmetric Perceptions, 
Issue Salience, and Outcomes”, that symmetric issue perception is a condition under 
which economic sanctions work (Adrian U-Jin Ang and Peksen 2007, 135-145). For 
instance, the dismantling of the apartheid regime in South Africa was the objective of UN 
sanctions.  These sanctions were perceived as a symmetric issue or problem because 
apartheid was rejected both within the target state and outside it in the international 
community. Apartheid was a serious problem for the 80% of the South African population 
who were Black before it became a problem to be dealt with by the international 
community. Political parties and movements in South Africa such as the ANC called for 
comprehensive but not prolonged, sanctions. Moreover, religious institutions and non-
racial church groups such as the South African Council of Churches (SACC) and the 
Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference (SACBC), demanded conditional 
disinvestment (Orkin 1989, 8-11). To wit, apartheid had issue saliency both inside South 
Africa and in the international community.5 This symmetric issue perception in South 
Africa made UN sanctions more justifiable as well as more successful. 
 
6) Legitimate Authorizer 
The authorizer of the legitimacy of sanctions depends on the type of sanction(s) implemented: (a) 
International, (b) Unilateral, and (c) Secondary or Extraterritorial. 
a) International Sanctions 
From a legal perspective, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the sole 
competent authority to authorize international sanctions. However, one should not 
overlook the fact that the UN has its own flaws (Fisher 2011, 68). The current structure of 
the UN is corrupt, unaccountable, and highly influenced by the US (Gordon 2007, 59-77). 
Gordon asserts that UN sanctions on Iraq were basically a US proposal to the UN under 
the name of global governance(Gordon 2009, 358-9). She believes that the role of the UN 
in implementing sanctions on Iraq under the pressure of the US was the “legalization of 
atrocity” (Gordon 2010). 
                                                
5 Joy Gordon asserts that South Africa should not be taken as a typical case of sanctions. In fact, in almost all aspects, South Africa 
was unlike any case of sanctions. While in many cases the implementation of sanctions goes against the will of the target state and 
population and reinforces nationalism, in South Africa the majority of the black population supported sanctions and the 
implementation of sanctions resulted in greater international solidarity with South Africa’s Black population ( C.	Joy	Gordon,	
"Economic	Sanctions	and	Global	Governance:	The	Case	of	Iraq,"	Global	Crime	10,	no.	4	(2009),	356-367).	 
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Even when international sanctions are authorized by the UNSC, the legitimacy of its 
process should be taken into account as well. In fact, there is still the question of whether 
the authorization of international sanctions has been based on the will and priorities of a 
few states, or an international consensus (Chesterman and Pouligny 2003, 503-518). 
Hence, assessing the UNSC’s competence in authorizing international sanctions needs to 
consider the following factors: 
• Political context of the UNSC; 
• Sanctions Committee’s procedure and transparency. 
In sum, in spite of the UNSC failure to act properly in some sanctions cases, these failures 
should not open up a moral space for imposing international sanctions outside the 
framework of the UN. Rather, it should attract attention to the urgent need for UN 
reforms. 
 
Once an international sanctions regime has been authorized by the UNSC, all Member 
States are legally bound to follow the decisions of the UNSC. However, Member States 
may follow the UNSC sanctions in two different ways: 
• Authorize sanctions within the UNSC framework 
• Authorize sanctions based on a broad interpretation of the UNSC resolution(s) 
All Member States would be legitimate authorizers of sanctions if they authorized sanctions 
within the UNSC framework. However, they would have less legitimacy if they authorized 
sanctions based on a broad interpretation of the UNSC resolution(s). 
 
b) Unilateral Sanctions 
Any country has the right to impose sanctions on another country based on its own 
national interests. However, the unilateral sanctions should be restrained, not excessive. In 
fact, unilateral sanctions fall into the following two categories in which the authorizer’s 
legitimacy differs: 
• restrained 
Unilateral restrained sanctions refer to diplomatic relations interruption and banning trade. 
Every sovereign state would be a legitimate authorizer of unilateral restrained sanctions. 
• Excessive 
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Unilateral excessive sanctions refer to banning goods and services which endanger target 
civilians’ lives. No sovereign state would be a legitimate authorizer of unilateral excessive 
sanctions. 
 
c) Secondary or Extraterritorial Sanctions 
Secondary or extraterritorial sanctions refer to “economic restrictions designed to deter 
third-country actors from supporting a primary target of unilateral sanctions”  (Meyer 
2009,  906). According to Andreas Lowenfeld, “[i]n a secondary boycott, state A says that 
if X, a national of state C, trades with state B [the primary sanctions target], X may not 
trade with or invest in A.” (Lowenfeld 1996, 419- 429). As a general rule, all the national 
legislations should be territorial, otherwise they would violate the international laws’ 
principles (Mohamad 2015, 71). Consequently, no single state would be a legitimate 
authorizer of unilateral sanctions with extraterritorial applications or what is called 
secondary sanctions. Extraterritorial sanctions are condemned by the international 
community, in particular by the UN General Assembly Resolutions (Clark and Wang 
2007, 7-8). In one of the resolutions, the UN General Assembly calls for: 
“the immediate repeal of unilateral extraterritorial laws that impose sanctions on 
companies and nationals of other States; (The UN General Assembly Resolution 
A/RES/51/22 December 6, 1996, para. 2). 
Moreover, it calls upon “all States not to recognize unilateral 
extraterritorial coercive economic measures or legislative acts 
imposed by any State;” 6(The UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/51/22 December 





7) Unambiguous Resolutions 
                                                
6 The UN General Assembly’s criticism of extraterritorial sanctions had been particularly targeting the US sanctions against Cuba (Clark and 
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Sanctions should be authorized with full clarity in declaring the (a) causes, (b) objectives, and (c) 
measures of sanctions. Additionally, the language of sanctions’ resolution/document should not 
be vague, contain undefined terms, or non-evidentiary requirements. 
In sum, an unambiguous sanctions resolution/document would hinder any misinterpretation, auto-
interpretation, and consequently the authorization and implementation of expanded sanctions 
beyond the original framework. 
 
8) Well-defined Termination Mechanism and Requirement 
The sanctions resolution/documents should clearly define: 
a) How (Mechanism); and 
b) Under what condition (Requirements) 
sanctions would be lifted. 
It would be unjust to set “imprecise mechanisms” and/or “immeasurable requirements” for the 
termination of authorized sanctions. Any deficit in this regard would pave the way for open-
ended sanctions being implemented. 
Another way to avoid an open-ended implementation of sanctions is to authorize sanctions in a 
renewable format. In other words, a sequential reassessment of sanctions is required to assure 
whether sanctions should still be in place or not. 
In 2000, the UN established an informal working group to develop sanctions’ efficacy and 
design. One of the most controversial debates in the UN informal group was about the 
sanctions termination mechanism. In fact, the members of the informal working group were 
divided in supporting one of the following termination mechanisms: 
a) Open-ended sanctions; 
Sanctions should be open-ended until a new resolution is passed; 
b) Renewable sanctions; 
Sanctions should be authorized for a definite period of time and if they are to be renewed, 
another resolution should be passed (Weschler 2009, 40-42). 
The proponents of the first mechanism, including the U.S., argued that sanctions should be 
in place as long as the target state does not change its behavior. They were also concerned 
about the risk of veto during sanctions renewal periods. In contrast, the opponents of the 
first mechanism, including France, argued that sanctions should always be authorized for a 
specific period of time to meet the standard of ethics and morality (Weschler 2009, 40-42). 
The sanctions on Iraq is a clear example of how open-ended and ill-designed sanctions can 
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result in years of sanctions implementation as occurred after Saddam Hussain’s rule was 
toppled. 
In spite of the disagreement among the UN informal working group, the UN has been 
authorizing both open-ended and renewable sanctions. The following pattern explains the 
UN behavior in this matter: 
a) Global security; 
When the issue of sanctions is global security, for instance nonproliferation and 
counterterrorism, the UN has authorized sanctions in an open-ended framework. 
b) Conflict management; 
When the issue of sanctions is conflict management the UN has authorized sanctions in a 
renewable framework (Weschler 2009, 40-42). 
 
3.2. Just Implementation of Sanctions 
The just implementation of sanctions deals with the conditions under which the implementation of 
sanctions would be closer to a just implementation. These conditions are classified under principles 
and mechanisms including: Target Discrimination Principle, Civilian Immunity Principle, 
Proportionality Principle, Prospect of Success Principle, Negotiation Principle, Monitoring and 
Evaluation Mechanism, and Judicial Review Mechanism. Accordingly, the just implementation of 
sanctions should not violate a set of principles and at the same time require special mechanisms. 
 
1) Target Discrimination Principle 
The centerpiece of Just Implementation of Sanctions is that civilians should be immune to the 
impacts of sanctions. Accordingly, the core of both the Target Discrimination Principle and the 
Civilian Immunity Principle is the same. But they have been magnified separately due to the 
controversial debates around the differences between targeted and comprehensive sanctions and 
how targeted sanctions are identified as more humane. 
A targeted sanction “means applying pressure on specific decision-making elites and the companies 
or entities they control” (Cortright and Lopez 2002, 2). According to this definition, “targeted 
sanctions are actor- and issue-oriented” in which specific individuals, commodities and sectors are 
carefully selected. In contrast, comprehensive sanctions are “broad-based and state- and society-
oriented” (Eriksson 2011, 3). Targeted sanctions are also called “smart sanctions”. Hufbauer and 
Oegg believe that smart sanctions are like "smart bombs". Only those individuals, elites and 
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decision-makers who are responsible and specific sectors under their control are being targeted 
(Hufbauer and Oegg 2000). 
 
According to the Target Discrimination Principle, the implementation of sanctions would be unjust 
under the following circumstances: 
a) Comprehensive implementation of targeted sanctions 
It would be an unjust implementation of sanctions if the sanctions that were authorized to be 
targeted to reduce the inhumane impacts of sanctions were actually implemented 
comprehensively. In fact, a comprehensive implementation implies that the impacts of targeted 
sanctions go well-beyond the sanctioned target (Population-wide impacts). For instance, when 
Iran’s shipping lines were targeted, it was not only Iran’s shipping companies that were affected 
by the sanctions, but also the whole trading system. Consequently, civilians’ access to all goods 
were affected as well. Thus, the targeted authorization of sanctions on Iran’s shipping lines was 
comprehensively implemented. The comprehensive implementation of targeted sanctions 
contradicts the primary logic of authorizing targeted sanctions because they harm the civilian 
population. Comprehensive sanctions are therefore unjust by definition. 
Targeted sanctions with targeted implementation are more just. In most cases, targeted sanctions 
against individuals do not have comprehensive implementation, nor impacts in other fields or  on 
civilian lives. 
 
b) Sanctions implementation curbs access to humanitarian goods, e.g. food, medication, medical 
equipment and services 
It would be an unjust implementation of sanctions if the sanctions implementation either directly 
or indirectly impedes target’s access to humanitarian goods. For instance sanctions against Iran 
were not directly targeting medication and medical equipment, but Iranian access to medication 
was curbed indirectly due to sanctions on banking system and financial transactions. 
c) Sanctions implementation curbs the right to development 
The development of a country is driven by its infrastructures, human resources, technology, 
telecommunications and banking (Manchak 2010,  433). Therefore, harming these pillars of 
development would result in curbing a country’s right to development. For instance, the U.S. 
protracted sanctions on Cuba “directly violate (d) Cuba’s right to development” (Manchak 2010, 
434). The sanctions hit Cuba’s banking system and cut it off from the modern trading system. 
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Additionally, they weakened Cuba’s technological progress, human resources cultivating process 
and functioning of its infrastructure (Manchak 2010, 434). 
d) Sanctions implementation destroys targets’ infrastructures 
Similar to rules of just war in which it is prohibited to attack non-military targets and to destroy 
civilian facilities (for instance a food factory instead of artillery), it would be unjust to demolish a 
country’s infrastructure by implementing sanctions. Target Discrimination Principle refers to the 
necessity to discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate targets in sanctions. 
 
2) Civilian Immunity Principle 
It is central to Just Implementation of Sanctions that civilians should not be harmed by the 
implementation of sanctions. This notion is assessed through invoking two principles: the Target 
Discrimination Principle, and the Civilian Immunity Principle. The focus of the Target 
Discrimination Principle is on the specific impacts of sanctioning on each one of the targets. The 
Civilian Immunity Principle’s attention is on the impacts of sanctions as a package, specifically as 
they affect civilians’ daily lives. It focuses on how the implementation of sanctions may impact the 
target population’s economic system, public health system, educational system, culture and 
environment. 
3) Proportionality Principle 
Not only should sanctions be authorized proportionately, but also proportionality should be 
maintained during the implementation of sanctions. Therefore, the implementation of sanctions 
should be monitored and adjusted for the purpose of retaining proportionality. For instance, if the 
UN’s comprehensive sanctions against Iraq, due to its invasion of Kuwait, were initially 
proportionate, they ceased to be proportionate when the reason for sanctions changed from invasion 
to the allegation of possession of WMD. The sweeping sanctions could have been adjusted to 
lessen countermeasures such as arms embargos to retain proportionality(O'Connell 2002, 63-79, 
78). 
 
Proportionality in implementation of sanctions includes the following definition, logic and 
measurability: 
a) Definition: 
Proportionality during sanctions implementation refers to maintaining equivalence between the 
countermeasures and their impacts as well as the original and additional committed wrongs. In 
other words, “measures must remain proportional to the original wrong. Only when the 
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wrongdoer commits new wrongs may more or different measures be taken” (O’ Connell 2002, 
77). Furthermore, the scope of inflicted harm on the target is central to the Proportionality 
Principle during sanctions implementation. Reisman and Stevick suggest, “collateral damage, as 
part of general damage, must also be proportional” (Reisman and Stevick 1998, 131) 
b) Logic: 
The logic of proportionality is the same both in the authorization and implementation of 
sanctions. The standard of countermeasure proportionality is unconnected with standards of 
effectiveness (O’ Connell 2002, 78). Therefore, it would be unjust to implement sanctions 
disproportionately in order to increase effectiveness. 
c) Measurability: 
Proportionality in time of sanctions implementation could be measured against (a) original and 
additional wrong/violation, (b) hypothetical threat, (c) inflicted harm on the target (intended and 
collateral damage). 
 
There are challenges to maintaining proportionality during the implementation of sanctions: 
a) Broad interpretation 
Even if sanctions were authorized proportionately, any broad interpretation during the 
implementation could expand the scope of injury. Consequently, the possibility of losing 
proportionality would increase. 
b) Prolonged implementation 
Even if sanctions were authorized proportionately, a prolonged implementation of sanctions could 
increase the possibility of more injury and lose proportionality. 
 
 
4) Prospect of Success Principle 
Even if sanctions were authorized in a just manner, they would be far from just if kept in place 
when there is no prospect of success. 
The Prospect of Success Principle during the implementation of sanctions is assessable against the 
general objectives of sanctions. The general objectives of sanctions are: 
a) Coercion 
Sanctions are meant to coerce the target to change its behavior. The focus of the traditional 
approach to sanctions is only on the coercion objective of sanctions (Biersteker and others 
2012, 10). 
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b) Constraint 
Sanctions are meant to constrain the target from prohibited activity. 
c) Signaling and stigmatizing 
Sanctions are meant to stigmatize the target and send a signal to the target and other actors 
about the consequences of a wrong/violation. 
(Biersteker and others 2012, 7-14). 
 
5) Negotiation Principle 
The implementation of sanctions should not prevent negotiation opportunities. Sanctions as 
leverage should promote negotiations (Himes February 28, 1997). 
 
6) Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism 
The implementation of sanctions would be more just if a monitoring and evaluation mechanism 
constantly watched and assessed the impact of sanctions on their target. It is the responsibility of 
sanctioners to establish a monitoring mechanism on their own initiatives, and accordingly adjust 
sanctions to reduce humanitarian harms and collateral damage. A monitoring mechanism that 
merely oversees the violation of sanctions and is mandated to promote the efficacy of sanctions is 
insufficient. 
In sum, a monitoring system to assess the consequences of sanctions is essential (Himes 1997). The 
existence of such a mechanism could ensure that sanctions would be more compatible with the 
fundamental humanitarian principle (Momtaz 2009, 348). 
 
7) Judicial Review Mechanism 
The implementation of sanctions would be more just if targeted individuals’ and entities’ rights to 
due process were recognized and practiced. Sanctioners are responsible to ensure that the targeted 
individuals’ and entities’ rights are protected by establishing or designating an independent, 
impartial and transparent judicial review mechanism. 
 
3.3. Just Post-Sanctions 
Just Post Sanctions refers to conditions under which the termination of sanctions would be more just. 
This topic is not expanded upon in this research project due to the limitation of this thesis. But since 
Iran and P5+1 were able to reach the nuclear deal in 2015, and some of the sanctions were lifted in 
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2016, I have devoted a section to “compliance” criterion in the conclusion chapter. I anticipate that Just 
Post-Sanctions will be my next research topic, after completing my Ph.D. 
In general, Just Post-Sanctions roughly encompasses the following criteria: 
1. Compliance 
Sanctions are lifted through a designated mechanism. An example would be, for instance  a new 
UNSC Resolution or  reaching the time period, sanctioner(s)should comply with the agreed upon time 
of termination of sanctions. It would be unjust to keep sanctions in place or hinder and delay the 
termination process. 
2. Compensation and Punishment 
The authorizer(s) and/or implementer(s) of unjust sanctions should be held accountable in an 
international tribunal. They should be recognized as “wrongdoer(s)” and be ordered to compensate 
the damages inflicted on the target and victims of unjust sanctions. 
3. Proportionality 
The punishment and compensation should be proportionate to the inflicted harm on the target. 
4. Deterrence 
Necessary deterrence measures should be adopted to avoid the authorization and implementation of 
unjust sanctions in the future. 
5. Collateral damage responsibility 
Regardless of the justness of the authorization and implementation of sanctions, sanctioner(s) should 
accept the responsibility of addressing collateral damages to the target. For instance, if sanctions were 
affecting the educational system of the target, it would be more just if sanctioner(s) take part in 
resituating or protecting the educational system. 
 
4. Contribution and Innovation According to the Existing Literature Review 
The contribution of this research to the current literature7 and policy implications are classified in three 
categories: (a) Methodological and theoretical contributions, (b) General contributions, and (c) 
Contributions to studies about Iran. 
a) Methodological and theoretical contribution 
This research will make a methodological and theoretical contribution by adjusting JWT for sanctions 
and developing a Just Sanctions Theory (JST) framework. The JST framework is an adjusted method 
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for analyzing and judging  different types of sanctions. Some scholars, such as Joy Gordon8 (Gordon 
1999, 387-400), Adam Winkler9 (Winkler 1999, 133-155), and Albert C. Pierce10 (Pierce 1996, 99-
113), have applied just war criteria to assess sanctions.  Although their works are useful and open up 
a new perspective from which to analyze sanctions, they do not go beyond the JWT framework and 
do not modify its criteria in accordance with sanctions. In this framework, sanctions would be just if 
they met the same criteria of JWT 
I believe that applying the JWT framework to sanctions requires modified methods because: 
Sanctions are not war. 
Applying war’s justice criteria to sanctions inaccurately implies that sanctions are similar to war in 
the sense that the same assessment tools would be sufficient to evaluate both war and sanctions. I 
believe that there is enough similarity between war and sanctions to allow us to adopt a JWT 
framework. But there are also enough differences that we must modify JWT in order to accurately 
apply it to sanctions. Although studies that have applied non-adjusted JWT to sanctions are inspiring, 
at the same time their work can lead to a misleading analysis of sanctions by ignoring the differences 
between sanctions and war. 
I would like to not only adjust JWT, but also to propose a comprehensive assessment framework for 
sanctions based on both (a) stages (authorization, implementation, and post-termination) and (b) 
criteria. Some scholars have conducted limited adjustments to JWT and applied these to sanctions. 
This step is a valuable methodological one, but it still has a long way to go before reaching a 
comprehensive assessment framework for sanctions due to the following reasoning: 
● Inadequacy of limited modified criteria 
                                                
8 Joy Gordon has published a series of articles and books mainly focused on the inhumane impacts of UN sanctions against Iraq. In her article 
entitled “Economic Sanctions, Just War Doctrine, And the Fearful Spectacle of the Civilian Dead”, she specifically points out just war tradition 
and concludes that UN sanctions against Iraq have violated both the “just of war” and “just in war” principles (Gordon 1999). However, she does 
not do any modification to just war principles; she chooses a few criteria of just war tradition, such as the existence of real danger, the possibility 
of success, proportionality and civilian immunity, that she believes have all been violated in the UN sanctions on Iraq (Gordon 1999).  
9 Adam Winkler, in an article entitled “Just Sanctions”, tries to examine the morality of sanctions by appealing to just war tradition. He concludes 
that we could have just sanctions if sanctions were limited to arms embargoes, diplomatic sanctions, and freezing of foreign assets, and do not 
extend to total embargoes. Winkler also asserts that economic incentives, along with limited sanctions, can facilitate the implementation of just 
sanctions (Winkler 1999:154-5). Yet, similar to Gordon, he picks a few criteria of just war tradition and applies them to sanctions without 
modification or refinement of JWT. In fact, in Winkler’s point of view, sanctions would be just if they met three criteria of just war tradition: just 
cause, right intention, and non-combatant immunity. However, he addresses an important pitfall in assessing sanctions by pointing to the 
necessity of the existence of “an international sanctions organization”. He claims that such an organization should be established to increase the 
morality, acceptability, and effectiveness of sanctions (Winkler 1999, 154). In sum, Winkler does not propose a new assessing framework for 
sanctions rather than JWT criteria. 
10 Albert C. Pierce (Just War Principles and Economic Sanctions 1996) studies the violation of the discrimination principle in economic 
sanctions in the case of Haiti by referring to studies that have been conducted by Lori Fisler Damrosch's and Michael Walzer. Gerard F. Powers 
and Jack T. Patterson, in two different chapters in a book entitled Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peace building in a post-Cold War World?. 
They respectively focus on the civilian immunity principle of JWT to morally assess the economic sanctions and appeal to Christiansen to 
evaluate the suitability of sanctions (Cortright	and	Lopez,	1995).	 
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Most of the studies that have modified JWT for sanctions revolve around a few selected JWT criteria, 
mainly “just cause” and the “civilian immunity principle”. For instance, Laurie Fisler Damrosch, a 
legal scholar, identifies merely three criteria for economic sanctions to be appropriate:(1) Civilian 
impact: economic sanctions should not bring the living standard below the survival level; (2) 
Wrongdoer impact: economic sanctions should be targeted to those who are responsible (the 
wrongdoers);(3) Wrongdoer/civilian impact: economic sanctions should not let wrongdoers be 
enriched at the expense of civilians (Fisler Damrosch 1993, 281–283). 
Even though the JWT selected criteria are adjusted for sanctions, limited criteria would be inadequate for 
analyzing sanctions, especially when no new criterion other than modified JWT criteria are introduced. 
● No recognition of Judgment stages 
Some scholars have noticed the necessity of JWT criteria modification, but have overlooked the 
importance of differentiated judgment stages in studying sanctions. I believe that one of the most 
critical and inspiring analytical points of JWT (and one which is properly applicable to sanctions), is 
the existence of differentiated judgment stages (justice of, justice in, and justice after war). For 
instance, theologian Kenneth Himes proposes seven criteria for assessing the moral legitimacy of 
economic sanctions in general11 (Himes 1997). In their respective endeavors of adjusting JWT criteria 
for sanctions, the different stages of authorization and enforcement of sanctions are not recognized. I 
believe that it is extremely important to notice the logically independent character of the judgment 
stages in order to have a systematic analysis of sanctions. In other words, it is important to note that 
just authorized sanctions can be implemented unjustly or unjust authorized sanctions can be 
implemented in accordance with the rules. In sum, judgment stages are as important as criteria of 
justice. Thus, I have tried to add to the value of the conducted studies by stressing this systematic 
angle. 
• Narrow framework 
Some scholars have recognized the judgment stages and the necessity to provide moral and legal 
standards for sanctions. Unfortunately, their suggested framework is still narrow.  Mark Amstutz 
allocates seven modified JWT criteria under two stages of “just of sanctions” and “ just in 
                                                
11 Theologian Kenneth Himes criticizes the dominant literature about sanctions, which mostly revolves around the question of whether sanctions 
work. He believes it is necessary to establish criteria for sanctions implementation. Based on just war tradition, he proposes seven criteria for 
assessing the moral legitimacy of economic sanctions:  (1) sanctions should not be implemented without good reason, such as aggression or 
repression by the wrongdoing nation; (2) sanctions should always come with negotiation and after the employment of less harmful means; (3) the 
objectives should be clearly stated, so the condition of lifting sanctions is clear (in reality, senders usually have policy shifts); (4) sanctions should 
follow the principle of discrimination and target people who are responsible for the crisis. Selective sanctions should come first and undermining 
the well-being of the average citizen must be avoided; (5) monitoring systems are required to evaluate the effects of sanctions -- human-rights 
groups such as the International Red Cross and Red Crescent can take this responsibility; (6) if sanctions are imposed for humanitarian causes, the 
sanctions should be supported by the victims of the target state (e.g. South Africa); and (7) sanctions should be implemented by the UN or 
regional groups and if they are carried out unilaterally, they require a persuasive argument (Himes 1997). 
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sanctions”12. His introduced framework is a valuable step forward, but it still requires more expansion. 
Additionally, it is important to note that if a just sanctions doctrine is to be introduced, it requires new 
criteria, not only the modification of the same criteria of JWT. 
 
In sum, I will make a methodological and theoretical contribution, not only by adjusting JWT, but also by 
proposing a comprehensive analytical framework (which encompasses both stages and criteria) to assess 
sanctions. 
 
b) General contribution 
Most studies about JWT and sanctions revolve around illustrating the inhumane impacts of economic 
or comprehensive sanctions. I will add to the value of what has been done so far by going beyond the 
humanitarian dimension of a single type of sanction. 
● Beyond the humanitarian dimension 
My research is not confined by morality and a humanitarian approach; it encompasses security studies 
and a global governance dilemma as well. The related works, such as studies that have been 
conducted by Joy Gordon (1999), Reisman W, Stevick D (1998) Adam Winkler (1999), Albert C. 
Pierce (1996), Gerard F. Powers and Jack T. Patterson (in Cortright, Lopez 1995), Mark R. Amstutz 
(2013), and Nema Milaninia ( 2015) mostly examine the morality and inhumane impacts of sanctions 
by appealing to JWT. Or, in accordance with International law standards, they including International 
Humanitarian Law. The main factor that guides my research beyond the humanitarian dimension is 
the uniqueness of my case study.  The intense and global nature of the imposed sanctions on Iran is 
unprecedented in history. Its uniqueness arises out of the terms of the large number of states imposing 
sanctions and the broad scope of the sanctions being implemented. In addition, the main cause of the 
imposed sanctions, Iran’s nuclear program - a so-called threat to global peace and security - brings 
security studies and global governance into my research.  By integrating them into my framework of 
analysis, I further enrich the JST analytical framework. 
 
● Beyond mono-type sanctions 
In almost all of the studies listed above, various types of sanctions are overshadowed by the 
dominance of economic sanctions. I believe that a comprehensive JST framework will permit me to 
                                                
12 Mark R. Amstutz, in one of the chapters of his book International Ethics: Concepts, Theories, and Cases in Global Politics (“Morality of 
Sanctions”), applies JWT to economic sanctions. Although he introduces the just sanctions doctrine in this chapter, he actually adopts seven main 
principles of JWT and applies them to economic sanctions with limited modifications. According to this chapter, the just sanctions doctrine 
consists of seven principles:  just cause, right intention, limited objectives, last resort and probability of success, which constitute “just of 
sanctions”, and discrimination and proportionality, the two criteria for “just in sanctions” (Amstutz 2013).  
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take better account of the range of different types of sanctions available or in play. In particular, I will 
develop analytical processes for assessing targeted sanctions which have flooded the recent literature 
on sanctions. It is claimed that they mitigate the inhumane impacts of sanctions, a claim that needs to 
be carefully analyzed and perhaps challenged. I hope to offer deeper insight by making targeted 
sanctions the central focus of my research. Sanctions on Iran are a mixture of all types of sanctions, 
which provide me with adequate empirical data. 
 
c) Contribution to studies on Iran 
My research is a new contribution to studies on Iran.  In particular, my analysis of sanctions on Iran 
and on relations between Iran and major powers from an adjusted framework of JST, will provide a 
new perspective for assessing them. This step is considered innovative since studies about Iran in the 
context of JWT have been conducted in other areas such as preventive war on Iran (Schwartz 2008, 
189)13 and the possible military action against Iran’s nuclear sites (O’Brien and Koons 2012, 655-
703)14. Moreover, as I aim to reflect on the narratives both from inside Iran and from the international 
community, I will contribute to a more balanced analytical assessment of the justice of sanctions on 
Iran. I will also provide deeper understanding of Iran’s relationship with the international community. 
I hope that my research provides a new and systematic analytical framework to assess all sanctions, 
including the most unprecedented sanctions in history: Iran’s sanctions regime. 
 
Importance 
There is a need for a sanctions standard or sanctions law. “No Charter provision 
specifically spells out any standard for the proper application of sanctions” (O’ Connell 
2002, 79). Sanctions should be authorized and implemented lawfully and in accordance 
with International humanitarian law standards and countermeasure standards even at the 
price of being less effective (O’ Connell 2002, 79). Given the growing trend toward 
resorting to sanctions as a global governance tool to restore global peace and security, it is 
of great significance to bridge the existing moral and legal gaps. I suggest that this research 
                                                
13 Daniel Schwartz has applied JWT not to sanctions against Iran, but to possible preventive war on Iran. He aims to see whether Iran is a threat 
to global security based on JWT. Schwartz examines three conditions of sufficient threat with regard to Iran (a manifest intention to harm, an 
active preparation which supports the intent to injure, and a situation in which the danger mounts because of waiting to diminish the threat). He 
concludes that even if Iran seeks or possesses nuclear weapons, a preventive attack on Iran’s nuclear sites would be unjust, since there are other 
options such as diplomacy and there is also little room to assume that Iran would not be deterred to use nuclear weapons (Schwartz 2008). 
14 O’Brien, Matthew B., and Robert C. Koons applie JWT to the possible war against Iran’s nuclear sites. They claim that an attack on Iran’s 
nuclear sites can meet 3 conditions of Just War Tradition (just cause, proportionality, and right intention), but needs more justification to meet the 
other four conditions (comparative justice, competent authority, last resort and probability of success). However, they conclude that even the 
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In order to examine my hypothesis regarding the two main research questions, I conducted both field 
research (observation and interview) and library research (primary and secondary sources). I traveled 
to Iran and the U.S to observe the impacts of sanctions on the ground and to conduct a number of 
interviews, while the majority of my research rests on library research. The authorization and 
implementation of sanctions on Iran are primarily based on Iran’s alleged efforts to possess nuclear 
weapons, support for terrorism, and violation of human rights (all of which have been denied by the 
Iranian government). In response, I have also devoted a portion of my research to the content 



















Chapter 2: Just Authorization of Sanctions (Part I) 
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Just Authorization of Sanctions (Part I) 
The “Just authorization of sanctions” principle merely constitutes one piece of the “just sanctions” puzzle. A 
comprehensive understanding of justice based upon sanctions relies on studying justice at three different stages; 
a) sanctions authorization, b) sanctions implementation and c) post sanctions era. Accordingly, this chapter and 
the next two chapters evolve around one main question (the first research question of the thesis): “Have 
authorizations of sanctions against Iran been just?” 
In order to answer this question, chapters 2,3, and 4 are devoted to applying the just authorization of sanctions’ 
criteria to the UN, U.S., and EU sanctions against Iran. The UN, U.S., and EU sanctions authorizations are 
examined in the light of the following principles: comparative just cause, right objective, last resort, 
proportionality in authorization, high possibility of success, legitimate authorizer, unambiguous resolutions, and 
well-defined termination mechanism and requirements. 
The “Comparative just cause” principle is the most determinative indicator, and the centerpiece in the “just 
authorization of sanctions” tradition. Hence, this chapter is entirely allocated to examining the different 
narratives of imposers of sanctions (UN, U.S., and EU), and the target (Iran) as they bear upon the causes of 
sanctions authorizations against Iran. 
1. Comparative Just Cause 
Iran has been subject to three different types of sanctions: (a) nuclear-related sanctions (by the UN, U.S., and 
EU), (b) human rights-related sanctions (by the U.S. and EU), and (c) terrorism related sanctions (by the U.S.). 
Examining each type of sanctions with the Comparative Just Cause principle requires studying the narratives of 
the those imposing sanctions and those targeted by sanctions. Accordingly, this section contains three main 
subsections: 
• Comparative Just Cause for nuclear-related sanctions against Iran 
• Comparative Just Cause for human rights-related sanctions against Iran 
• Comparative Just Cause for terrorism-related sanctions against Iran 
 




In 1979 the U.S. authorized an initial set of 
sanctions against Iran as a response to the 
hostage crisis in Tehran. Since then, the U.S. 
has expanded its sanctions by imposing 
nuclear, human rights, and terrorism-related 
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sanctions against Iran. 
 
UN 
In 2006, the UNSC authorized nuclear-
related sanctions against Iran due to concerns 




In 2007, the EU authorized nuclear-related 
sanctions against Iran in compliance with the 
UNSC Resolutions. The aftermath incidents 
of the June 12, 2009 presidential elections in 
Iran triggered the EU to impose human 




Before providing a broader elaboration on each of the subsections, it would be beneficial to reconsider the just 
causes of sanctions. These causes revolve around (1) self-defense, (2) sufficient threat, (3) and the breaking of 
international norms. In other words, only sanctions, which are authorized based on one or more of these causes, 
would meet the just cause principle. Accordingly, this analysis must take into consideration both the senders’ 
and target’s narratives (comparative just cause). 
 
 
1.1. Comparative Just Cause for Nuclear-Related Sanctions Against Iran 
The nuclear-related sanctions against Iran have been authorized by the UN, U.S., and EU (referred to as “the  
opposing countries” or “ the sanctioners” in this research). The opposing countries’ core stated cause to authorize 
nuclear-related sanctions is that Iran’s nuclear program has posed a threat to world peace and security. The  
opposing countries’ narrative regarding Iran’s nuclear threat is built on a set of assumptions, concerns, reasons, 
 and indications. On the other hand, Iran has rejected the opposing countries’ allegation by providing a  
counter-narrative grounded on its own set of assumptions, reasons, actual causes, and indications. 
 
1.1.1. The Opposing Countries’ Narrative 
Why is Iran’s nuclear program a threat to global peace and security? The answers to this question 
provide the foundation of the process, which led to the nuclear-related sanctions authorizations 
against Iran. The entire basis for the countries involved in particular the US, authorizing nuclear-
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related sanctions against Iran starts here. The arguments revolve around the claim that Iran’s 
nuclear program has military purposes; Iran is seeking to possess nuclear weapons so as to become 
a nuclear-armed country. In doing so, Iran is viewed as becoming a threat not only to regional 
security, but also more broadly to international peace and security. A set of assumptions, concerns, 
reasons, and indications support the arguments by Opposing countries. 
 
• Assumptions: Identifying Iran’s nuclear program as a threat to regional and international peace 
and security rests on the following widely accepted assumptions: 
a) Iran seeks to possess nuclear weapons; 
b) Nuclear Iran would trigger nuclear dominoes in the region leading to other countries 
obtaining nuclear weapons; 
c) Nuclear Iran would pass nuclear weapons to groups understood to be or claimed as being 
terrorists; 
d) Nuclear Iran would pose an existential threat to Israel; 
 
• Concerns: The peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program is deeply questionable, according to 
the countries supporting sanctions leading to the following concerns: 
a) Uranium Enrichment: Iran’s domestic uranium enrichment process does not have an 
economic rationale; 
b) Stockpile: Iran’s accumulation of 20 percent enriched uranium is worrisome. This worry 
exists despite the fact that weapons-grade uranium is enriched above 80 percent; 
c) Heavy-Water Reactor: Iran’s construction of a heavy water reactor is worrisome, because it 
uses natural uranium to produce plutonium which is another way of building nuclear 
weapons; 
d) Past Activities: Iran’s activities in the past, particularly before 2003 relate to these worries. 
That is, the constructing of uranium enrichment, heavy-water reactor facilities, and 
cooperating with the father of Pakistan’s atomic bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, has inflamed 
mistrust by other countries when it comes to the continuation of such activities and their 
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In conclusion, why would Iran want to have High-Enriched Uranium (HEU), heavy water 
reactor, plutonium, advanced generations of centrifuge, and advanced ballistic missiles if its 
nuclear program is related to peaceful goals? 
 
• Reasons: The acceptance of the above assumptions and concerns triggers an important 
question: why would Iran want to possess nuclear weapons? Those posing these questions have 
a number of explanations for Iran’s intentions and motives for developing nuclear weapons or 
at least obtaining nuclear weapon capability. Acquisition of nuclear weapons, or nuclear 
weapon capability would in the minds of its critics have remarkable outcomes for Iran. It 
would: 
a) increase Iran’s influence in the region; 
b) promote Iran’s prestige in the world; 
c) boost the regime’s survival; (House of Commons Committees - FAAE (40-3) - Human 
Rights in Iran December 2010,  54-58). 
 
• Indications: According to the Opposing countries’ narratives, there are enough indications in 
the real world to acknowledge the validity of the stated assumptions, concerns, and reasons for 
worry when it comes to Iran’s nuclear program. 
 
1) Violation 
The first indication in support of these worries arises from Iran being seen as violating the Nuclear 
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and related Safeguards. It has done so by deceiving the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran’s violation is categorized into two classes of not reporting on 
construction-installation nor on nuclear materials and experiments. 
A. Not reporting on construction and installation; 
• Natanz facility and Kalaye Electric Company (KEC): In 2002, the Iranian opposition group 
Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), also known as National Council for Resistance of Iran (NCRI)15, 
for the first time publicly revealed Natanz nuclear facility which was secretly being constructed 
by Iran. Although, Iran was not obliged to announce the existence of the site under 
construction, the Natanz high security underground facility triggered suspicions over the 
                                                
15 MEK, is a left-leaning Muslim opposition group in exile. They were actively involved in struggle against the Shah, but shortly after the Islamic 
revolution in 1979 they started armed struggle against the Islamic republic of Iran, and eventually had to go in exile by the end of 1981.  Its leadership 
is resided in Paris, and its core members were in Iraq for many years. The US, Canada, and the EU designated MEK as a terrorist group formerly, but 
it was delisted latter ("People's	Mujahedin	of	Iran,"	,	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Mujahedin_of_Iran.	). It is believed that Israel 
provided MEK with information on Iran’s nuclear program. 
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peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. In conjunction with the Natanz revelation, the 
disclosure of nuclear activities in a private company, Kalaye Electric brought some worries. It 
was involved in centrifuge development and testing, and later moving them to Natanz facility, 
actions that then amplified distrust. Kalaye Electric nuclear activities are considered to be a 
violation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement16(The Institute for Science and International Security 
(ISIS)website : Kalaye Electric Company) 
 
• Qom facility (Fordow): Fordow is an underground nuclear site close to the city of Qom, a holy 
city for Shia Muslims. This uranium enrichment facility is built deep under the mountain rocks 
because of potential attack by Israel. The prominent belief among opposing countries is that 
Iran has violated its international obligations because it has failed to report to the IAEA the new 
centrifuges in the Qom facility. It therefore “violates the terms of the Subsidiary Arrangements 
of the modified "Code 3.1,"17 which Iran agreed to in 2003.” (Acton 2009) . Iran claims that it 
has declared to the IAEA the suspension of the modified “Code 3.1” implementation in March 
2007, and it is back to the original version. Iran argues that it has the suspension right, because 
its parliament has not ratified the modified Code 3.1. Nevertheless, some experts find this 
justification to be absurd (Acton 2009). Information indicates that Iran had started the 
construction of Qom facility before this announcement (Acton 2009).  For instance, a document 
called “Public Points for Qom Disclosure” (PPQD), which were provided by the Obama 
administration, acknowledged that Iran had started to construct the Qom facility several years 
ago (Iranwatch website September 25, 2009). Eventually the IAEA questioned the credibility of 
Iran’s claim  regarding suspending the implication of modified Code 3.1: 
 
“In accordance with Article 39 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, agreed Subsidiary 
Arrangements cannot be modified unilaterally; nor is there a mechanism in the 
                                                
16 The first Safeguard Agreement between Iran and the IAEA was concluded in 1974. In general, IAEA Safeguards enable the agency to assure that 
States are respecting their international obligations in using nuclear material and technologies for peaceful purposes	(	
https://www.iaea.org/safeguards.	). 
17 Original Code 3.1: (1976) requires a member state to submit design information for new facilities “normally not later than 180 days before the 
facility is scheduled to receive nuclear material for the first time.”  
Modified Code 3.1: (1992) requires a member state to notify the IAEA “as soon as the decision to construct or to authorize construction has been 
taken, whichever is earlier” 	,	https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/3iles/online_version_sg-fm-1170_-_model_subsidiary_arrangement_code_1-
9.pdf.	) 
“In 1992, after Iraq's nuclear weapons program was discovered by the IAEA, the Board of Governors of the IAEA amended the Subsidiary 
Arrangements rules and developed the modified Code 3.1. -“ It also developed the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement, which empowers 
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Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of provisions agreed to in Subsidiary 
Arrangements” (GOV/2007/22, para.14). 
 
Additionally, Mohamed Elbaradei, the former head of IAEA, affirmed that, "Iran has been on the 
wrong side of the law in so far as to inform the agency at an earlier date…. Iran was supposed to 
inform us on the day it was decided to construct the facility. They have not done that."18 (CNN 
website September 30, 2009). 
 
B. Not reporting on nuclear materials and experiments; 
According to the opposing countries’ narrative, not only has Iran failed to report on its nuclear 
construction and installations, but also it has failed to report on its uranium imports, uranium 
conversion and uranium enrichment. Iran has also failed to report on its Plutonium Experiments 
and Laser Isotope Enrichment Experiments(Shire and Albright 2006):2). The environmental 
samples have revealed High Enriched Uranium (HEU) contamination at some nuclear facilities 
(Shire and Albright 2006: 3). Moreover, Iran has attained plutonium, indigenously or from 
foreign sources, without declaring them to the IAEA (Shire and Albright 2006: 4). Ultimately, 
the IAEA Board of Governors’ report in 2003 acknowledged “Iran has failed to meet its 
obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the 
subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material 
was stored and processed” (GOV/2003/40 6 June 2003, 7). The 2011 IAEA Board of Governors’ 
report reaffirmed that Iran’s failure to report its nuclear material, and declare its facilities goes 
back to the late 1970s (GOV/2011/65 8 November 2011, Annex page 1). The IAEA officially 
recognized Iran to be in noncompliance with the IAEA safeguarded agreement for the first time 
in 2005 (GOV/2005/70 24 September 2005). 
 
2) Inspection 
The opposing countries’ narrative singles out Iran’s resistance towards nuclear inspections as 
another indication, which enhances their suspicions regarding the peaceful nature of Iran’s 
nuclear program. Iran has been rejecting full inspections of its dubious nuclear and military 
facilities, including both Parchin military complex and full access to its nuclear scientists and 
specialists for interviews and investigation. In 2012, the IAEA announced that the inspection 
from the Parchin military complex is required to verify that this military site is not involved in 
                                                
18 Mohamed Elbaradei also said “I do not think based on what we see that Iran has an ongoing nuclear weapons program."	"IAEA:	Iran	Broke	Law	by	
Not	Revealing	Nuclear	Facility,"	,	http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/09/30/iran.iaea.nuclear/index.html?iref=24hours.	) 
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nuclear explosive testing. Iran rejected full access, but agreed on a limited inspection after 
negotiation on a comprehensive agreement (Albright and Avagyan July 31, 2012). The IAEA has 
hesitations regarding Parchin military site activities, and suspects it has a nuclear explosive 
testing chamber (Albright and Avagyan, July 31, 2012). In addition to inspections of suspicious 
nuclear and military facilities, the IAEA requested access to the Iranian nuclear scientists to 
clarify different aspects of Iran’s nuclear program, especially the possibility of military 




The existence of credible documents on covert aspects of Iran’s nuclear program provides further 
evidence of Iran’s threat, in the context of the opposing countries’ narrative. The IAEA 
allegations against Iran are grounded on different information sources including its own 
investigation:, Member States, independents sources, satellite imagery, interviews, and Iran itself 
to be credible (GOV/2011/65 8 November 2011, 8). One of the documents, which has triggered 
the most controversial debates regarding the probability of a military dimension of Iran’s nuclear 
program is the so-called “alleged studies documentation” or “laptop documents”. According to 
what the senior American intelligence officials claim, these documents, , were gathered from a 
stolen Iranian laptop, and they illustrate that Iran has been working on the nuclear warhead design 
(Broad and Sanger Nov.13, 2005). This document was made known to the Agency in 2005. 
Although this documentation is in electronic format, and could have been manipulated, as Iran 
argues, the IAEA believes otherwise.  It sees it as comprehensive, complicated, and consistent 
enough internally and with other gathered information, that the possibility of any fabrication can 
be ruled out. (GOV/2011/65 8 November 2011, Annex page 12) 
 
4) Possible Military Dimension (PMD) 
The concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimension (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program have 
been repeatedly reflected on the IAEA Board of Governors’ reports According to the opposing 
countries; these reports provide another indication of the validity of Iran’s threat. Since 2002, the 
IAEA has been increasingly concerned about the Possible Military Dimension (PMD) of Iran’s 
nuclear program (GOV/2011/65 8 November 2011, 7). The IAEA Board of Governors’ report 
states that Iran was involved in a series of activities related to nuclear weapons,19 under a 
                                                
19 Such as:”  
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structured program, prior to the end of 2003. In their view, it is a possibility that some of the 
activities to develop nuclear explosive devices continued after 2003 (GOV/2011/65 8 November 
2011, 8-10). Moreover, the report underlines that Iran has attempted to gather nuclear weapons 
development information from clandestine channels In 2007, the IAEA was informed through an 
interview with a member of the clandestine nuclear supply network, that Iran was given 
information on nuclear explosive design (GOV/2011/65 8 November 2011: Annex page 8). 
5) Ballistic missiles 
Iran’s endeavor to enhance and promote its missiles program is another activity, which escalates 
the suspicions about claims of an innocent nuclear program, according to the opposing countries’ 
narrative. Principally, Iran’s Ballistic missiles could potentially be used to deliver nuclear 
weapons. 
The IAEA Board of Governors’ report affirms that according to the “alleged studies 
documentation” Iran was involved in a research study called Project 111 to examine how to 
integrate new payload chambers into a missile delivery vehicle, Shahab 3 20  (GOV/2011/65 8 
November 2011, Annex page 11). Consequently, the opposing countries assume that Iran’s 
missiles program, like Iran’s nuclear program, is worrisome. Surveillance of Iran’s nuclear 
facilities would thus not be enough. There would need to be in conjunction inspections over its 
military sites and Ballistic missiles program. Only under such comprehensive surveillance and 
prohibitions would all the paths towards Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons be blocked. 
6) Israel 
According to the opposing countries’ narrative, the “wiped off the map" discourse by Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, Iran’s former presient, is the crystallization of Iran’s more than three decades 
enmity towards Israel to the extent that it directly calls for Israel elimination. During “The World 
Without Zionism” conference, which was held in Tehran in 2005, Ahmadinejad stated that Israel 
should be “wiped off the map” (IRIB News October 26, 2005). In the context of the opposing 
countries’ narrative, Ahmadinejad was not only threatening Israel but also all liberal democracies 
such as Canada, the United States, and Western Europe (Report of the Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and International Development December 2010, 57). The prominent belief in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
• Some successful efforts to procure nuclear related and dual use equipment and materials by military related individuals and entities; 
• Efforts to develop undeclared pathways for the production of nuclear material; 
• The acquisition of nuclear weapons development information and documentation from a 
clandestine nuclear supply network and 
• Work on the development of an indigenous design of a nuclear weapon including the testing of 
components .” (GOV/2011/65  8 November 2011, 8) 
20 This information affirms “that Iran had been engaged in activities involving studies on a so-called green salt project, high explosives testing and the 
re-engineering of a missile re-entry vehicle to accommodate a new payload”(GOV/2011/65 8 November 2011, Annex page 2) 
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opposing countries is that Ahmadinejad’s harsh rhetoric, in conjunction with other protracted 
antagonistic statements by Iranian officials, and Iran’s support of Hamas and Hezbollah -- all are 
existential threats towards Israel. 
 
 
Consequently, according to the opposing countries’ narrative there are enough indications that reveal 
Iran’s endeavors to attain nuclear weapons and that Iran has enough motivation to follow its nuclear 
ambitions. Hence, Iran’s nuclear program is a “sufficient threat” to the regional and international peace 
and security, particularly Israel’s existence, and the opposing countries has an absolute “just cause” to 
authorize nuclear-related sanctions against Iran. 
 
1.1.2. Iran’s narrative 
Why is Iran’s nuclear program not a threat to global peace and security? The answer to this 
question is the keystone of Iran’s narrative against the allegations, which led to the authorization of 
nuclear-related sanctions against Iran. Iran’s argument revolves around explaining the peaceful 
nature of its nuclear program. Iranian officials have been emphasizing that Iran’s nuclear program 
has a peaceful purpose, and it is an absolute and inalienable right of Iranian people to enjoy the 
peaceful nuclear program, unless it is proven that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons21 (Zahrani and 
Dowlatkhah 2010, 140-1). Based on Iran’s reasoning, the fact that the IAEA has not been able to 
prove that Iran is seeking to possess nuclear weapons22 in addition to the fact that Iran is the most 
closely monitored country in the world, illustrate the rightfulness of Iran’s claims over its nuclear 
program. 
Iran’s narrative provides a counter-argument against the assumptions, concerns, reasons, and 
indications, which support the opposing countries’ narrative. 
 
•  Assumptions: According to Iran’s narrative, the opposing countries’ assumptions: (a) Iran 
seeks to possess nuclear weapons, (b) nuclear Iran would trigger nuclear dominos in the region, 
(c) nuclear Iran would pass nuclear weapons to the “terrorists”, and (d) nuclear Iran would 
                                                
21 According to Article 4 of the NPT “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to 
develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this 
Treaty. ("The	Treaty	on	the	Non-Proliferation	of	Nuclear	Weapon	(NPT),"	Department	for	Disarmament	Affairs,	United	Nations;	
http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html;.	) 
22 In spite of the protracted IAEA’s inspections, the Agency has never declared conclusively that Iran has been seeking the procurement of nuclear 
weapons. Neither has it been able to acknowledge that Iran’s nuclear program has been exclusively peaceful (Paul	K.	Kerr,	Iran’s	Nuclear	Program:	
Tehran’s	Compliance	with	International	Obligations	Congressional	Research	Service,[April	28,	2014]),	1). 
  
     44 
attack Israel, are all the opposing countries’ attempt to manufacture an unnecessary crisis, and 
to securitize both Iran and its nuclear program. 
a) Manufactured crisis; the dominant belief among Iranian officials is that the country’s 
nuclear crisis is one of the contemporary manufactured crises by US and Israel. This 
manufactured crisis is based on falsified documents and assumptions presented to media 
and the world by US-Israel intelligence officers.  Iran’s president, Hassan Rouhani, and 
Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, have repeatedly called Iran’s nuclear 
program an “unnecessary”, and “manufactured” crisis that should be terminated only 
through negotiations 23 (Press TV May 4, 2015; Serat News Website September 25, 2014; 
Tasnim News Agency Oct.4, 2015). 
b) Securitization; according to Iran’s narrative, the opposing countries’ assumptions and 
allegations against Iran’s nuclear program are the continuation of decades of endeavor by 
US-Israel to securitize the entire Islamic Republic of Iran(Semati and Rahnavrd 2009; 
Mohseni and Salehi 2011, 613-634). In fact, Iran’s nuclear crisis is a successful example of 
securitization24, in which, the securitizing actors (U.S. and Israel) have successfully been 
able to depict Iran’s nuclear program, through a set of Speech Acts, as an imminent and 
existential threat to world peace and security (valued referent object) to the extent that the 
                                                
23 Some of the scholars in the West have also called Iran’s nuclear crisis a “manufactured crisis”.  Gareth Porter, an American historian and 
investigative journalist, has authored a book entitled “Manufactured Crisis: the Untold Story of the Iran Nuclear Scare” (2014). Porter argues that 
Iran’s so-called nuclear crisis has been manufactured by US-Israel in three phases: 
1) 2002-2008: The Iranian armed opposition group Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK) announced in August 2002 that Iran has constructed 
an underground enrichment facility in Natanz. US-Israel intelligence was behind it. The IAEA started investigations on possible 
secret Iranian nuclear weapons. In early 2008, these investigations ended and the IAEA was unable to find any evidence to prove the 
allegation.  
2) 2008-2011:“The alleged studies documentation” or “laptop documents” on secret Iranian nuclear weapon program was supposedly 
stolen and handed in to the U.S. by an unknown party. The IAEA started the second round of inquiry. 
3) 2011- present: The IAEA’s report, mainly based on Israel intelligence information, proclaimed that there is a possibility that the 
Iran’s nuclear weapons-related testing was continuing after 2003. As a result, the toughest sanctions were imposed on Iran, targeting 
Iran’s oil export and banking sector (Gareth	Porter,	Manufactured	Crisis:	The	Untold	Story	of	the	Iran	Nuclear	ScareJust	World	
Books,	2014,	16).  
	
Likewise, Edward S. Herman, professor emeritus of finance at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, and David Peterson, an independent 
journalist and researcher based in Chicago, have coauthored an article entitled “ The Iran ‘Threat’ in a Kafkaesque World” (2012), in which they argue 
that Iran’s nuclear crisis has been manufactured through  “Kafkaesque politics” and not reality. Herman and Peterson draw attention to the following 
reasoning: 
• 38 IAEA reports on Iran (2003-2012) along with a remarkable number of inspections have never determined that Iran is perusing nuclear 
weapons; 
• The alleged Iranian threat is constructed by U.S. and Israel propaganda; 
• The U.S. has mobilized multilateral institutions to place Iran on the international stage; 
• The media has had a fundamental role in depicting Iran as a threat; 
• Iran’s case is similar to the case of Iraq, when it was said that Iraq possesses “weapons of mass destruction” (a false claim). ( Edward S. 
Herman and David Peterson, "The Iran “Threat” in a Kafkaesque World," Journal of Palestine Studies 42, no. 1 (2012), 24-45. ) 
 
24 The Copenhagen School defines securitization as a successful Speech Act “through which an inter-subjective understanding is constructed within a 
political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to 
deal with the threat” (Barry	Buzan	and	Ole	Waever,	Regions	and	Powers:	The	Structure	of	International	Security,	Vol.	91Cambridge	University	
Press,	2003,	491). 
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target audience (the UNSC and the EU) have been convinced to adopt immediate and 
extraordinary measures (sanctions) against Iran25 (Hormozi November 2015). 
 
•  Concerns: According to Iran’s narrative, the opposing countries’ concerns regarding Iran’s 
nuclear program, Iran’s uranium enrichment activities, stockpile, heavy water reactors, and past 
activities have been a pretext to authorize sanctions against Iran, whereas, their genuine 
concerns are as follows: 
a) Iran’s revolutionary identity; the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a revolutionary state, has 
challenged the world order, particularly by hegemonic interests, and by authorizing 
sanctions.  Accordingly, opposing countries have a responsibility to encounter this 
revolutionary state26 (Moshirzadeh and Jafari 2012, 54). In fact, the U.S. antagonistic policy 
in authorizing sanctions against Iran is rooted in the U.S perception about Iran’s 
revolutionary identity27, regardless of whether Iran is adopting revolutionary policies in 
reality or not (Ibid, 71). Iran’s supreme leader and the politicians close to him strongly 
believe that the Islamic and revolutionary identity of Iran’s regime is the opposing 
countries’ genuine concern. Such a concern, in turn, has resulted in decades of enmity 
including imposing tough sanctions against Iran. Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme leader, 
emphasizes that 
 
“Iran’s nuclear program is just an excuse for the West to impose sanctions. It has only 
been a few years that Iran’s nuclear program has been highlighted by the West, but it has 
been 30 years that they have been imposing sanctions. So, why have they been imposing 
sanctions even when there was no nuclear concern? The problem therefore, is that they 
want to confront a nation who wants to be independent and resist against inequality and 
cruelty” (Iran’s supreme leader website February 22, 2012). 
 
                                                
25 For more information see: 		
Shani	Hormozi,	"Securitization	and	Desecuritization	of	Iran’s	Nuclear	Program,"	Caspian	Journal	of	Applied	Sciences	Research	(CJASR)	4,	no.	11	
(November	2015).	 
26 According to a comparative study conducted on US foreign policy towards Iran and Cuba, there were similar reasons why both Iran and Cuba were 
subjected to US sanctions: 
a) Challenging the status quo; 
b) Geopolitical significance; 
c) Revisionist foreign policy.( Zahra	Sha'iei	and	Mohammad	Reza	Yazdani,	"the	U.S.	Policy	Towards	Iran	(1979-1991)	and	Cuba	
(1959-1991)	during	the	Cold	War:	A	Comparative	Study,"	Journal	of	Foreign	Policy	25,	no.	3	(2011),	635-656.	) 
27 “Iran’s identity is characterized by three elements: revolutionary, Islamic, and the third world state” (Dehghani Firoozabadi, 2008:306-307 in 
Moshirzadeh and Jafari 2012, 57). 
  
     46 
b) Iran’s geopolitical significance; Iran’s geopolitical situation: (Hormoz Strait, Persian Gulf 
and connections with Central Asia, along with its rich resources: oil, gas, mineral materials, 
and metal), have made the country the source of attraction for the opposing countries, and at 
the same time subject to containment policies such as sanctions (Tabyin Strategic Think 
Tank 2013, 9-10). 
c) Iran’s regional influence; The opposing countries, particularly Israel and the U.S., are 
concerned about any change in the regional balance of power in favor of Iran. In this 
context, Iran’s nuclear capability, whether peaceful or with military purpose, would be a 
game changer. Even a peaceful nuclear capability would increase Iran’s soft and hard 
power, and would change the balance of power in the region. Hence, imposing pressure on 
Iran, including authorizing sanctions, to give up its nuclear program, would curb Iran’s 
regional influence and lower the risk of change in the regional balance of power. 
 
•  Reasons: Whereas the opposing countries’ narrative explains the reasons why Iran would want 
to possess nuclear weapons, Iran has a counter-narrative on why Iran would not want to have 
nuclear weapons: 
a) Religious prohibition (Fatwa): According to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, 
the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are forbidden 
(Haram) based on Islam (Iran’s supreme leader website April 16, 2010); 
b) Arms race risk: Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would trigger its neighbors and other 
countries in the region to proceed in the same way, which would ultimately increase the 
arms race risk; 
c) Loss of conventional superiority: Iran has a regional conventional superiority due to its 
conventional weapons, geopolitical situation, vast surface area, and population size. Iran’s 
possession of nuclear weapons would persuade other states in the region to follow the same 
path, which would eventually result in loss of conventional superiority by Iran; 
d) Emergence of nuclear terrorism: Iran and other regional countries’ procurement of nuclear 
weapons would increase the possibility of nuclear weapons getting in the hands of terrorist 
and extremist groups in the region, which would pose an immediate threat to Iran before it 
would opposing countries; 
e) Institutionalization of the U.S presence in the region: Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons 
would increase the perception of threat among countries in the region and would convince 
them to seek further U.S support, and presence; 
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f) Increase in vulnerability: The high cost of nuclear weapons’ production and maintenance 
would result in budget allocation reduction in infrastructure sectors and consequently 
increase Iran’s vulnerability; 
g) Domestic objection: Many within the Iranian political system and society are against the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons. This grouping functions as a powerful leverage against the 
proponents of nuclear weapons who are in the minority; 
h) Past experience as a deterrence: Iran was a victim of unconventional and chemical 
weapons during the eight years of war with Iraq (1980-1988). By having this painful 
experience, an endeavor for the Middle East to be free of WMD best serves Iran’s security. 
(Hadian and Hormozi 2010, 189-95) 
 
However, although Iran would not want to have nuclear weapons, it would want to have 
nuclear capability28. Hossein Mousavian, the former top Iranian nuclear negotiator, believes 
that the Iraq invasion of Iran in 1980, and Saddam’s use of chemical weapons against Iran 
were game changers. They altered Iran’s security calculation and pushed it toward nuclear 
capability (not nuclear weapons) as a defensive and deterrence tool (Mousavian 2012). 
 
•  Indications 
According to the opposing countries’ narrative, there are a number of indications in support of 
the core argument that Iran’s nuclear program is not innocent, and thus the country poses a 
threat to world peace and security. On the contrary, Iran’s narrative rejects and challenges all 
these indications by providing different explanations. 
 
1) No violation 
                                                
28 Nuclear capability consists of a spectrum in which at one end there is peaceful nuclear application (medical, scientific, and energy uses), and at the 
other end, there is military nuclear application (nuclear warheads). Iran would want to have “lawful” nuclear capability but not “full” capability. 
Nuclear capability is classified in three categories: 
a) Acquisition of knowledge and technology of the full stages of the uranium enrichment cycle; 
b) Delivery vehicle capability (Missiles); 
c) Nuclear warhead capability (full capability); 
d) Possession of nuclear weapons. 
The first two capabilities both fall under the “lawful capability” category, while the last two fall under illegal nuclear activities ( Nasser	Hadian	and	
Shani	Hormozi,	"Iran’s	Nuclear	Program:	Lawful	Capability,"	Research	Letter	of	Political	Science	5,	no.	3	(2010),	185). 
Iran with nuclear “lawful capability” would be able to achieve all the objectives achievable by having nuclear “full capability” but with lower costs. 
These objectives are: 
a) Deterrence; 
b) Promotion of domestic-international dignity and proud (Soft power); 
c) Elevation of development 
d) Enhancement of Iran’s regional and international role and influence; 
e) Increase in Islamic World Power 
(Ibid,	199). 
  
     48 
Iran stresses that it has not violated the NPT and related Safeguards Agreements. According 
to Iran’s narrative, what has happened is that Iran has not reported some of its legal nuclear 
activities, which based on Iran’s understanding of its commitments, is not equal to a 
violation. 
 
A. Not reporting on construction-installation: 
Natanz facility: The construction of Natanz facility was legal, and Iran had no obligation 
to report it to the IAEA, because at that time Iran was committed to the original code 3.1 
(not modified code 3.1). It was only after the official declaration of Natanz to IAEA in 
February 2003 that Iran agreed to voluntarily (without Majlis ratification) implement the 
modified code 3.1 29 (Sahimi Sep.27, 2009). 
 
Qom facility (Fordow) (No violation): Iran claims that not reporting the Qom facilities to 
the IAEA earlier is not a violation of Iran’s international obligations. Iran had agreed to 
implement the modified Code 3.1 in February 2003 and declared its suspension in March 
2007. Since the construction of the Qom facility occurred after March 2007 (when Iran 
was not implementing the modified Code 3.1), Iran has not violated its Safeguards 
Agreement. Based on Iran’s narrative, since the modified code 3.1 had not been ratified by 
the Majlis, Iran had no obligation to report its decision regarding new constructions. 
However Iran did report on the Qom facility after the installation of the centrifuges (CNN 
website September 30, 2009). 
Ali Akbar Salehi, director of the Iranian Atomic Energy Agency, affirms that "According 
to the [IAEA's] current governing rules, there was no urgency in reporting anything about 
this installation and we could have not announced it, but we did so in order to contribute 
to trust-building and transparency and we did so much sooner than the required 
time,"(CNN website September 30, 2009). 
 
In sum, Iran was voluntarily implementing the modified Code 3.1 from February 2003 to 
March 2007. Natanz was constructed before this time, and Fordow’s construction-
installation took place after this period. In fact, Iran was not supposed to notify the IAEA 
                                                
29 Even some serious opponents of Iran’s nuclear program acknowledge that Iran” was not obligated to notify the IAEA of its construction of the 
Natanz facilities for uranium enrichment “, although it was committed to inform the IAEA about its nuclear activities in other places such as Kalaye 
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on its nuclear construction and installation, before and after this period, unless it decided 
to introduce nuclear material into the facility, in which case it should inform the IAEA no 
later than 180 days before the first nuclear material insertion. 
 
Table  2.2 Original and modified Code 3.1 
Original Code 3.1 
 
Modified Code 3.1 
Requires member states to 
declare to the IAEA the 
existence of any nuclear 
facility no later than 180 
days before introducing any 
nuclear material into the 
facility. 
Requires member states to 
notify the IAEA as soon as 
the decision to construct or to 





Table  2.3 Iran’s commitment to the Original and modified Code 3.1 
Iran’s 
commitment to 


















Natanz  Fordow 
 
After the IAEA referred Iran’s dossier to the UNSC, Iran declared to the IAEA in March 2007 
that it would suspend its voluntary implementation of modified code3.1 and Additional Protocol. 
It would revert back to the original version as retaliation to referring Iran’s case to the UNSC. 
Thus, since March 2007, Iran has been bounded b the original code 3.1, which requires 
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notification of 180 days before introducing any nuclear material into the facility and not at the 
time it makes the decision (Sahimi Sep.27, 2009). 
 
B. Not reporting on its nuclear materials and experiments: 
Iran has claimed that the High Enriched Uranium (HEU) contamination found at some of its 
facilities is related to purchased equipment and not Iran’s uranium enrichment activities. 
Generally, Iran does not have access to HEU 36%, which was found in some polluted equipment. 
The IAEA has confirmed Iran’s statement by reporting that the Agency “tends, on balance, to 
support Iran’s statement about the foreign origin of most of the HUE contamination” 
(GOV/2006/15 27 February 2006, para.9). 
 
 
Why was Iran not reporting on some parts of its nuclear activities? 
Iran is not denying that it was conducting some of its nuclear activities without reporting them in 
the past. But it argues that these activities were legal and calls the international community to 
understand the reasons by contextualizing the issue and taking into account the following 
realities: 
a) Nuclear cooperation alteration; Iran’s nuclear program was started with the aid and 
cooperation of the opposing countries, particularly the US, during the Shah’s regime30. Yet 
after the Islamic revolution in 1979, the opposing countries isolated Iran by halting its nuclear 
cooperation with Iran and by withdrawing from all nuclear contracts31. Iran was thus left 
alone after a significant investment in its nuclear program, with unfinished projects worth 
billions of dollars and with no knowledge of enrichment technology(Mousavian 2012). The 
antagonistic nature of the Opposing countries- Iran relations affected their nuclear cooperation 
and drove Iran to black markets to provide its peaceful nuclear program needs, and to invest 
in indigenous nuclear knowledge (Mousavian 2012). 
b) Strategic loneliness; Iran’s strategic loneliness after the revolution has been crystalized during 
the eight years’ war with Iraq, when all powerful countries including the US, supported Iraq 
even when it used chemical weapons (CW) against Iran (Hadian and Hormozi 2010, 187). 
The International community was silent and the UNSC not only did not pass any resolution 
                                                
30 In 1957, the U.S. initiated negotiations with Iranian Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, as part of President Dwight Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace 
program ( Hossein	Mousavian,	"The	Iranian	Nuclear	Dispute:	Origins	and	Current	Options,"	Arms	Control	Today	42,	no.	6	(2012).	 
31 For instance, the Eurodif consortium had a contract with Iran to enrich uranium in France and provide fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor and the 
Bushehr power plant, but it had to halt its cooperation with Iran due to pressure from the U.S. (Ibid.) 
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against Iraq, but also it did not condemn Saddam Hussein’s chemical attack against Iran32 
(Mehr News Agency September 26, 2007). Iran’s strategic loneliness refers to the perception 
that Iran’s experiences, particularly the eight years’ war with Iraq, have proven that it cannot 
trust and rely on International organizations.  Iran concluded that it needed to be self-
sufficient and to rely on its own material and nonmaterial resources(Mesbahi 2001, 149-150). 
 
Consequently, according to Iran’s narrative: 
a) All that has happened is that Iran was not reporting some of its legal activities, and Iran’s 
failure to report is not equal to violation of NPT and its relevant Safeguards (Tadayyoni 
and Tavakkoli 2010, 147); 
b) Iran had just causes to keep some parts of its nuclear program legally unreported; 
c) Iran adopted measures, such as voluntarily implementation of the Additional Protocol33 
and has accepted the most intrusive inspections at some periods in order to improve 
confidence building and transparency; 
d) Iran should be able to exercise its “inalienable right” under Article IV of the NPT, and 
enjoy “nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” and “without discrimination”. 
 
2) Inspection 
According to Iran’s narrative, contrary to the opposing countries’ allegation that considers 
Iran’s resistance to full inspection as a sign of ongoing dubious nuclear activities, Iran has 
just causes to reject full inspections of its nuclear and military sites, and full access to its 
nuclear scientists: 
a) Espionage risk: Iran cannot permit inspections of its military sites because as its 
supreme leader and high ranking political and military officials have repeatedly stated, 
such inspections would be a kind of official and legal espionage. It could lead to 
revelation of military secrets, which would expose a security threat to Iran (Press TV 
Website May 20, 2015; Kayhan Newspaper May 25,2015; Alef News Website May 22, 
2015). 
b) Nuclear scientists’ security: Iran ceased to disclose the identities of Iranian nuclear 
scientists to IAEA inspectors for interview because it is life threatening for the 
                                                
32 In spite of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iranian civilians, Iran remained committed to the NPT and did not retaliate. Ayatollah Khomeini, 
Leader of the Islamic revolution, rejected some military leaders’ requests as they were seeking retaliation (Akbar Hashemi Rafsnjani, Peace and 
Challenge (Record and Memo of 1983) [3 ,[ آرامش و چالشrd ed. The Revolution knowledge Publication Office, 2007, 269). 
33 Additional Protocol allows IAEA inspectors access to Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing and storage facilities. 
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scientists: four scientists were assassinated and one injured (Fars News Agency October 
7, 2015). 
c) Unreliable confidentiality of the IAEA: Iran cannot have unlimited information 
exchanges with the IAEA without taking into account the possibility of information 
leaking through the Agency. In 2011, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran's former ambassador to 
the International Atomic Energy Agency, objected to the IAEA’s violation of 
confidentiality, especially the revelation of the identities of Iranian nuclear scientists 
who had cooperated with the IAEA inspectors. He emphasized that the disclosure of 
their identities by the IAEA resulted in their assassination by the US-Israel intelligence 
services (Mashregh News Website July 1, 2015). 
 
3) Fabricated documents 
The so-called “alleged studies documentation” (also known as “laptop documents”) is one 
of the most controversial documents. According to some of the senior American 
intelligence officials, this document reveals the military dimension of Iran’s nuclear 
program. Iran believes that the credibility of this document is highly questionable to the 
extent that Iran calls it “an animation game” rather than an authentic document 
(GOV/2011/65 8 November 2011, Annex page12). Iran argues that since the “alleged 
studies documentation” is in electronic format, it cannot be identified as a credible 
document. The possibility of manipulation and fabrication should be taken into account by 
the IAEA (GOV/2011/65 8 November 2011, Annex page12). Moreover, many of the 
documents have been handed in to the IAEA by Israel directly or indirectly through Iranian 
opposition groups (e.g. MEK), and the IAEA has been refusing to disclose them (Porter 
2014). 
4) Past and Present Issues (PPI) 
Iran rejects the opposing countries’ allegation of a possible military dimension (PMD) to 
its nuclear program. Therefore, instead of PMD, it uses Past and Present Issues (PPI). 
According to Iran’s narrative, the PMD allegation is not justifiable due to the following 
reasons: 
(a) Forged; PMD allegation is based on forged documents34, and the IAEA has not 
examined the documents’ authenticity independently; 
                                                
34 For instance, the U.S. has presented a 2 paged letter, that reveals the PMD of Iran’s nuclear program. This letter is claimed to be from Iran’s 
Defense Ministry yet, only the second page has the recorded/registered number, and also the first page has a different font from the second signed 
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(b) Never handed to Iran; the IAEA has never handed in the documents to Iran, so Iran 
would have had the opportunity to defend and respond accurately. The IAEA claims that 
the U.S is not giving Iran access to these documents because the same country, which 
provided it may use it to produce nuclear weapons! (Saed 2010, 197) 
(c) Not operational; even the forged documents are on studies, not operational activities, 
which would be in violation of the NPT (Saed 2010, 179-181). 
 
5) Ballistic missiles 
Unlike the prominent belief in the opposing countries that Iran is promoting its ballistic 
missiles to use it as a delivery vehicle for a nuclear warhead in the future, Iran argues that 
its missile program is a part of Iran’s defensive capability, and thus a security imperative 
(Koosha and Eskandari 2012, 388). Moreover, according to Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
all Member States are entitled to enjoy a legitimate defense without discrimination. 
Consequently, Iran should not be excluded from promoting its conventional weapons 
including ballistic missiles (with conventional warheads) (Saed 2010, 183). Especially since 
Iran’s security environment is extremely challenging and full of turmoil, a multifaceted 
national security plan and military strategy are required (Hadian and Hormozi Winter 2011, 
25). In fact, if any other country were in Iran’s place, surrounded by terrorist groups (such 
as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Taliban, al-Nusra Front) and regional wars (Yemen, and Syria), it would 
have had to boost its military capability. However, Iranian officials have repeatedly stated 
that Iran’s military doctrine has always been and will remain defensive (Press TV Website 
Aug 22, 2015). 
 
6) Israel 
The Iranian officials’ antagonistic rhetoric against Israel is not about its nation and the 
Jewish population but the so-called illegitimate occupation regime. The Islamic Republic of 
Iran does not recognize the Israeli regime as a legitimate regime but as an occupation 
regime. According to Iran’s narrative, the “wiped off the map" controversy reflects the 
misunderstanding. On the Iranian presidential website, Ahmadinejad had stated that “the 
Zionist Regime of Israel faces a dead-end and will under God's grace be wiped off the 
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map”. (Presidency of Islamic Republic of Iran website June 3, 2008) Iran’s foreign minister, 
Manouchehr Mottaki, at that time refuted that Iran is seeking to threaten Israel: "Nobody 
can remove a country from the map. This is a misunderstanding in Europe of what our 
president mentioned…how is it possible to remove a country from the map? He is talking 
about the regime. We do not recognize legally this regime," (Hurriyet Daily News 
2/22/2006) . 
According to Iran’s narrative, it is Prime Minister Netanyahu who repetitively and publicly 
threatened to use unilateral military force against Iran’s nuclear sites under the guise of self-
defense and it is Israel, who possessed up to 40035 nuclear warheads, who has always 
refused to sign the NPT and has invaded other countries in its record36. 
Consequently; according to Iran’s narrative, the opposing countries’ cause to authorize 
sanctions against Iran is unjust, and is a guise to fulfill its regional interests and objectives. 
Iran, as a partner to the NPT, has an inalienable right to enjoy peaceful nuclear capability 
without discrimination. Its nuclear program is not a threat to world peace and security. 
Rather, it has been depicted to be a “sufficient threat” and thus it is necessary to be 
subjected to punishment measures such as sanctions. 
 
1.1.3. Examining the criterion 
In order to examine “comparative just cause” criterion for the authorization of nuclear-related 
sanctions against Iran, the opposing countries and Iran’s narratives and just causes for authorizing 





                                                
35 There is no official statistic on the number of nuclear warheads possessed by Israel, although it is estimated to be from 75 to 400	"Israel	and	
Weapons	of	Mass	Destruction,"	http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction.	 ) 
36 Israel record on attacking nuclear facilities: 
1. Iraq (June 7, 1981): Israel destroyed the French-built Osirak nuclear research facility near Baghdad. Israel proclaimed that this nuclear site 
was involved in military nuclear activities and could pose a threat to Israel’s existence (BBC Web site, On this day:7 June)  
2. Syria (September 6,2007): Israel’s fighter jets bombed al-Kibar, a suspected nuclear plant in Syria in  Deir ez-Zor region.( "Operation	
Orchard,"		http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Orchard.	) Syria never retaliated out of fear of nuclear counterstrike by Israel 
(Ronen Bergman, "WikiLeaks: Syria Aimed Chemical Weapons at Israel," Ynet News, April 14, 2014). 
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Table 2.4 Summarizing the Opposing countries and Iran’s narratives on Iran’s nuclear program 
 The Opposing countries’ 
narrative 
Iran’s narrative 
General argument Iran’s nuclear program is a threat to 
international peace and security and 
its practice has been in contradiction 
to its claim of an innocent nuclear 
program 
Iran’s nuclear program has been 
depicted as a threat by US-Israel, 
and it is the inalienable right of 
Iran, as a partner to the NPT, to 
enjoy a peaceful nuclear program 
without discrimination 
Assumptions (a) Iran seeks to possess nuclear 
weapons; 
(b) Nuclear Iran would trigger 
nuclear dominos in the region; 
(c) Nuclear Iran would pass nuclear 
weapons to the terrorists; 
(d) Nuclear Iran would attack Israel 
The opposing countries’ 
assumptions are an attempt to (a) 
manufacture an unnecessary crisis, 
and (b) to securitize both Iran and 
its nuclear program. 
 
Concerns (a) Uranium enrichment activities; 
(b) Stockpile; 
(c) Heavy water reactor; 
(d) Past activities. 
The opposing countries’ genuine 
concerns are: 
(a) Iran’s revolutionary identity; 
(b) Iran’s geopolitical significance; 
(c) Iran’s regional influence. 
 
Reasons Iran would want to possess nuclear 
weapons because it would: 
(a) increase Iran’s influence in the 
region; 
(b) promote Iran’s prestige in the 
world; 
(c) boost the regime’s survival. 
Iran would not want to possess 
nuclear weapons because of the 
following reasons: 
(a) Religious prohibition (Fatwa) 
(b) Arms race risk 
(c) Loss of conventional superiority 
(d) Emergence of nuclear terrorism 
(e) Institutionalization of the U.S 
presence in the region 
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(f) Increase in vulnerability 
(g) Domestic objections 














Iran has violated the NPT and related 
Safeguards 
Given Iran’s commitments at 
different time periods, it has not 
violated the NPT and the related 
safeguard by not reporting its legal 
nuclear activities 
Inspection Iran’s rejection of full inspections of 
its dubious nuclear and military 
facilities and access to its nuclear 
scientists for interview is an 
indication of its illegal nuclear 
program 
Iran would not allow full 
inspections of its military sites and 
access to its nuclear scientists 
because of : 
(a) Espionage risk; 
(b) Nuclear Scientists’ security; 




Credible documents and evidence 
exist to support Iran’s violation and 
diversion from its obligations 
The documents are fabricated by 




There are indications of a Possible 
Military Dimension (PMD) to Iran’s 
nuclear program 
The IAEA has never been able to 
declare conclusively that there is a 
Possible Military Dimension 
(PMD). The PMD allegation is not 
justifiable due to the following 
reasons: 
(a) Forged; 
(b) Never handed to Iran; 




Iran’s ballistic missiles could 
potentially be a delivery vehicle for 
nuclear warheads 
Iran’s ballistic missiles are a part of 
Iran’s defensive strategy and 
security imperative. Iran should 
enjoy the legitimate defense right 
  















without discrimination especially 






Iran’s nuclear program is an 
existential threat to Israel’s 
existence (The “wiped off the map” 
discourse is an indication of its 
threat) 
The Iranian officials’ antagonistic 
rhetoric against Israel is not about 
its nation and the Jewish population 
but the so-called illegitimate 
occupation regime. That is Israel, 
with a large nuclear arsenal, who 
has repetitively threatened to use 
unilateral military force against 
Iran’s nuclear sites. 
Conclusion Iran’s nuclear program is a 
“sufficient threat” to international 
peace and security and the opposing 
countries has an absolute “just 
cause” to authorize sanctions against 
Iran. 
Iran’s nuclear program has been 
depicted as a “sufficient threat” to 
international peace and security, 
and the opposing countries has no 
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The opposing countries’ and Iran’s narratives illustrate that each side has a share of reasonable causes for their 
course of actions. Nevertheless, it is the responsibility of sanctions authorizers to ensure that it has the most just 
cause before imposing sanctions on its targets. The opposing countries’ cause for authorizing nuclear-related 
sanctions against Iran revolves around “sufficient threat” or “preemptive self-defense” and “International norm-
breaker”. 





A real Offense by the target 
Conditions: 
1) A manifest 
intention to harm; 
2) Active preparation 
which supports the 
intent to injure; 
3) Waiting to diminish 
the threat would result 
in mounting danger 
(Schwartz 2008:201) 
Condition: 
Violation of international 
treaties and agreements 
What is not 
considered to be a 
real threat: 
1)Military preparation 
(i.e. advancing and 
boosting military 
forces); 
2) Blustering by 
enemies (Walzer in 
Farrell 2013, 38) 
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a) Iran has failed to report some of its nuclear activities, yet the IAEA has not conclusively acknowledged 
Iran’s violation and a military dimension of its nuclear program; 
b) Iran has been advancing its military capability, in particular, its missiles program. In spite of its officials’ 
blustering, specifically by Ahmadinejad37, it has not publicly manifested an intention to attack other 
countries; 
c) Lastly, while the opposing countries’ causes have the initial arguable ground, they need more evidence to 
ensure that they have the most just cause in comparison to Iran’s causes. 
 
1.2. Comparative just cause for human rights-related sanctions against Iran 
When can human rights violations trigger the authorization of sanctions? 
Authorization of human rights-related sanctions is triggered when there is a “gross and systematic 
violation” of human rights. 
There is no solo and fixed source of reference for the definition of gross and systematic violation of human 
rights (Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights briefing No. 6 August 
2014). In general, it encompasses four main components: 
a) quantity; b) time; c) quality; and d) planning (Quiroga 1988,16) 
For instance, when a large number of individuals have severely and repeatedly been deprived of their 
rights under the law, merely because they belong to a specific group, then a systematic violation of human 
rights has occurred. 
 
1.2.1. The opposing countries narrative 
The US and the EU have authorized human rights-related sanctions against Iran. The UN has never 
authorized human rights-related sanctions against Iran. But, it has passed a number of human rights 
related resolutions against Iran, drafted by Canada. Moreover, the UN has appointed a “Special 
Rapporteur” on Iran to watch the human rights situation. 
 
• General argument: Systematic violation of human rights 
According to the opposing countries’ narrative Iran’s regime has been “systematically and repeatedly” 
violating its citizens’ rights (Canada Parliament. Senate. Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
                                                
37 Dr. Houshang Hassan-Yari, Professor of international relations and strategic military studies at the Royal Military College of Canada, as witness to 
the standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development tries to illustrate the blustering nature of Ahmadinejad speeches. He calls 
the international community not to  “ react to the inflammatory words of people like Ahmadinejad”(	Report	of	the	Standing	Committee	on	Foreign	
Affairs	and	International	Development,	Ahmadinejad’s	Iran:	A	Threat	to	Peace,	Human	Rights	and	International	Law,[December	2010]	,52-53). 
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International Trade 2012, 21). This violation is considered to be systematic, because it has been codified 
into the national law and also Islamic law (Sharia), and has affected a remarkable number of people over 
a long period of time. 
One dominant narrative views Islamic law as incompatible with so-called universal human rights. For 
instance, even though Iran is a partner to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), it has the 
reservation that “The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran reserves the right not to apply any 
provisions or articles of the Convention that are incompatible with Islamic Laws and the international 
legislation in effect.” (Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International 
Development, December 2010, 28) 
 
• Evidence of deteriorating human rights 
The opposing countries’ allegations on Iran’s human rights record fall into the following categories: 
1) Religious and ethnic discrimination; there is “systematic abuse” against religious minorities, 
specifically Baha’is38 (Canada. Parliament. Senate. Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade, 2012, 22). Iran’s regime does not recognize the Baha’i Faith as a valid religion 
and considers it to be a “heretical sect” rather than a religion “(Katzman March 5, 2014, 17). There 
are about 300,000-350,000 Baha’i in Iran. The UN Rapporteur is claiming that 110 Baha’is are in 
prison, and seven of the Baha’i Faith leaders have faced longtime prison sentences in 2010“(Katzman 
March 5, 2014, 17). Other religious minorities, who are living in Iran, such as Sunnis, Christians and 
Jews have their constitutional rights. However they have restrictions in different aspects of their lives 
such as job opportunities. Muslims who convert to another religion would face apostasy charges 
(Canada. Parliament. Senate. Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2012, 
22). In contrast, ethnic minorities, including the Kurdish, Azeris, Arab, and Baloch communities are 
facing discriminatory policies by the regime (e.g. ethnic minorities are not permitted to teach their 
own languages at schools) 39. According to the Amnesty International Annual Report in 2012, Iranian 
ethnic minorities are confronting “ongoing discrimination in law and practice,” (Ibid). 
2) Gender discrimination; The opposing countries deem that Iran’s regime is systematically violating 
women’s rights, since gender discrimination is codified into the national law and Sharia. Women do 
not enjoy equal rights with men in issues such as inheritance, marriage, divorce and child custody. 
Their court testimonies are worth half the weight of a man’s and the life value of a woman is 
                                                
38 About 90% of the population of Iran is Shiite-Muslim, and Sunni-Muslims make up around 10% of the population. The non-Muslim population of 
Iran is constituted by Christians, Zoroastrians, Jewish, and Baha’i 	(Kenneth	Katzman,	Iran:	U.S.	Concerns	and	Policy	ResponsesCongressional	
Research	Service,[March	5,	2014]	,16). 
39 About 51% of the population of Iran is Persian, 24% are Azeris (Turkic), 7%-15% Kurds, and 3% Arab “(Ibid). 
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considered less than a man’s (Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International 
Development, December 2010, 24-25; Katzman March 5, 2014, 16-17). The share of women from 
Iran’s workforce is less than 20% with about 5 times less salary (Katzman March 5, 2014,16-17). 
3) Widespread practice of the death penalty and torture; Iran stands in the second place after China in 
the practice of executions most related to drug crimes. (Canada. Parliament. Senate. Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2012, 23). The UN has condemned Iran in its 
resolutions over execution of minors, torture (flogging and amputations), death penalty (especially for 
“moharebeh”, enmity against God, which has a broad and vague connotation), and stoning(Human 
Rights Council (UNHRC) November 26, 2012). 
 
4) Violation of due process; According to the opposing countries’ narrative, Iran grossly violates due 
process through unfair trials, trials behind closed doors, trials without access to defense lawyers, 
ambiguous charges such as enmity against God (moharebeh), corruption on the earth, arbitrary 
detention, long and strict sentences, and torture (Canada. Parliament. Senate. Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2012, 24) 
5) Violation of political rights; The dispute over the June 2009 presidential election was a critical point 
with the regime’s intensifying political repression on the one hand, and the opposing countries’ 
authorization of tougher sanctions against Iran on the other. Iran is believed to apply systematic 
restrictions on peaceful assemblies, freedom of expression, free access to the Internet, political and 
human rights activists, independent journalists, lawyers, and the media (Human Rights Council 
(UNHRC) November 26, 2012). 
 
 
1.2.2. Iran’s narrative 
Iran’s narrative on the opposing countries’ allegations against Iran’s human rights situation mostly 
revolves around a general argument and a number of contextualizing explanations. 
 
• General Argument: Human Rights as a Foreign Policy Tool 
According to Iran’s narrative, the human rights issue has become a foreign policy tool at the disposal of 
the U.S. The U.S foreign policy towards the Middle East is the crystallization of the paradox between US 
interests and principles. On one hand the US has been supporting the most undemocratic governments in 
the region (i.e. Saudi Arabia). And on the other hand it has been squeezing some other countries, such as 
Iran, for violations of human rights. Consequently, values such as human rights and democracy have 
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increasingly been subordinated by the national interests of great powers. Nothing can be more damaging 
to human rights values than appealing to it as a tool in a foreign policy-toolbox through an instrumental 
approach. 
Iran believes that the opposing countries do not really care about the situation of human rights in Iran. 
Rather, they maneuverer around human rights values as a pretext to demonize and isolate Iran and 
maintain their pressure on the nation (Ziabari Dec 25, 2013). In contrast, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, two 
major oil producers, receive exemptions (Ahmad khanbeigi October 2011, 22). The US human rights 
policies record illustrates that the US has been planning to legitimize its interference in other countries 
under the guise of human rights values during and after the cold war (Shafiei and Yazdani 2011,652). 
Accordingly, human rights-related sanctions against Iran are a pretext for further interference in Iran’s 
domestic affairs (Ahmad khaanbeigi October 2011, 8). For instance, human rights-related resolutions 
against Iran encompass a variety of issues. Human rights-related sanctions, however, are mostly focused 
on political rights of dissidents in Iran, rather than issues such as women’s rights. This imbalance 
enhances the belief that the pressure on Iran over its human rights record is more a political tool rather 
than support for fair human rights values. 
 
• Contextual explanations 
According to Iran’s narrative, a comprehensive understanding of Iran’s human rights situation and the 
validity of the opposing countries’ allegations would only be possible through a contextualization 
approach. Hence, instead of providing case-by-case counter narratives against the opposing countries’ 
allegations (evidences of human rights violations in Iran), Iran draws attentions to a number of 
contextualizing explanations: 
 
1) Islamic and cultural particularities; 
Sadegh Larijani, Iran’s head of the judicial system’ asserts that the majority of the opposing 
countries’ allegations regarding violations of human rights in Iran are centered around the death 
penalty, inheritance and couples’ rights. As these rules are embedded in Islam (divinely-based rules), 
Iran cannot simply follow opposing countries rules (human-based rules) (International Campaign for 
Human Rights in Iran August 11, 2014). 
Mohammad Javad Larijani, Iran’s head of the human rights council in the judiciary, proclaims 
that “the Islamic revolution of Iran happened because Iranian people wanted the 
implementation of Islamic rules… However, it does not mean that we oppose all the 
international rules…. Iran is a signatory party to many international obligations. Abandoning 
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these commitments would have ramifications. Nonetheless, it would be possible to have an 
appropriate interpretation of international obligations that are in accordance with Islam”  (Mehr 
News Agency May 30, 2007) . Hence, the use of so-called pro-human rights universality cannot 
be used in ignorance of the cultural and religious particularities of Iran. 
 
2) Regional countries’ record; 
According to Iran’s narrative, a comparison between Iran and regional countries’ record on human 
rights would be enlightening in comprehending the actual causes behind the authorization of human 
rights-related sanctions against Iran. On one hand, the situation of human rights in Iran is much better 
than in many countries in the region, and on the other hand, countries with much worse human rights 
records in the region are exempted from the opposing countries’ pressure. For instance, the human 
rights record in Saudi Arabia, the US major regional ally and trade partner, is one of the worst in the 
world. Women only make up about 5% of the workforce and those who work are not allowed to work 
with men (Ziabari Dec 25, 2013). Moreover, women are not allowed to drive, and up until 2008 they 
were not allowed to go to hotels if they did not have a male guardian’s permission (Ibid). The rights 
of religious minorities are also very poor. Shiite Muslims constitute 10% to 15% of the population 
and face severe restrictions in the practice of their religion. Freedom of speech is highly constrained 
and a the slightest criticism results in strict punishment and even execution (Ibid). However, Saudi 
Arabia appears to be exempted from human rights- related pressure and sanctions. Thus, the validity 
of causes behind the authorization of human rights-related sanctions against Iran is highly 
problematic. 
 
3) The opposing countries’ record 
Iranian officials have been questioning the opposing countries’ causes in authorizing human rights-
related sanctions against Iran by pointing out the violation of human rights in the countries that have 
authorized sanctions, or are drafting resolutions against Iran. 
Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenyee, asserts that “ anyone can talk about human rights, but 
not the U.S., who is the biggest human rights violator in the world” (Iran’s supreme leader website 
August 9, 2015). 
He affirms that the U.S. actions speaks for itself: it is the only country that has used nuclear bombs in 
all of history, it provides unconditional support to Israel in killing Palestinians (especially in Gaza), it 
tortures and detains without trial in prisons such as Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, it commits drone 
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strikes and kills civilians in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and discriminates against its own black people. 
These are all examples of the worldwide violations of human rights committed by the U.S. (Ibid). 
Canada has predominantly drafted all the human rights-related resolutions against Iran, however 
according to Mohammad Javad Larijani, Iran’s head of the human rights council, its own record is 
stained by crime and discrimination against Aboriginal peoples in Canada. The incarceration of 
Indigenous peoples in Canada is at a far higher level than is found for other Canadians. He affirms 
that “it is difficult to believe that Canada is truly concerned with the violation of human rights in Iran, 
while Canada voted against the resolution condemning Israel over its crimes in Gaza and closed its 
eyes on the killing of hundreds of Palestinian women and men in Gaza”. (Raja News Website 
November 20, 2010). 
 
• Progressive trend 
Iran admits that there are deficits and some laws, e.g. law on death penalty regarding narcotic crimes that 
need to be changed. According to Iran’s narrative, Iran’s human rights situation is a work in progress, 
and like many other countries, it is trying to improve its human rights situation in accordance with its 
own cultural-religious framework and security imperatives. 
Death penalty; 
The majority of executions in Iran are a result of narcotic trafficking convictions. Iran has underscored in 
its response to the UN Special Rapporteur’s report on human rights in Iran that since Iran is a neighbor of 
the biggest producer of narcotics in the world, Afghanistan, it has to adopt strict policy to confront the 
massive and organized drug smuggling to Iran and through Iran to European countries (Judiciary of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran High Council for Human Rights May 17, 2015) . Organized narcotic trafficking 
is taking a great toll on Iran. More than 4000 soldiers have lost their lives and over 12000 have been 
injured. Furthermore, Iran spends hundreds of millions of dollars annually to confront the narcotic 
smuggling network and on its own rehabilitation policies (Ibid). According to Mohammad Javad 
Larijani, Iran’s head of the human rights council, “it is so sad that we are witnessing such a high number 
of executions related to narcotic crimes under the current law. We are trying to change the law and if we 
succeed the number of executions will be reduced by 80%” (ISNA Oct 11, 2015). 
The Situation of Women; 
a) Education: Iranian women are increasingly being admitted into universities and are surpassing males. 
For instance, the percentage of female university students increased by more than 25% in ten years 
from 1991 to2001 (1370-1380) (Tabatabaei yazdi August 2007, 2). Of the general entrance exams of 
universities in 2008, 63% of participants were female and 37% were male (Aftab News Website 
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October 19, 2010). This imbalance triggered serious concerns among Iranian policymakers regarding 
the executive imperatives, and the social and economic ramifications, and pushed them towards 
adopting gender share allocation policies. More recent statistics illustrate a more balanced 
distribution among female and male university students (Aftab News Website October 19, 2010). 
However, even after adopting the controversial gender share allocation policies, statistics reveal that 
more than 60% of accepted participants in university entrance exams in 2012 were woman (BBC 
September 12, 2012). 
b) Workforce: According to Article 4 of Islamic Republic of Iran Labor Law, each individual, regardless 
of gender, has the right to choose her/his desired job, provided it is not against Islam and public good 
and rights (Ministry of Cooperatives Labour and Social Welfare website). However, the 
unemployment rate of women is still remarkably higher than that of men. The unemployment rate 
among young women (between 20-24 years old) living in cities is 54.1%, while it is 23.8% for men at 
the same age (Tabnak News Site July 20, 2014). 
 
1.2.3. Examining the criterion 
According to the opposing countries’ s narrative, Iran is an  “International norm-breaker”. 
 
Table 2.6. The Opposing countries narrative on Iran’s human rights situation 





Iran has systematically 
violated human rights and 
there is enough evidence to 
claim the deterioration of the 







1) Religious and 
ethnic 
discrimination 
- There is systematic abuse 
against religious minorities, 
specifically Baha’is 
- Iranian ethnic minorities 
confront ongoing 
discrimination in law and 
  




Gender discrimination is 
codified into Iran’s national 
law and Sharia. Women do not 
enjoy equal rights with men in 
issues such as inheritance, 
marriage, divorce and child 
custody. Their court 
testimonies are worth half the 
weight of a man’s and the life 
value of a woman is 
considered less than a man’s 
3) Widespread 
practice of the 
death penalty and 
torture; 
Iran stands in the second place, 
after China, in the practice of 
execution 
4) Violation of due 
process 
Iran grossly violates due 
process through unfair trials, 
trials behind closed doors, 
trials without access to defense 
lawyers, ambiguous charges 
such as enmity against God 
(moharebeh) and corruption on 
the earth 
5) Violation of 
political rights 
Iran applies systematic 
restrictions on peaceful 
assemblies, freedom of 
expression, free access to the 
Internet, political and human 
rights activists, independent 
journalists, lawyers, and the 
media 
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Table 2.7.   Iran’s narrative on the allegations against its human rights situation 
Iran’s narrative 
General argument Foreign policy tool; 
The Opposing countries has been appealing to 











(a) Islamic & cultural 
particularities 
Western human rights are not universal and 
cultural and religious particularities should be 
taken into account. 
 
(b) Regional countries’ 
record 
Iran’s human rights situation is much better than 
many other countries (e.g. Saudi Arabia) in the 
region; nevertheless, those countries are exempted 
from the sanctions of the opposing countries, 
which undermine the opposing countries’ cause to 
authorize sanctions against Iran. 
(c) The opposing 
countries’ record 
The U.S. record on human rights is stained: 
. Usage of nuclear bomb 
. Unconditional support of Israel’s crime in Gaza 
. Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib prisons (torture and 
detentions without trial) 
. Drone strikes 
. Discrimination against Black and Hispanic 
Americans; high discrimination and abuse of 
illegal persons 




Death penalty Iran is trying to change the law on narcotic-related 
execution, which would reduce the execution rate 
by 80%. 
Women’s rights Women’s rights in Iran are progressing. For 
example, more than 60% of admitted participants 
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1.3. Comparative just cause for terrorism-related sanctions against Iran 
The U.S. designated Iran as a “state sponsor of terrorism” on January 23, 198440 (Katzman May 7, 2014, 
3). Although only the U.S has authorized terrorism-related sanctions against Iran, many other countries 
have been accompanying the U.S in reiterating the same allegations. 
1.3.1. The U.S. narrative 
The U.S. argument, which created the foundational cause of terrorism-related sanctions authorizations 
against Iran, is made up of the following categories: 
a) Terrorism sponsorship 
Iran has been supporting the alleged terrorist group, Hezbollah, in the region for a long time. The 
U.S., Canada, Israel and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have all recognized Hezbollah as a 
terrorist organization. Hamas has also been classified as a terrorist organization by the U.S., the 
European Union, Canada, Israel and Japan. 
b) Threat to the peace process; According to the opposing countries’ narrative, Iran’s multi-faceted 
support (funding and training), of alleged terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas has posed a 
threat to the peace process in the region (Levitt July 25, 2012, 1-15). 
c) State terrorism 
According to the U.S. narrative, Iran has been involved in a series of extraterritorial terrorism-related 
activities such as: the truck bombing of the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks in Lebanon (1983, 
Lebanese Hezbollah ), bombings of the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait (1983, Da’wa Party of 
Iraq),  the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires (1992, Lebanese Hezbollah), the bombing 
of the Argentine-Jewish Mutual Association (AMIA) building in Buenos Aires (1994, Lebanese 
Hezbollah), and the bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia (1996, Saudi Hezbollah) ” (Katzman 
March 5, 2014, 35-6). Additionally, Iran was involved in extraterritorial assassinations of its political 
dissidents in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Katzman March 5, 2014, 35). 
 
1.3.2. Iran’s narrative 
a) Supporting emancipation movements; 
There is no doubt that Iran was actively providing military and financial support for the Lebanese 
Hezbollah in the 1980s and the early 1990s and in recent years (Sakhaei Ardakani 2010, 314). 
                                                
40 The Hezbollah attack on U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon in October 1983 triggered the designation of Iran as a “ state sponsor of terrorism” by 
the U.S. Secretary of States (Kenneth	Katzman,	Iran	Sanctions,	Congressional	Research	Service,[May	7,	2014]	, 3). 
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However, according to Iran’s narrative, unlike the U.S who identifies Hezbollah as a terrorist group, 
Iran recognizes it as an emancipation movement that fights against the occupation of the southern 
part of Lebanon by Israel. Thus, for Iran, it is legitimate and justifiable to defend the emancipation 
movement (Ibid, 120-1). 
b) Peace process 
Iran does not view its support of Hezbollah and Hamas as an obstacle for the peace process. On the 
contrary, Iran believes that there will be no hope for Middle East Peace unless there is recognition of 
Palestinian’s self-determination right (Ibid, 120-1). 
c) Self-defense; 
Iran rejects the allegations of conducting extraterritorial terrorist attacks against U.S. interests. 
Although Iran’s participation in some of the terroristic activities is undeniable, most of them have 
been carried out against two enemies of Islamic Republic of Iran,  (1) Mojahedin-e-Khalgh (MEK) 
and (2) Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan in Iraq. These groups have carried out many terrorist-
type operations against Iran inside and outside of the country in which many Iranian people and some 
Iranian leaders have lost their lives41. Thus, these two groups have been among Iran’s security 
concerns, and consequently, Iran describes its operations against them as a part of a self-defense 















                                                
41 According to the U.S. ministry of foreign affairs’ report, MEK attacked Iran’s embassies in 13 countries in the first 9 months of 1997. It took 
responsibility for 194 terrorist operations. As a consequence of these activities, on October 8th 1997, the U.S. ministry of foreign affairs finally named 
MEK a terrorist organization (  Roohollah Sakhaei Ardakani, the U.S. Sanctions Against Iran (Failure of a Sanction)  [( تحریم آمریکا علیھ ایران (شکست یک
 .(Tehran: Arvan, 2010) ,119-20) [تحریم
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Table 2.8. The U.S and Iran’s narratives on terrorism 






(a) Iran supports 
terrorist groups 





(b) Iran’s support 
of the terrorist 
groups has posed a 
threat to the peace 
process in the 
region 
 
There will be no 
hope for Middle 
East Peace unless 
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Just Authorization of Sanctions (Part II) 
1. Right objective 
There is a profound split between the sanctioners and Iran’s narratives over the sanctions’ core 
objectives. While, the sanctioners proclaim that each sanction regime has been authorized to meet a 
specific core objective, Iran does not distinguish separate sanctions and discrete objectives.  In the 
Iranian perspective, all sanction regimes pursue a set of objectives different from the officially 
announced core objectives. 
 
1.1. The sanctioners’ narrative on sanctions core objectives 
The three different sanctions regimes of nuclear, human rights, and terrorism-related, have been 
authorized against Iran with the following core objectives: 
 
• Nuclear-related sanctions: Nonproliferation 
The officially stated core objective of nuclear-related sanctions against Iran is nonproliferation. 
Gary Samore, White House WMD Coordinator, asserts that authorizing nuclear-related 
sanctions against Iran would curtail Iran’s nuclear program, and would pose serious obstacles to 
the regime’s endeavors to acquire nuclear material. Moreover, it would enforce “the credibility 
and integrity of international nonproliferation regimes” (katzman April 22, 2014, 3). However, 
the sanctioners’ narrative is not unified on how the core objective of nonproliferation should be 
met. There are two dominant approaches: 
a. “ Full dismantlement” objective; This step would lead to a nonproliferation core objective; 
Israel, Canada and some republicans in the U.S. believe that only by full dismantlement of 
Iran’s nuclear program would the core objective of nonproliferation become accessible42 
(Ibid). 
b. Limitation and transparency objective; This step would lead to the nonproliferation core 
objective; Supporters of this objective believe that provided sanctions would secure the 
objective of limited and extensively monitored uranium enrichment; the core objective of 
nonproliferation would be secured too (Ibid). Nevertheless, the first approach has been 
                                                
42 Even after Iran and P5+1 reached the Geneva interim agreement, The Joint Plan of Action (JPA) in November 2013, in which Iran is entitled 
to preserve the right of limited uranium enrichment, Canada emphasized the necessity of the full dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear program. John 
Bird, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs in the cabinet of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, asserted that “We have made-in-Canada foreign 
policy”, and Canada will not lift or ease its sanctions until the full dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear program 	(Barrie	Mckenna,	,”	Canada	'Deeply	
Skeptical'	Iran	Will	Follow	through	on	Nuclear	Deal,"	The	Globe	and	Mail,	Nov.	24	2013). 
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receiving fewer acceptances as the pace of Iran’s nuclear development and investments were 
increasing. Gary Sick, an American special expert on Iran, believes that no one should expect 
Iran to overlook its decades of nuclear experience and program. There is no doubt that the full 
dismantlement scenario is unrealistic (Canada. Parliament. Senate. Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2012, 19). Most significantly Iran has financially 
invested to an enormous extent in its nuclear program and has tied its national pride to it 
(Bahgat 2005, 35). The Geneva interim agreement or the Joint Plan of Action  (JPA), which 
was signed between Iran and P5+ 1 on 24 November 2013 revealed and deepened the existing 
gap between the supporters of “full dismantlement” and “limitation and transparency” 
objectives (Semati and Hormozi 2014, 22). 
 
• Human rights-related sanctions: human rights promotion 
According to the senders’ narrative, the core objective of human rights-related sanctions against 
Iran is to push the regime to respect human rights values (Long and Luers 2012, 7). 
 
• Terrorism-related sanctions: Counterterrorism 
According to the U.S., preventing Iran from supporting so-called terrorist groups such as the 
Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas is a core objective of terrorism-related sanctions (Long and 
Luers 2012, 7). 
 
1.2. Iran’s narrative on sanctions’ core objectives 
The predominant narrative among Iranian authorities is that the stated objectives by sanctions senders 
are a guise, or in the most optimistic scenario, secondary to the genuine objectives. Iran does not view 
a distinct and separate core objective for each type of sanction, especially when it comes from the U.S, 
the only actor who has authorized all three nuclear, human rights, and terrorism-related sanctions. 
According to Iran’s narrative, sanctions should be viewed in the broader picture and in the context of 
the U.S. containment policy against Iran (Moshirzadeh and Jafari 2012, 62). In other words, sanctions 
are one of the elements of the containment policy. Thus, containment policy objectives such as a 
regime change, behavior change, and the reduction of Iran’s regional influence, are all extended to the 
objectives of sanctions. 
• Policy Context: containment policy 
The containment policy is historically rooted in the Dual Containment Policy (DCP), which was 
framed by Martin Indyk, the Clinton White House adviser on the Middle East in 1993. 
  
     74 
According to the policy of dual containment, both Iraq and Iran were identified as U.S. strategic 
enemies and had to be contained. The threat of Saddam Hussein had to be neutralized through 
regime change and Iran’s threat had to be contained by pressuring Iran to change its behavior in 
its domestic and regional policies (Millward 1995, 2). The dual containment policy was later 
known as containment policy. The containment policy objectives’ spectrum stretches from 
regime change to behavior change and the reduction of Iran’s regional influence. According to 
Iran’s narrative, sanctions are not a distinct policy but an element of containment policy. Thus 
sanction objectives are the same as containment policy objectives: 
 
a) Regime change 
Theoretically, a hegemonic power objectives toward a revolutionary state vary from 
changing behavior to toppling the regime and this is the case for the U.S objectives and 
policies as a “hegemonic power” towards Iran as a “revolutionary state”. (Moshirzadeh and 
Jafari 2012, 51). Many Iranian authorities strongly believe that the true and ultimate 
objective of sanctions is not to stop Iran’s nuclear program but to change the regime 
(Shariati-Nia and Towhidi 2013, 100). Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, 
affirmed in one of his speeches addressing the Experts Council  members :” The opposing 
countries imposition of sanctions on Iran has a long run objective … and that is confronting 
the Islamic regime” (Delavar pour aghdam , Mostafa and Moadi roodsary 2014, 121-148). 
The objective of regime change has been systematically pursued by some American 
policymakers. For instance, a bill in the 111th Congress states that the U.S. policy should 
support the toppling of the regime (The Iran Democratic Transition Act, S. 3008). (Katzman 
March 5, 2014, 61-62). There are two approaches in the U.S to toppling Iran’s regime: war 
and soft toppling (Moshirzadeh and Jafari 2012, 68). The Iranian narrative stresses that the 
behavior of the U.S. towards Iran over the past 30 years, including the imposition of 
sanctions, reveals the veiled objective of “soft toppling” (Emamjomezadeh and Moradi 
2009, 55). 
b) Behavior change 
According to Iran’s narrative, U.S. policies towards Iran have always been centred around 
the two-pronged objective of regime change and behavior change (Moshirzadeh and Jafari 
2012, 70). Since 2005, U.S. concerns about Iran’s nuclear program have led to a shift in 
foreign policy. The U.S has been focused on changing Iran’s behavior rather than toppling 
its regime (Ibid, 69). 
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c) Reducing and containing Iran’s regional influence 
According to Iran’s narrative the important objectives of containment policy, which have 
been pursued through the imposition of sanctions, are to contain and reduce Iran’s regional 
influence and power. These objectives are to be met by empowering Iran’s rivals, 
weakening Iran’s alliances, and reducing Iran’s strategic capabilities. 
 
In summary, based on the Iranian parliament’s Research Center report, none of the 
opposing countries announced objectives (nonproliferation, promotion of human rights, and 
counter-terrorism), is among Iran’s understanding of genuine sanction objectives. 
According to this report, the following goals are the actual objectives of sanctions: 
 
a) Isolating Iran regionally and globally; 
b) Generating domestic insecurity; 
c) Generating a gap between society and authorities (ruling system); 
d) Gaining concession from Iran in nuclear negotiations; 
e) Limiting the defensive and deterrence capability of the armed forces; 
f) Forcing Iran to give up indigenizing uranium enrichment technology and producing 
nuclear fuel (Delaavar Pour Aghdam October 2012, 3). 
 
1.3. Examining the criterion 
 
Table 3.1 The sender’s narrative on sanctions’ core objectives 
Sanctions Core objective Senders 
Nuclear-related Nonproliferation UN, US, EU 
Human rights-related Promotion of human 
rights 
US, EU 
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Table 3.2 Iran’s narrative on sanctions’ core objectives 
Sanctions Core objective Senders Policy 
context 


























2. Last resort 
The definition of appealing to sanctions as the last resort suggests “the imposition of sanctions must be 
preceded by other, less-coercive instruments.” (Amstutz 2005, 188). There are other options before resorting 
to sanctions. These include: diplomacy, covert measures, incentive measures, legal referrals and threats of the 
use of military force or sanctions 
2.1. The opposing countries’ narrative on appealing to nuclear-related sanctions as the “last 
resort” 
According to the opposing countries’ narrative, all other less-coercive instruments were examined 
before appealing to sanctions, but they either failed or were insufficient.  In other words, the 
authorization of sanctions was the last resort after the failure of other less-coercive tools such as 
negotiations, incentive measures, military threats, covert operations and legal referrals. 
• Negotiations failed 
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The dominant opposing countries’ narrative is that sanctions against Iran were authorized as the 
last resort because the negotiations failed (Crane 2012, 111). The blame for negotiations failure 
should be put on Iran because Iran’s intention to negotiate has not been to reach an agreement 
but to buy time and develop its nuclear ambitions. As Hassan Rouhani once mentioned, “the 
discussions with the Europeans have made it possible for Iran to gain time and make important 
progress in key sectors.” (Delpech 2012, 40). The widespread belief in the opposing countries is 
that, as a general rule, diplomacy is doomed to fail with all authoritarian regimes, including 
Iran, since these types of political systems need an enemy to survive (Ibid, 42). Even the Paris 
Agreement of November 2004, in which Iran demonstrated a remarkable cooperation and 
transparency in its nuclear program by suspending its uranium enrichment and voluntarily 
implementation of the Additional Protocol, it was just a short-time success of negotiation 
efforts. Undersecretary Burns in May 2005 emphasized that “Iran’s repeated brinkmanship in 
its negotiations with the EU3 . . . is part of Iran’s continuing effort to divide the international 
community, weaken our resolve and avoid adhering to its international obligations“(Rajiv 2014, 
688-702). Thus, negotiations with Iran failed, in spite of Iran’s tactical and short time 
cooperation, and paved the way for applying more coercive tools. 
 
• Incentives were offered 
Different incentive packages had been offered to Iran before appealing to sanctions. 
Nonetheless Iran had chosen to turn them down and develop its nuclear program. On 5 August 
2005, the EU3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) all proposed a “Framework for a 
Long Term Agreement”, including a comprehensive nuclear and economic incentive package in 
return for complete suspension. However, Ahmadinejad, who was newly elected as the 
president, rejected the proposal and Iran resumed uranium enrichment in the same month. Later, 
in February 2006, Iran announced that it would discontinue its provisional implementation of 
the Additional Protocol (Krause 2012, 57-59). 
Furthermore, the P5+1 (or the E3+3), which includes the EU-3 and China, Russia, and the 
United States, a diplomatic alliance which became active in 2006, offered an incentive package 
to Iran in June 2006, Iran was offered economic, political, security and nuclear cooperation in 
return for halting its uranium enrichment and ensuring full compliance with the IAEA/UNSC 
resolutions (Rajiv 2014, 919-20). The incentives which were offered to Iran included 
supporting Iran’s integration in the world economy by accepting Iran’s membership in the 
WTO, cooperation in high technology, partnership with the EU in the Energy sector, nuclear 
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cooperation (building light water reactors and nuclear fuel waste management), and lifting 
constraints on the civil aviation sector (Ibid, 919-20). Hence, enough incentives were offered, 
but it was Iran who impeded the diplomatic path by not accepting the incentives and continuing 
uranium enrichment (Ibid, 919-20). Robert J. Reardon, Adjunct Associate political scientist at 
RAND Corporation, proclaims that many incentive packages were offered to Iran since 2002 
yet Iran had never been convinced to stop its nuclear program due to the following reasons: 
a) Hardliners and conservatives have been taking advantage from the antagonistic 
relations with the opposing countries, especially the US, thus any incentive package 
would hardly convince them to agree on any nuclear deal; 
b) Incentives have been viewed as a threat by some ruling elites, targeting Iran’s 
independence and domestic stability; 
c) The fragmented domestic political landscape is a serious barrier to any nuclear deal 
with a single political group; 
d) The inflexible position of both sides has devalued the offered incentives (the opposing 
countries have been insisting on complete suspension of uranium enrichment, whereas 
Iran has always been stating that uranium enrichment is its redline) (Reardon 2012, 
141-144). 
 
• Resolutions, covert operations and military threats were insufficient 
The IAEA Board of Governors had issued nine resolutions on Iran before referring Iran’s case to 
the UNSC43. The ninth resolution was adopted on February 4, 2006 in which the IAEA Board of 
Governors requested the Director General to report to the UNSC the required steps that Iran 
should take (GOV/2006/14 February 4, 2006, 2). It was only after recognition of Iran’s non-
compliance with the IAEA’s resolutions by the IAEA Board of Governors that Iran’s case was 
referred to the UNSC in February 2006. As the first step, the UNSC issued a non-legally binding 
statement asking Iran to comply with its obligation under the IAEA resolutions. Iran’s failure to 
meet its obligations convinced the UNSC to take the second step and pass the legally binding 
resolution 1696 under Article 40 of Chapter VII, in July 2006 (Katzman March 5, 2014, 26). This 
resolution was the final step before appealing to sanctions as the last resort. The resolution 1696, 
gave Iran one month until August 31, 2006, to meet its obligations set by the IAEA 44. Iran failed 
                                                
43 For further reading on the IAEA Board of Governors resolutions, see the link bellow: 
	"IAEA	and	Iran	-	IAEA	Resolutions":	https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iran/iaea-and-iran-iaea-resolutions.	 
44 These demands include: the suspension of uranium enrichment and heavy-water reactor construction and the ratification of the Additional 
Protocol (AP) 	(Katzman,	Iran:	U.S.	Concerns	and	Policy	Responses	  
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to comply with Resolution 1696 and thus the UNSC appealed to sanctions as the last resort, and 
authorized Resolution 1737 under Article 41 of Chapter VII, in December 200645. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Prior step taken by the IAEA and UNSC before appealing to sanctions as the last resort 
 
Furthermore, the U.S. has been involved in covert operations to slow down Iran’s nuclear program before 
and after the authorization of the UN sanctions in 2006 (Kerr October 17, 2012, 26). The most famous cyber-
attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities is known as Operation Olympic Games. In this instance, a computer worm, 
named Stuxnet, attacked computers in Natanz nuclear facility (Vielhaber and Bleek 2012, 484-5). Stuxnet 
infected about 1000 centrifuges and caused them to spin out of control (Albright and others 2013, 59). 
Operation Olympic Games was authorized by President George W. Bush in 2006, and President Obama 
reauthorized it three years later (Vielhaber and Bleak 2012, 484-5). 
The time and scope of most of the covert operations are not publicly known, yet the budget allocation by the 
U.S. Congress is an acknowledgement of such polices46. 
In addition to the covert operations, the U.S. and Israel have been constantly threatening Iran of using 
military force to stop Iran’s nuclear program. It has always been the position of the U.S. that all options 
including military actions are on the table to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear-armed power. However, 
the continuous military threat has not deterred Iran from developing its nuclear program to this point. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
March 5 2014, 26). 
45 It is mandatory to comply with resolutions taken under Article 40, but it is Article 41 which refers to economic sanctions and Article 42 which 
gives the permission of military action. (Ibid, 26) 
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• Limited airstrike would have a paradoxical effect 
According to the opposing countries’ narrative, a limited airstrike was not an option prior to 
appealing to sanctions, due to its paradoxical effects. A limited or surgical airstrike against Iran’s 
nuclear facilities could not destroy Iran’s nuclear program completely. On the contrary, it could 
provide Iran with enough drive and justification to more quickly possess nuclear weapons 
(Reardon 2012, 141-144). 
• Nuclear Iran was not tolerable 
Tolerating a nuclear Iran, even without nuclear weapons, had never been an option before 
appealing to sanctions. The widespread belief in the opposing countries is that Iran’s leaders are 
irrational actors and the logic of nuclear deterrence is not applicable to this regime (Waltz 2012, 
2-5). In other words, a knife should never be in the hands of an irrational actor. Israel has been 
adopting an even less tolerant position by viewing “Iranian enrichment capacity alone as an 
unacceptable threat” (Ibid). 
 
2.2. Iran’s narrative on appealing to nuclear-related sanctions as the “last resort” 
According to Iran’s dominant narrative, authorizing nuclear-related sanctions against Iran was not the last 
resort, but a political choice. This reasoning is based on the following three main arguments: 
• Negotiations could succeed 
According to Iran’s narrative, negotiations could succeed: 
a) If the opposing countries did not have maximalist demands; For a long time the opposing 
countries were insisting on the indefinite suspension solution in return for the offered 
incentives, and was not ready to compromise on the level of uranium enrichment in Iran. 
However, as Iran’s foreign minister, Zarif, has asserted, “suspension is not a solution in 
itself”, and the opposing countries cannot request indefinite suspension (Zarif 2006). In fact, 
the logic behind uranium suspension is to provide enough time for the IAEA inspector to 
conduct an investigation and verification. Iran did provide this by suspending its uranium 
enrichment for about two years, but no long-term solution was proposed by the opposing 
countries other than the overemphasis of indefinite suspension (Ibid). 
If the opposing countries could lower its demands and recognize Iran’s inalienable right to 
enrich uranium as a signatory party to the NPT, as it finally did in the Joint Plan of Action 
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(JPA), and later in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), negotiations could have 
succeed earlier47. 
b) If the opposing countries had appreciated Iran’s nuclear cooperation under president 
Khatami; Iran announced to the IAEA in October 2003, that it had adopted a full disclosure 
policy and was ready to fully collaborate with the IAEA to clarify the peaceful nature of its 
nuclear program. Subsequently, the IAEA inspectors were allowed to visit locations of 
concerns, verify nuclear-related materials, and even interview individuals who were involved 
in Iran’s nuclear program (GOV/2011/65 8 November 2011, Annex page 1). As another 
cooperative course of action, Iran signed the Additional Protocol (AP) in December 2003, and 
voluntarily suspended uranium enrichment. In sum, from 2003 to early 2006, Iran performed 
unprecedented cooperation with the IAEA.  But according to Hossein Mousavian, Iranian 
former top nuclear negotiator under president Khatami, the opposing countries missed the 
opportunity and failed to negotiate seriously (Mousavian 2012). 
c) If the opposing countries were not giving a cold shoulder to Iran’s proposals; 
While the opposing countries were insisting on the indefinite suspension solution, Iran was 
trying to propose long-term solutions that would guarantee peaceful enrichment rather than 
indefinite suspension (Zarif 2006). Yet, the responses of the opposing countries were 
disappointing. 
1) In 2003, Iran, under president Khatami, suggested a comprehensive negotiations 
package, including not only Iran’s nuclear program, but also possible regional co-
operation. Yet the response of the White House was ‘‘we don’t speak to evil.’’48 (BBC 
18 January 2007). 
2) On March 23, 2005, Iran proposed a comprehensive package to the EU3 (France, 
Germany and Britain), in the absence of Iran-US contact, announcing its permission to 
around-the-clock IAEA inspections and its readiness to prohibit developing nuclear 
weapons through national legislation. Although the E3 was keen to work on this 
proposal, the offer was refused due to the U.S. opposition (Zarif 2006). The EU3 
overlooked the March 2005 Iranian offer and decided to wait until Iran’s presidential 
election time which was a few months later in June, hoping that Akbar Hashemi 
                                                
47 Many non-Iranians scholars also believe that the West overemphasize on complete enrichment suspension solution rigorously harmed the 
negotiations (Joachim	Krause,	Iran’s	Nuclear	Programme:	Strategic	Implications	Routledge,	2012	, 59). 
48 The plan was rejected by Vice-President Dick Cheney's office. “One of the then Secretary of State Colin Powell's top aides told the BBC the 
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Rafsanjani would win and they could reach a better deal. However, it turned out that 
Mahmood Ahmadinejad won the election (Krause 2012, 57-59). Thus, another 
opportunity was missed. 
3) On Sept. 17, 2005, Iran suggested that it is ready to continue its uranium enrichment 
inside the country with the partnership of other countries to maximize the enrichment’s 
transparency. The partnership offer was refused (Zarif 2006). 
4) On March 30, 2006, Iran proposed the establishment of consortia for fuel-cycle 
development with regional and non-regional countries. “No one cared to respond to 
this proposal” (Zarif 2006). 
 
• Iran’s nuclear dossier could have been held in the IAEA 
According to Iran’s narrative, it was the political pressure and not technical or legal reasons which 
led to the referral of Iran’s nuclear dossier from the IAEA to the UNSC. In fact, according to 
Hossein Mousavian, Iranian former top nuclear negotiator, the referral of Iran’s nuclear dossier 
from the IAEA to the UNSC was “illegal and illegitimate” (Jamejamonline News Website 
Febraury 25, 2013) . 
A number of states, and non-state actors, including US, Israel, AIPAC, ISIS49, were highly 
involved in leading the IAEA Board of Governors’ policies toward Iran and in supposedly 
bringing it out of the IAEA technical body and to the UNSC security body. The IAEA course of 
action in referring Iran’s nuclear dossier to the UNSC has raised criticisms even among non-
Iranians. Some consider this referral as a premature decision of the Board of Governors since this 
decision was made without any real evidence of breaching the NPT or related Safeguards by Iran 
(Dupont 2012, 7). 
In sum, according to Iran’s narrative, if it was not for the political pressure, Iran’s dossier could 
have been judged within the IAEA and not the UNSC. Hence, authorizing sanctions was not the 
last resort, but a political choice. 
 
• Nuclear Iran could be tolerated 
Iran is a signatory party to the NPT, and consequently has the right to enjoy peaceful nuclear 
technology without discrimination. Thus the Iranian narrative principally does not accept the 
opposing countries’ intolerance regarding Iran’s nuclear capability. Tolerating nuclear Iran could 
                                                
49 Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) is a nongovernmental US based organization, that has been remarkably active in 
depicting Iran’s nuclear program as a threat (S. Samuel C. Rajiv, "‘Politicised Safeguards’: Iran–IAEA Contentions, Drivers and Policy 
Implications," Strategic Analysis 38, no. 5 (2014), 689). 
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be another option rather than appealing to sanctions as the so-called last resort. There are 
countries such as Japan, who have acquired highly advanced nuclear technology and have decided 
not to build a nuclear weapon. Instead of tolerating nuclear Iran as it has been tolerating countries 
like Japan, the opposing countries authorized sanctions. Some opposing countries scholars such as 
Kenneth Waltz have also supported this option, and believe that the opposing countries should 
have tolerated nuclear Iran50 (Waltz 2012, 2-5). 
 
2.3. Studying the “last resort” criterion regarding human rights and terrorism-related sanctions 
against Iran 
There is a fundamental difference between the “last resort” criterion regarding the human rights and 
terrorism-related sanctions against Iran, and nuclear-related sanctions against Iran: 
• In the case of Iran’s record on human rights; The US and EU have appealed to sanctions, while the 
UN, the most legitimate sanctions authorizer, has been exercising other less coercive tools, such as 
issuing resolutions and appointing a Special Rapporteur other than appealing to sanctions. In other 
words, authorizing human rights and terrorism-related sanctions against Iran has not been the last 
resort, at least for the UN, up to this point. Hence, while appealing to sanctions has not been the last 
resort for the UN, it could have hardly been the last resort for other actors. 
• In the case of the Iran’s alleged support for terrorism; only the US has appealed to the sanctions 
tool. The EU and the UN have not considered sanctions as the last resort. Thus, in comparison to 
human rights-related sanctions, it is even harder to accept the U.S. claim in appealing to sanctions 
as the last resort. 
 
In sum, it is hard to assert that authorizing the human rights-related sanctions by the US and EU 
was the last resort, while the UN is still suggesting other less coercive tools. It is even harder to 
claim that the terrorism-related sanctions, authorized just by the US, was the last resort, while both 
the UN and the EU had not been convinced to resort to the sanctions tool. It is worth noticing that 
some specialists believe that basically appealing to sanctions for the purpose of promoting human 
rights would have a paradoxical effect, and that the proper alternative to sanctions would be to 
continue to raise the human rights issue and to support human rights projects (Dalacoura 2003, 57). 
                                                
50 Waltz even considers a nuclear-armed Iran to be one of the best possible scenarios for the region’s stability. He proclaims that, based on 
nuclear deterrence logic, nuclear-armed Iran would enhance the stability in the Middle East because Iran and Israel would deter each other and 
the regional balance of power would be restored. In contrast to the West’s attempt to depict Iranian leaders as irrational actors, nuclear-armed 
Iran, like India, Pakistan and China would choose the self-preservation principle over the self-destruction principle (	Kenneth	N.	Waltz,	"Why	
Iran	should	Get	the	Bomb,"	Foreign	Affairs	91,	no.	4	(2012),	2-5.	 
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2.4. Examining the criterion 
The opposing countries and Iran’s narratives on sanctions as the “last resort” are completely opposed. 
The opposing countries’ narrative asserts that appealing to nuclear-related sanctions against Iran was 
the “last resort” while Iran proclaims that authorizing sanctions was a “political choice” rather than the 
last resort. 
 










succeed + Iran’s 
proposals were 
overlooked 
Legal referral IAEA referred the case 
to the UNSC 
The dispute was 
resolvable within the 
IAEA 




- Military threat + Covert 
operations were 
destructive 
-Nuclear Iran could be 
tolerated as an option 
 
3. Proportionality in Authorization 
Proportionality refers to the equivalence between the breached rule/norm and its consequences on one 
hand and the nature and scope of the countermeasures on the other (Cannizzaro 2001, 891). Hence, the 
chosen tool, sanctions, should be proportionate to the committed wrong and/or the exposed threat, and it 
should also take into account the predictable consequences. 
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3.1. The opposing countries’ narrative on nuclear-related sanctions proportionality 
There are two narratives in the opposing countries regarding the proportionality of nuclear-related 
sanctions against Iran: 
a) Sanctions are a proportionate tool; 
According to this approach, the authorization of nuclear-related sanctions is both an equivalent 
international response to Iran’s violation, and a proportionate countermeasure against Iran’s 
nuclear threat and its possible consequences. Based on the opposing countries’ assumptions, 
Iran’s nuclear program seeks to acquire nuclear weapon, nuclear Iran would trigger nuclear 
dominos in the region, nuclear Iran would pass nuclear weapons to the terrorists, and finally 
nuclear Iran would attack Israel. Hence, the prospect of Iran’s nuclear threat is broad and 
devastating enough that a maximum coercive tool short of military action would be the most 
proportionate tool (Dobbins and others Spring 2012). 
b) Sanctions are a disproportionate tool; 
According to this approach, sanctions are a disproportionate tool because they are inadequate to 
deter Iran’s nuclear threat. Sanctions cannot stop Iran’s nuclear program and are therefore unable 
to prevent potentially devastating threats.  Hence, military strikes and not sanctions would be a 
more proportionate tool. Proponents of the military strike approach believe that a strike on Iran “is 
the least bad option” given the exposed threat by Iran’s nuclear program (Kroenig 2012, 76-86). 
Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly warned the international community about the 
disproportionality and inadequacy of the sanctions tool to counter Iran’s nuclear threat. He 
believes that the sanctions tool would not eliminate the threat but would delay it to a "point of no 
return" (Goldberg 2010). Former US Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, also claims that the 
sanctions tool is inadequate to defuse Iran’s nuclear threat. He suggests that “to stop Iran’s bomb, 
bomb Iran” (Bolton March 26, 2015) . 
 
The widespread belief in the opposing countries supports the first approach. 
3.2. Iran’s narrative on nuclear-related sanctions proportionality 
According to Iran’s narrative, nuclear-related sanctions against Iran is a disproportionate tool due to the 
following reasoning: 
 
a) Disproportionality between the tool and the threat 
Iran asserts that at most it has failed to report some of its legal activities, which is different from 
violation. In such a case, according to the NPT, the IAEA and its members would stop offering 
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aid to a partner who has not been committed to its obligations properly. Therefore, referring Iran’s 
dossier to the UNSC in the first place, and then authorizing sanctions was not proportionate to 
what Iran had done especially, because similar cases in the past did not face the same analogous 
countermeasures (Tadayyoni and Tavakkoli 2010, 157). For instance, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Egypt had each failed to report to the IAEA some of their nuclear activities, yet the IAEA not 
only withheld their case referral to the UNSC but it also opted to manifest a considerable 
tolerance towards those nations. It was revealed later that South Korea had uranium enrichment 
up to 77% (Tadayyoni and Tavakkoli, 2010, 157). 
b) Disproportionality between aims and threats (Unconnected aims) 
The prominent belief in Iran is that the nuclear-related sanctions against Iran were authorized to 
obtain broader aims than the announced nonproliferation objective. Sanctions were authorized for 
unconnected aims such as regime change, behavior change and the weakening of Iran’s regional 
power. Thus, the nuclear-related sanctions are a disproportionate tool since they are following 
unconnected-aims. 
c) Disproportionality in scope 
Iran’s nuclear program has inflicted no direct harm whereas the scope of authorized sanctions, as 
a tool of collective punishment, has been affecting its population of 77 million people directly and 
indirectly. 
 
3.3. Proportionality of human rights and terrorism-related sanctions 
Proportionality positions in nuclear-related sanctions authorizations against Iran are more measurable 
than human rights and terrorism-related sanctions. Iran’s narrative on both the proportionality of 
human rights and terrorism-related sanctions are mostly focused on the unconnected aim argument. In 
other words, Iran rejects the opposing countries’ narrative that sanctions are a proportionate tool for 
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Table 3.4 The Opposing countries and Iran’s narratives on proportionality of nuclear-related 
sanctions 
The Opposing countries Iran 
(a) Proportionate tool Disproportionate tool: 
(a) Disproportionality between the 
tool and the threat 
(b) Disproportionality between the 
aims and the threat 
(c ) Disproportionality in scope 
 
(b) Disproportionate tool 





4. High possibility of success (Sanctions efficacy) 
One of the important criteria of the just authorization of sanctions is that a high possibility of success 
should be predictable before appealing to sanctions. 
4.1. How predictable was the effectiveness of sanctions against Iran at the time the sanctions were 
authorized? 
 
a) Core objectives of sanctions against Iran; 
Sanctions are more likely to succeed when they pursue minor issues rather than major ones 
(Amstutz 2005). If they target major core objectives, the target state is more likely to resist 
(Amstutz 2005). 
The officially announced core objectives of nuclear, human rights, and terrorism-related sanctions 
against Iran are (a) nonproliferation, (b) promotion of human rights, and (c) counterterrorism. 
Whereas, the translation of these objectives to the Islamic-revolutionary State of Iran was that Iran 
is required to (a) abandon its nuclear program after a prolonged and financially massive investment 
on it; limit its strategic defensive missiles program (b) overlook its religious identity and cultural 
particularities and (c) overlook its constitutional principle on defending emancipation groups, and 
self-defense strategy.  Iran perceived the objective of sanctions as highly as its survival (regime 
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change), therefore, it was ready to resist with full force. Iran’s readiness to manifest its maximum 
resistance to the authorized sanctions was not unpredictable, given its Islamic-revolutionary 
identity and the antagonistic history with the opposing countries. 
b) Number of sanctioners; 
The possibility of the success of sanctions is higher when they are imposed multilaterally rather 
than unilaterally. Cliff Morgan, Navin Bapat, and Valentin Krustev (2006) studied 888 cases of 
sanctions (threatened and imposed) from 1971 to 2000. The result illustrates that the success rate 
was 39.5 cases and 54.8 cases when sanctions were imposed unilaterally and multilaterally 
respectively (Kordzadeh Kermani 2014, 108-109). Iran has been subject to international and 
multilateral sanctions. The remarkable number of sanctioners had been a promising factor for 
predicting the possibility of the success of sanctions in Iran. 
c) Type of sanctions; 
Comprehensive sanctions are more likely to be successful whereas targeted sanctions are more 
likely to be effective when they are combined with other types of sanctions51. According to a 
survey only about 25% of the sanctions that were implemented out of the framework of 
comprehensive sanctions were successful (Hufbauer and Oegg 2000). 
Sanctions on Iran have become more comprehensive over time, however. Some sanctions have 
been authorized under the name and type of “targeted” or “smart” sanctions. They are more 
comprehensive in practice when they are implemented along with other sanctions and have targeted 
Iran’s core economic sectors. Thus, the possibility of success, based on the sanctions type factor, 
was promising during the time of sanctions authorization. 
d) Type of target regime; 
As a general rule, the possibility of the success of sanctions is more likely when they are imposed 
on democratic regimes (Amstutz 2005). Regardless of whether Iran’s regime is democratic or not, 
the opposing countries have always considered the Islamic Republic of Iran as an undemocratic 
regime. Hence, according to sanctioners, Iran’s type of regime must have been considered a 
negative factor when calculating the success rate of sanctions in Iran 
The possibility of sanctions’ success depends not only on the type of regime but also the role and 
psychology of its leaders, in this case Iran’s supreme leader. Some of the most important statements 
                                                
51 A targeted sanction “means applying pressure on specific decision-making elites and the companies or entities they control”( David	Cortright	
and	George	A.	Lopez,	Smart	Sanctions:	Targeting	Economic	StatecraftRowman	&	Little.ield,	2002	, 2). According to this definition “targeted 
sanctions are actor- and issue-oriented” in which specific individuals, commodities and sectors are carefully selected, while comprehensive 
sanctions are “broad-based and state- and society-oriented” (Mikael	Eriksson,	Targeting	Peace:	Understanding	UN	and	EU	Targeted	
SanctionsAshgate	Publishing,	Ltd.,	2011	, 3). Targeted sanctions are also called “smart sanctions”. 
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by the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, are listed below as a reflection of the regime’s 
position and resistance to sanctions: 
• Inalienable right; 
“Nuclear energy and nuclear technology is the inalienable right of Iran’s nation and no one 
is allowed to overlook this right”... “We will insist on this right and we will achieve it” 
(Delaavar Pour Aghdam October 2012, 4-5) 
• Indigenized nuclear technology; 
Nuclear technology should be indigenized, in spite of the opposing countries’ endeavor to 
deprive Iran from this technology (Ibid, 3-4) 
• Scientific progress: 
“One day our authorities were convinced to have 25 centrifuges in the country but they 
(the opposing countries) said you cannot! Then officials were ready to keep 5 centrifuges, 
but again they said you cannot! Then our officials were convinced to have 3 centrifuges, 
and again they said you cannot! Today you have heard the report that we have 11,000 
centrifuges. If we had backed off and continued to be flexible, today we wouldn’t have 
such a scientific progress” (Iran’s supreme leader website July 24, 2012) . 
• Self-sufficiency and independency; 
“They (the opposing countries), doesn’t want us to have nuclear technology because it 
makes Iran powerful in different fields . They want us not to have this technology, so you 
would remain weak and they can keep imposing their policies easier….ability to produce 
nuclear fuel would be a necessary need for Iran’s nation in near future, and if we don’t 
achieve it today….later we should beg foreigners or probably our enemies.”(Delaavar 
Pour Aghdam 2012, 15)… :” breaking the exclusiveness of a few western countries in 
producing nuclear energy would be in interests of all independent countries including non-
alignment movement countries” (Iran’s supreme leader website August 30, 2012). 
• Sanctions would be beneficial; 
“These pressure would not lead us to revise our policies, rather would assure us in 
continuing our way”. ”… if there were no economic pressure and economic sanctions and 
scientific sanctions our young talents wouldn’t have bloomed ….sanctions triggered the 
inner talent of the nation ... sanctions triggered the country’s officials to take gas self-
sufficiency seriously...sanctions have functioned like catalyzer for self-sufficiency”           
( Delaavar Pour Aghdam 2012, 5-8). 
• Islamic world pride; 
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” The nuclear energy is an indigenous achievement for Iran’s nation, this is a proud 
development for the Islamic world” (Ibid, 13). 
• Manifestation of resistance; 
” Sanctions have 2 advantages for Iran, one is that it triggered us to pay attention to our 
inner capacity….like if there was no sanctions against Iran on arms we couldn’t have been 
able to achieve such an amazing development in this field….., second they have imposed 
sanctions to force Iran to back off…and when we haven’t backed off the splendor of the 
opposing countries would  break in the eyes of regional nations, and it is in our interest” 
… ”We have gradually gained the ability to resist sanctions and become damage-proof 
….bypassing sanctions is a good and interesting way and it’s good that the government 
and nation apply it” ( Ibid, 9-12). 
• Nuclear Weapons are prohibited; 
“I have no doubt that the decision making bodies in those countries who are opposing us 
know that we are not seeking nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are not in our interest. 
Moreover we consider it wrong from the perspective of theory and religion (Feghh). We 
believe that using these weapons is a big sin and keeping them is a useless and dangerous 
job and we never pursue it” (Iran’s supreme leader website June 21, 2004). 
“Iran’s nation has been never seeking to possess nuclear weapons, and will not, and will 
prove to the world that nuclear weapons would not bring authority.” (Iran’s supreme 
leader website February 22,2012). 
 
e) Ability of target to circumvent sanctions; 
As a general rule, along with the increase in the pressure of sanctions over time, the target’s 
adjustment and ability to circumvent sanctions would grow as well (Kordzadeh Kermani 2014, 
107-108). Thus, with protracted sanctions, there would always be a risk of inefficacy, since the 
target learns different ways to circumvent sanctions and adjust itself to survive under the conditions 
of its imposed sanctions. Iran had the experience of U.S. sanctions since the Islamic revolution in 
1979. Thus, it was predictable that before each round of authorizing sanctions Iran would add new 
skills to its ability to circumvent sanctions. 
f) Symmetric issue perception; 
When the subject of sanctions has saliency both inside of the target state and outside of it, sanctions 
are both more justifiable and have a higher possibility of success. Comprehending both elite and 
public opinions over a sanctioned issue is an important factor in predicting the possibility of the 
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success of the sanction. Assessing the elite’s position can illustrate how flexible the target could be 
towards compromise. Likewise, public opinion reveals the importance of sanctioned issues at the 
society level, and how far would people go for change. 
 
• Perception of the Iranian Elite 
Iranian elites’ opinions towards Iran’s nuclear program fall in four main categories (Hadian 2010, 364-
367): 
a) Opponents of nuclear energy; the nuclear energy, from the perspective of its opponents in Iran, is 
harmful for the environment and does not have economic justification for a country which has 
rich oil and gas resources. Some of Iran’s former parliament members belong to this category. 
b) Proponents of nuclear energy; A large number of Iranian elites including politicians (such as 
Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, former president of Iran), political activists, scholars, university 
professors and students are among proponents of peaceful nuclear energy and oppose nuclear 
weapons. Those belonging to this group believe that Iran should not fall behind with new 
technologies and energy sources. 
c) Proponents of nuclear weapons capability; A remarkable number of influential elites inside the 
ruling system, academia, and research institutions support nuclear capability and view the nuclear 
energy oriented purpose as an insufficient approach. Accordingly, nuclear capability is necessary 
for Iran because of two main reasons: security deterrence and nuclear technological 
independency52. 
d) Proponents of nuclear weapons; A small fraction of Iranian elites deem that Iran should withdraw 
from the NPT and build nuclear bombs. Given Iran’s dangerous security environment and the 
antagonistic approach of the opposing countries towards the Islamic Republic of Iran, acquiring 
nuclear bombs is a necessity for Iran53 (Hadian 2010, 364-367). 
 
• Perception of the Iranian public 
It is not easy to understand Iran’s public opinion regarding the nuclear program since there is hardly a 
reliable and independent organization that has conducted a comprehensive survey or poll. In addition, the 
                                                
52 For more information read: 
Hadian, Nasser and Shani Hormozi, 2010. “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Lawful Capability.” Research Letter of Political Science 5 (3) Summer: 179-
214 (Farsi) 
http://www.ipsajournal.ir/?_action=articleInfo&article=126 
53 For instance, Abumohammad Asgarkhani Professor of International Relations at the University of Tehran asserts “if you ask whether Iran 
should possess nuclear weapons I would say that this is a necessity for Iran’s survival strategy… this is a minimum deterrence for our self-
defense in this untrustworthy world”(	Nasser	Hadian,	"Iran’s	Nuclear	Program:	Multiplicity	of	Views	and	Discursive	Context,"	Political	
Quarterly	40,	no.	1	(2010),	367). 
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domestic media has been cautiously maneuvering around the issue, especially before Rouhani was 
elected as the president. 
The general Iranian public perception on Iran’s nuclear program has gradually changed over time. This 
transition   can be explained as having occurred in three stages: 
 
a) Intra-elite debate; 
Iran’s nuclear program had been more of “an intra-elite debate” than a subject of public 
discussion mainly between 1987 and 2003 (Chubin in Krause 2012, 102). Iran’s nuclear program 
was not debated up until the issue became of extreme interest at the international level. 
b) Nuclear pride/ Nuclear populism; 
The Iranian government’s discourse of “the inalienable right of peaceful nuclear energy” 
gradually became dominant and welcomed by many Iranians inside and outside of the country. 
Iran’s capability of building indigenous nuclear technology became a source of national pride. 
However, under president Ahmadinejad, a deviation of “nuclear populism” was generated 
(Chubin in Krause 2012, 103). The nuclear populism was generated by Ahmadinejad’s 
government through over-exaggeration in linking the nuclear program to Iranian’s dignity, 
belittling the international community’s response to it, and finally depicting his government as a 
nuclear hero who revived Iran’s nuclear program after Khatami’s government surrendered to 
opposing countries’ pressure. 
c) Nuclear-Sanctions dualism; 
The nuclear program itself did not have saliency among Iranian people at its first stages. It was 
only after sanctions were authorized and gradually intensified and its impacts touched the lives of 
the Iranian populace that both the nuclear program and more sanctions became the subject of 
public discussion and dissatisfaction. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Iranian perception transition trend on the nuclear issue 
 
 
In sum, the nuclear program did not have “symmetric issue perception” and Iranians had never asked 
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Table 3.5 Possibility of Iran sanctions success at the time the sanctions were authorized 
Sanctions’ success 
factors 
Sanctions are more 
likely to succeed if: 
Case of Iran 
Core objective of 
sanctions 




Type of sanctions Comprehensive Targeted+ 
comprehensive 




Ability of the target 
to circumvent 
sanctions 














4.2. Case study: South Africa 
The history of the success of sanctions is not bright. Among sanctions cases, the case of South Africa 
and the dismantlement of its Apartheid regime, is usually referred to as the most successful example of 
sanctions. However, there are controversial debates about the credit that should be allocated to the role 
and share of sanctions in the case of South Africa. In order to shed light on the importance of the 
“symmetric issue perception” factor in analyzing the possibility of success in sanctions, it is valuable to 
study the case of South Africa. In the case of South Africa, there was a convergence between what the 
suppressed majority of black people wanted in South Africa and what the international community 
wanted not only for South Africa but for the whole world. In sum, the majority of insiders and 
outsiders of South Africa were rallying around a flag. Thus, there was a “symmetric issue perception” 
on race discrimination (subject of sanctions). 
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South Africa was placed under UN sanctions from 1977—1994, due to its Apartheid policy and pursuit 
of nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program (Charron 2011, 114). 28 countries along with 
other actors such as some organizations, universities, and churches took part in authorizing sanctions 
against South Africa. 54 
 
• Symmetrical demand 
One of the particularities of sanctions against South Africa was that the subject of sanctions, Apartheid, 
was the cause of pain for the majority of the target population. The existence of such a symmetric 
demand increases the likelihood of the success of sanctions. The imposition of a racial segregation 
system by a white minority deprived non-white people, who constituted over 80% of South Africa’s 
population, of their very basic rights. The black population of South Africa was fighting back against the 
unjust and inhumane Apartheid regime and struggling for their basic rights. This demand from inside 
South Africa was heard across the globe and there was worldwide sympathy with black people, and a 
worldwide call for the same rights. 
 
a) Opposition parties 
African National Congress (ANC); ANC55 has been the most effective opposition party 
against the Apartheid regime. It was among the supporters of sanctions against South 
Africa, demanding “comprehensive and mandatory sanctions” since the 1950s (Orkin 
1989, 8). The Pan-African Congress (PAC) was also among the supporters of 
“comprehensive and mandatory sanctions” against South Africa (Orkin 1989, 8-9). There 
were other opposition parties and movements such as the South African Communist Party 
(SACP), Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) and the United Democratic Front (UDF) 
who were active against the Apartheid regime. They voiced the suffering of black people 
although they did not necessarily have a clear position towards the tool of sanctions. 
 
                                                
54 The 28 countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Holland, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
United States, and West Germany (David	Hoile,	Understanding	Sanctions	International	Freedom	Foundation	(UK),	1988	,14). Although, the 
U.S. and the United Kingdom had participated in imposing arms embargo against South Africa in 1977 through UNSC resolution, they vetoed 
any further UN sanctions in 1985. Thus UNSC could only adopt non-binding extra measures at that time 	(Bronwen	Manby,	"South	Africa:	The	
Impact	of	Sanctions,"	Journal	of	International	Affairs	46,	no.	1	(1992)	,198). While Prime Minister Thatcher and President Reagan were 
against further sanctions, in 1986, the U.S. Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA), and it became a law, when 
Reagan’s veto was overridden (George	W.	Shepherd,	Effective	Sanctions	on	South	Africa:	The	Cutting	Edge	of	Economic	Intervention	Praeger	
Publishers,	1991	, 11). 
55 The history of the ANC foundation dates back to 1912. In 1960, its military wing was formed and the ANC imposed a combination of violent 
and non-violent resistance against the Apartheid regime (Anicee	Van	Engeland	and	Rachael	Rudolph,	"From	Terrorism	to	Politics,"	(2008)  
,10). 
  
     95 
b) Opposition leaders 
Nelson Mandela was the most influential, unifying, and respected political leader in South 
Africa who fought against the Apartheid regime (Shepherd 1991, 86). Mandela, along with 
other black opposition leaders, supported the authorization of sanctions and saw it as a 
significant tool (Levy 1999, 2). Even when he was released from prison in 1990, he stated 
“To lift sanctions now would be to run the risk of aborting the process toward ending 
Apartheid.” (Levy 1999, 10) 
Stephen Bantu Biko was another influential black leader. He strongly inspired black people 
by his famous slogan “"black is beautiful”. Biko too supported International sanctions 
against South Africa. He challenged the argument of those who opposed sanctions against 
South Africa: 
“The argument is often made that loss of foreign investment would hurt blacks the most. It 
would understandably hurt blacks in the short run, because many of them would stand to 
lose their job, but it should be understood in Europe and North America that foreign 
investment supports the present economic system and thus indirectly the present system of 





The South African Council of Churches (SACC) and the Southern African Catholic 
Bishops Conference (SACBC) were among demanders of sanction authorizations against 
South Africa. SACC had demanded “conditional disinvestment” in 1985. Later in 1989, a 
delegation of church leaders who traveled to Washington, including Archbishop Tutu, 
called for US sanctions against South Africa (Orkin 1990, 11). 
Desmond Mpilo Tutu, is the most outstanding religious leader who was supporting 
nonviolence actions against the Apartheid regime and who was also a proponent of 
sanctions against South Africa. He believed that sanctions were the last chance of non-
violent action (Documentary movie: Apartheid- Desmond Tutu & F.W. de Klerk). Tutu 
did not undervalue the suffering of black people under international sanctions but he 
argued that at least their suffering is "with a purpose” (wikipedia website: Desmond Tutu). 
 
d) Worldwide civil rights movements and support 
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Black people were attaining remarkable progress in different parts of the world such as the 
U.S. through the civil rights movement, the trade unions and black churches (Shepherd 
1991, 85) The Anti-Apartheid Movement in Britain formed in 1960. This movement 
demanded that all economic relations with South Africa cease. In the same year, the 
American Committee on Africa called the U.S. government to authorize sanctions against 
South Africa (Orkin 1990, 8-9). 
 
Table 3.6 Particularities of the South Africa case from the perspective of symmetric issue 
perception on the subject of sanctions 
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Chapter 4: Just Authorization of Sanctions (Part III) 
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Just Authorization of Sanctions (Part III) 
1. Legitimate authorizer 
1.1. UN legitimacy in authorizing sanctions against Iran 
Legally speaking, the competence of authorizing international sanctions is reserved for the UN, thus 
the UN has been a legitimate actor in authorizing sanctions against Iran. Yet, the process of authorizing 
sanctions against Iran needs a separate line of legitimacy scrutiny. This requirement can be considered 
the same as when domestic courts are considered to be legitimate bodies in their ability to deal with 
disputes and issue verdicts while their justice process has to be studied in each case.  The UNSC does 
not have a clean record on authorizing just sanctions. The UN comprehensive sanctions against Iraq 
and the “oil for food” scandal is one of the most dramatic failures of the UN in authorizing inhumane 
and unjust sanctions. Hence, legitimacy in the authorization of sanctions is not confined to a legitimate 
authorizer, but it also requires a legitimate process. 
 
The process of authorizing UN sanctions is conducted through UNSC and Sanctions Committees 
(Hovell 2009, 94-5). The political context of the UNSC along with the transparency deficit of the 
Sanctions Committees are the main factors, which have undermined the legitimacy of sanction 
authorizations. 
 
a) UNSC: Political context 
The political context of the UNSC has been undermining the legitimacy of its decision-making 
process. The process of issuing resolutions by the UNSC is highly influenced by the great powers’ 
interests. Correspondingly, Iran’s case has not been an exception and the U.S. has had a central role 
in the authorization of Iranian sanctions by the UNSC. The fact that Iran’s nuclear dossier did not 
stay with the IAEA and was referred to the UNSC in the first place was due to U.S influence at the 
forefront (Rajiv 2014, 688-702). The UNSC has been adopting a selective approach in using the 
sanctions tool. For instance, India and Pakistan, two nuclear powers, were able to pursue their 
nuclear ambitions without the UNSC authorizing sanctions against them. The inconsistent decision-
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Iran believes that the UNSC has not been impartial to Iran and that sanctions against Iran have been 
authorized through a political process. The UNSC’s partiality towards Islamic Republic of Iran 
goes back to 1980, when the UNSC issued its first resolution on Iran-Iraq war. According to Iran’s 
foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif,  “the first UNSC resolution on the Iran-Iraq war, issued 
in September 1980, did not recognize Iraq’s “invasion” of Iran and did not even call Iraq to 
“withdraw” its military forces from Iran’s territory. The UNSC was silent until Iran succeeded in 
taking back Khoramshahr city, and it was then that finally the UNSC decided to invite Iran to its 
sessions as one side of the war. Iran boycotted UNSC for 6 years to show its objection and 
dissatisfaction “(Raji 2013). Furthermore, when Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran during the 
war, the UNSC neither passed a single resolution against Iraq, nor even condemned Saddam 
Hussein’s chemical attack against Iran (Mehr News Agency September 26, 2007). 
 
b) Sanctions Committees: Transparency deficit 
Sanctions Committees as subsidiary bodies for UNSC are pivotal in authorizing targeted sanctions 
against individuals and entities yet they are highly prone to politicization mainly because most of 
their sessions take place behind closed doors without record-taking (Hovell 2009, 94-5). Sanctions 
committees suffer from transparency deficits due to their high number of closed meetings and 
informal consultation processes56 (Emadi 2012, 145). The transparency deficit of the sanctions 
committees undermines the legitimacy of the sanctions authorization process in general. 
 
1.2. U.S. legitimacy in authorizing sanctions against Iran 
U.S. sanctions against Iran fall into two categories: (a) unilateral sanctions, (b) secondary sanctions 
(extraterritorial sanctions). 
 
a) Unilateral sanctions 
After the Islamic revolution of Iran, the relation between the U.S. and Iran became hostile and the 
U.S. authorized a set of unilateral sanctions against Iran. The hostage taking of fifty two Americans 
in Iran on November 4, 1979, triggered President Carter to authorize unilateral sanctions against 
Iran. The adopted unilateral restrictive measures by the US blocked Iran’s access to more than $12 
billion of its bank deposits, gold, and properties (Carswell 1981, 247-265). All the property owned 
                                                
56 For instance “between the establishment of the Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee in October 1999 and the end of 2005, the 
committee held 31 formal meeting and approximately 150 informal consultation” 	(Devika	Hovell,	"The	Deliberative	De2icit:	Transparency,	
Access	to	Information	and	UN	Sanctions,"	in	Sanctions,	Accountability	and	Governance	in	a	Globalised	World,	eds.	Jeremy	Farrall	and	
Kim	Rubenstein	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2009)	 , 95). 
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by the government of Iran within U.S. jurisdiction was blocked by Executive Order 12170 (1979), 
and US exports to Iran were banned due to Executive Order 12205 (1980). Additionally, the 
Executive Order 12211 (1980) prohibited all imports from Iran (Cordesman, Gold, and Coughlin-
Schulte 2014, 40). 
 
It is the exclusive right of any sovereign state to interrupt its diplomatic relations with other states. 
Hence, the U.S. was a legitimate authorizer to impose unilateral restrained sanctions against Iran. 
Restrained sanctions encompasses measures such as diplomatic relations interruption and banning 
trade. However, some other U.S. unilateral sanctions fall into the category of unilateral excessive 
sanctions which extend to banning goods and services which endangers target civilians’ lives and 
thus makes the U.S. an illegitimate authorizer. For instance, U.S. sanctions on services and spare 
parts for civilian airlines through the 1995 Executive Order, was a unilateral excessive sanction 
which endangered Iranian lives57. 
 
b) Secondary sanctions (extraterritorial sanctions) 
The legitimacy of authorizing secondary sanctions (i.e. sanctioning third parties or imposing 
penalties on third parties for trading with the target and/or providing assistance) is highly 
questionable. 
As a general rule, national legislation ought to be territorial as basic international law principles 
affirm. Consequently, authorizing unilateral sanctions with extraterritorial application violates 
international law’s principles and its legitimacy becomes problematic (Mohamad 2015, 71). The 
U.S. has authorized a number of secondary sanctions against Iran. For instance, in 1996, the U.S. 
congress mandated the Iran—Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), now known as the Iran Sanctions Act 
(ISA), in response to alleged Iranian and Libyan support for terrorism and endangering U.S. 
national security and foreign policy interests. According to ILSA, the U.S. President is required to 
impose secondary sanctions on third parties (foreign entities, persons) who invest more than $ 20 
million in Iran’s energy sector within one year“ (Meyer 2009, 929). The U.S. president should 
choose at least two out of the six secondary sanctions:  military export license, export-import bank 
assistance, bank loans, government contracts, imports, financial institution restriction (Katzman 
2006). ILSA authorization increased the controversy around the legitimacy and legality of 
                                                
57 Many Iranian pilots have complained about the ban on services and spare parts of civilian aircrafts due to the threat posed to passenger safety. 
Since the1995, U.S. authorization of sanctions on Iran’s aviation sector, 1700 Iranian passengers and crew have been killed in air accidents. It is 
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extraterritorial sanctions. Some scholars argued that the authorization of ILSA had been against 
International law (Alexander, 1997). ILSA is a manifestation of extraterritorial applications of 
national legislation and sanctioning of third parties. In 2000, the Iran Nonproliferation Act was 
authorized.  Based on that, any person, entity or government that assists Iran in the WMD program 
will be subject to U.S. secondary sanctions (Cordesman, Gold, and Coughlin-Schulte 2014, 41-2). 
In 2010, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) was 
authorized. According to CISADA, the U.S. will impose secondary sanctions on any entity that 
exports more than $1 of million gasoline to Iran or helps Iran to import gasoline by providing 
goods and services worth more than $1 million. Furthermore, any entity that provide more than $1 
million worth of goods and services for the maintenance and expansion of Iran’s refined petroleum 
products will be subject to U.S. secondary sanctions (Cordesman, Gold, and Coughlin-Schulte 
2014, 41-2). According to the National Defense Authorization Act  (NDAA 2012), any business 
with the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) is prohibited, and any financial institution or international bank 
that violates this rule by doing business with the CBI including purchasing Iran’s crude oil will be 




The United Nations General Assembly has been strongly opposing the authorization of unilateral 
extraterritorial sanctions by issuing different resolutions. On 6 December 1996, the General 
Assembly issued a resolution and clearly called for “the immediate repeal of unilateral 
extraterritorial laws that impose sanctions on corporations and nationals of other States” and also 
called upon “all States not to recognize unilateral extraterritorial coercive economic measures or 
legislative acts imposed by any State” (The UN General Assembly Resolutions, 51st Session 
(1996)). The countries that voted against the resolution 1996 were United States, Israel, and 
Uzbekistan (Rathbone, Jeydel, and Lentz 2013, 1072-1073). 
 
EU position; 
The EU reacted strongly to the U.S. unilateral extraterritorial sanctions, ILSA.  In1996, the same 
year in which ILSA was authorized by the U.S congress, the EU issued European Council 
Regulation 2271/96 to protect EU interests against the U.S. unilateral extraterritorial sanctions 
including ILSA and the Helms-Burton Act (the Cuba embargo)  (Council Regulation (EC) No 
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2271/96 of 22 November 1996 )  . Regulation 2271/96 was based on countermeasures against the 
extraterritorial implication of U.S. unilateral sanctions: 
1. Non-compliance; EU natural and legal persons were forbidden to comply with 
extraterritorial sanctions; 
2. Non-recognition; EU judgments and administrative determinations were forbidden to 
recognize the implication of secondary sanctions; 
3. Claw back; recovery provisions had to be provided for damages caused by applying 
extraterritorial sanctions; 
4. Report; Natural or legal Persons who were affected by secondary sanctions should report 
to the European Commission (Clark and Wang 2007, 8-9). 
 
However, as time passed, U.S. secondary sanctions faced less resistance and received more 
compliance. The EU reaction to CISAD, another extraterritorial U.S. sanctions against Iran imposed 
in 2010, was different from ILSA.  Instead of adopting countermeasures, the EU authorized similar 
restrictive measures against Iran for EU members (Rathbone, Jeydel, and Lentz 2013, 1122-1123). 
 
1.3. EU legitimacy in authorizing sanctions against Iran 
EU legitimacy in authorizing sanctions against Iran is rooted in: 
a) UN Charter; all Member States are legally bound to follow the decisions of the UN; 
b) Treaty on European Union (TEU); within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) a Common Position is required to be adopted in Council in order to impose 
restrictive measures on a third country (European Commission – Restrictive measures 2008, 7). 
The EU may authorize sanctions (restrictive measures) in two ways: 
a) Regulations: making a proposal for regulations by the Council of the EU; 
b) Common Positions:  making proposals for Common Positions (Esfandiary 2013). 
All EU members are legally bound to the Common Positions and Regulations. 
The EU sanctions against Iran fall into the following three categories: 
 
 
a) Restrictive measures within the UN framework (Nuclear related); 
After the UN sanctions against Iran were authorized in 2006 (UNSCR 1737 (2006)), the EU 
brought UNSC binding resolutions into EU law and authorized nuclear related sanctions 
(restrictive measures) against Iran in 2007 (Council Common Position 2007/140/CFSP 27 
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February 2007), in which it underlined that the authorization of restrictive measures against Iran 
by the EU is nothing but the implementation of UNSCR 1737: 
“On 22 January 2007, the Council of the European Union welcomed the measures contained in 
UNSCR 1737 (2006) and called on all countries to implement them in full and without delay. “ 
(Ibid, para.2) 
 
Thus, the first UNSC resolution (UNSCR 1737 (2006) and the following binding resolutions 
against Iran: UNSCR 1747 (2007), UNSCR 1803(2008), and UNSCR 1929 (2010), have 
provided all member states the legitimacy to authorize sanctions against Iran within the UNSC 
issued resolutions. 
 
b) Additional restrictive measures based on a broad interpretation of UN resolutions (Nuclear 
related); 
In 2012, the EU authorized unprecedented additional restrictive measures targeting Iran’s energy 
sector and the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) (Council Decision 2012/635/CFSP 15 October 2012). 
“On 23 January 2012, the Council adopted Decision 2012/35/CFSP which amended Decision 
2010/413/CFSP by strengthening the restrictive measures against Iran in light of the reiterated 
serious and deepening concerns over the nature of Iran's nuclear program, and in particular over 
the findings on Iranian activities relating to the development of military nuclear technology, as 
reflected in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report. Those measures were further 
strengthened on 15 March 2012 by Decision 2012/152/CFSP” (Ibid, para.4). 
 
The EU’s restrictive measures against Iran were broadened through a set of decisions and 
amendments made by the Council of the European Union during 2012: 
• The EU members were prohibited from importing Iranian oil, assets of the Central Bank of 
Iran were frozen, the EU members were banned to export petrochemical equipment and 
technology to Iran, and the trading of precious metals (Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP 23 
January 2012) 
• The list of sanctioned Iranian individuals and entities was expanded (Council Decision 
2012/152/CFSP 15 March 2012) 
• EU members were prohibited from doing any transactions with Iranian banks and 
sanctions on Iran’s oil, gas, trade and transport sectors were expanded (Council Decision 
2012/635/CFSP 15 October 2012) 
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The EU broadened the sanctions against Iran presumably based on the UNSC resolutions, 
while The UNSC resolutions do not directly sanction Iran’s energy sector or prohibit Member 
States from purchasing Iran’s oil and gas. However, in the preamble to Resolution 1929 
(2010), it is stated that Iran’s energy revenue could be spent to fund Iran’s nuclear program 58 
(Resolution 1929 (2010), 3). Yet, Iran’s energy revenue could be spent for all other country 
expenses, given that the oil revenue constitute about 80 percent of Iran’s total export revenue. 
Moreover, The UNSC resolutions do not directly sanction Iran’s financial sector and banking 
system nor do they require Member States to freeze Iranian banks’ assets. However, the 
preamble to Resolution 1929 (2010) asks Member States to exercise vigilance in transactions 
with Iranian banks including the Central Bank of Iran59 (Ibid, 3). 
 
The expanded EU sanctions against Iran in 2012 compromised the most comprehensive 
sanctions that the EU had ever imposed on any country (Esfandiary 2013, 9). The 
comprehensiveness of additional restrictive measures by the EU against Iran has raised serious 
legitimacy and legality questions. Some believe that the additional restrictive measures of the 
EU against Iran are inconsistent with international law and are a “misinterpretation” and  
“extensive interpretation” of the UNSC resolutions (Dupont 2012, 19-20). The unprecedented 
EU restrictive measures against Iran were far beyond the UNSC resolutions requirements 
(Kordzadeh Kermani 2014, 104). The additional and largely expanded EU sanctions against 
Iran have undermined the consistency of the normative basis of UN sanctions against Iran 
(Orakhelashvili 2015, 20). However, it should not be overlooked that the ambiguity of the 
UNSC resolutions in the first place has contributed to the extensive interpretation of UNSC 





                                                
58 “ … noting the potential connection between Iran’s revenues derived from its energy sector and the funding of Iran’s proliferation- sensitive 
nuclear activities, and further noting that chemical process equipment and materials required for the petrochemical industry have much in 
common with those required for certain sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities” ( United Nations Security Council (UNSC) , 
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/unsc_res1929-2010.pdf.  
59 “… recalling in particular the need to exercise vigilance over transactions involving Iranian banks, including the Central Bank of Iran, so as to 
prevent such transactions contributing to proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems”
(UNSCR 1929(2010),  3). 
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c) Unilateral restrictive measures (Human rights related); 
In 2011, the EU authorized unilateral targeted restrictive measures against Iranians due to the 
allegation of human rights violations. Accordingly, travel bans and assets freezes were imposed 
on individuals and entities responsible for violations of human rights (Council Decision 
2011/235/CFSP April 2011). In addition, Member States were prohibited from exporting any 
kind of equipment to Iran that could be used for internal repression (Council Decision 
2012/168/CFSP 23 March 2012). 
 
Table 4.1 The legitimacy of the UN to authorize sanctions 
UNSC 
Legitimacy of authorizer Legitimate 
Legitimacy of process Weak legitimacy due to: 
(a) Political context of the UNSC 
(b) Transparency deficit of 
Sanctions Committee 
 
Table 4.2 The legitimacy of the U.S. to authorize sanctions 
U.S. 

















Every single state 










Not a single state 
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territorial, and the 







Table 4.3 The legitimacy of the EU to authorize sanctions 
EU 





(1) Restrictive measures 
within the UN framework 
 
Legitimate (a) All member 
states (including 
EU members) are 




(b) Treaty on 
European Union 
(TEU) 
(2) Additional restrictive 
measures based on a broad 
interpretation of UNSC 
resolutions 
 
Weak legitimacy All member states 




however since the 
UNSC resolutions 
against Iran have 
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leeway and 
ambiguities, it has 
opened up room 
for extensive 
interpretation. 
Hence, it can 
hardly be claimed 
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2. Unambiguous resolutions (Clear causes, objectives, and measures) 
2.1. UN resolutions against Iran: Causes, objectives, and measures; 
Sanction documents should be clear in terms of sanction causes, objectives, and measures. The UNSC 
resolutions against Iran are clear on declaring the cause and objective of authorizing sanctions on Iran. 
Accordingly, the cause of the UNSC resolution is declared to be the so-called threat of Iran’s nuclear 
program to world peace and security, and the objective, as announced, is nonproliferation. In spite of 
the clarity of the UNSC resolutions against Iran in terms of the declared causes and objectives, it is 
highly ambiguous regarding the measures that should be adopted by the Member States. The UNSC 
resolutions against Iran, especially, UNSCR 1929(2010), which is the most extreme UNSCR against 
Iran, contains vague language, undefined terms, and non-evidentiary requirements. This deficit has 
provided a recipe for misinterpretation, auto-interpretation, and ultimately the authorization of 
expanded and extensive sanctions against Iran. 
 
a) Vague language (vigilance language) 
In the UNSCRs against Iran, Member States are repeatedly required to “exercise vigilance” towards 
Iran, while it is not clear what vigilance precisely means. For instance, Member States are required 
to exercise vigilance in the following wide-range of issues: 
• Exercise vigilance regarding the entry of individuals who are involved in Iran’s nuclear 
program60; 
• Exercise vigilance regarding teaching and training Iranians in any discipline which would 
contribute to Iran’s nuclear program 61; 
• Exercise vigilance regarding transferring to Iran 62 
• Exercise vigilance regarding trading with and providing insurance to Iran 63; 
                                                
60 “Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, 
directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery 
systems” 	United	Nations	Security	Council	(UNSC),	,	https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/*iles/unsc_res1737-2006.pdf.	(UNSCR 
1737(2006), 10). 
61 “Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and prevent specialized teaching or training of Iranian nationals, within their territories or by their 
nationals, of disciplines which would contribute to Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery 
systems (UNSCR 1737(2006), 17). 
62 “Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint in the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their 
nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft of any battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack 
helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms to Iran, and in 
the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of 
financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of such items in order to prevent a destabilizing 
accumulation of arms;” (UNSCR 1747(2007), 6). 
63 “Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance in entering into new commitments for public provided financial support for trade with Iran, 
including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance, to their nationals or entities involved in such trade, in order to avoid such 
financial support contributing to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, as 
referred to in resolution 1737 (2006);” (UNSCR 1803 (2008), 9). 
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• Exercise vigilance regarding any financial transactions with Iranian financial institutions 
and banks 64; 
• Exercise vigilance regarding Iranian banks including the Central Bank of Iran 65 
• Exercise vigilance regarding doing business with individuals and entities related to the 
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping 
Lines (IRISL)66 
 
The UNSCRs call upon all Member States to “exercise vigilance” in different activities with Iran 
whereas “it is not clear what would constitute vigilance” (Gordon 2013, 995-996). The Panel of 
Experts67 has acknowledged the ambiguity of vigilance language in UNSCR against Iran and how 
Member States exercise it differently. According to the Panel of Experts’ report on Resolution 1929 
(2010), “There is no general understanding of the definition of “vigilance” ... Member States reported 
various mechanisms to comply with this requirement” (U.N. Doc. S/2012/395 June 12, 2012, 
para.190). Consequently, some Member States were driven to exercise maximum vigilance, for 
example ban all financial transactions with all Iranian banks to be safe and not to go through 
difficulties of uncertainties, and the possible risk of sanctions violation. 
Joy Gordon, professor of philosophy at Fairfield University, asserts “It is hard to imagine a term that 
is more vague and less informative than ‘exercise vigilance’ ”. She claims that the “vigilance 
language” of the UNSC has been deliberately adopted in order to provide a “mutual deniability” for 
the authorizer and implementers of sanctions on Iran. On one hand, the UN would be able to always 
claim that it has authorized targeted humane sanctions against Iran (since it has not directly 
sanctioned key sectors), and on the other hand the U.S and the EU would be able to broadly expand 
the implementation by directly sanctioning Iran’s infrastructure (energy sector, banking, financial 
transactions, and shipping) by claiming that they were only vigilant(Gordon March 27, 2013). 
                                                
64 “Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran, in 
particular with Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, and their branches and subsidiaries abroad, in order to avoid such activities contributing to the 
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006);” 
(UNSCR 1803(2008), 10). 
65 “… recalling in particular the need to exercise vigilance over transactions involving Iranian banks, including the Central Bank of Iran, so as to 
prevent such transactions contributing to proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems” 
(UNSCR 1929(2010), preamble) 
66 “Decides that all States shall require their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to 
their jurisdiction to exercise vigilance when doing business with entities incorporated in Iran or subject to Iran’s jurisdiction, including those of 
the IRGC and IRISL, and 
any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, if 
they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such business could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear 
activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems or to violations of resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747(2007), 1803 (2008) or this 
resolution;” (UNSCR 1929 (201), 22). 
67 The Panel of Experts is a monitoring body, which was created pursuant to paragraph 29 of resolution 1929 (2010). Each sanctions regime can 
create its own panel of Experts. 
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As a result of UNSCR ambiguity, some countries have alluded to the “vigilance language” to 
deliberately authorize excessive sanctions against Iran. For instance, based on the “vigilance 
language” the EU froze assets of the Central Bank of Iran, banned financing Iranian energy projects, 
importing Iranian oil, providing insurance for Iranian shipping companies, authorizing permission for 
Iran Air Cargo flights to land, and transactions with Iranian banks 68”(Gordon 2013, 991-995). 
 
b) Non-evidentiary requirements 
The UNSCRs contain more speculation-based requirements rather than evidentiary-based 
requirements. In other words, the Member States are required to impose additional prohibitions on 
trading, shipping, and financial transactions if they believe that such activities could contribute to 
Iran’s nuclear program. Consequently, since Member States have been given the latitude to impose 
sanctions based on their own speculations, and not necessarily on the basis of evidence, they have 
been able to expand the scope of implementation largely. For instance, the UNSCR 1929(2010) 
calls upon all States to: 
“prevent the provision of financial services, including insurance or re-insurance, or the 
transfer to, through, or from their territory, or to or by their nationals or entities organized 
under their laws (including branches abroad), or persons or financial institutions in their 
territory, of any financial or other assets or resources if they have information that provides 
reasonable grounds to believe that such services, assets or resources could contribute to 
Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, or the development of nuclear weapon 
delivery systems, including by freezing any financial or other assets or resources on their 
territories” (UNSCR 1929 (2010) para.21). 
 
The word “could” in the UNSCRs have paved the way for the U.S and the E.U to justify the 
authorization of broadly expanded sanctions against Iran without providing any evidence to support 
their claims (Gordon 2013, 997-999). Moreover, the potential contribution to Iran’s nuclear program 
is a low standard that can basically encompass any interaction with the Iranian government (Dupont 
December 23, 2013). In fact, any revenue source for the Iranian government including trading, 
                                                
68 Canada also authorized expanded sanctions against Iran in 2010 based on its interpretation of the UNSCRs’  “vigilance language”. Under the 
Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA), Canada authorized broad sanctions against Iran’ energy sector and the Islamic Republic of Iran 
Shipping Lines (IRSL). Accordingly, providing any kind of services to IRISL vessels, irrespective of what kind of goods they would ship was 
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foreign investment and financial transaction has the potential of being used for funding Iran’s nuclear 
program. 
 
2.2. US sanctions against Iran: Causes, objectives, and measures; 
The US has authorized a wide range of sanctions against Iran for more than three decades. These 
sanctions have been authorized either in the form of Executive Orders or Statutes. Since most of the US 
sanctions have been repeated, amended and expanded over   time, the most critical, updated and 
inclusive of them will be selected for the purpose of document analysis. 
 
• Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA)  (2010) (To 
amend the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996) 
CISADA is the most comprehensive US sanctions against Iran. It addresses all three US allegations 
against Iran. The U.S. sanctions against Iran relatively have an unambiguous language in declaring 
its causes, objectives, and measures. According to CISADA, Iran’s nuclear program along with the 
development of unconventional weapons and terrorism sponsorship have been identified as a 
security threat not only to the US but also to all its allies (CISADA (2010), Sec.2 (1)). Furthermore, 
Iran is involved in a so-called “systematic violation of human rights” (CISADA (2010), Sec.2 (6)). 
Consequently, the objectives, as stated in the sanction document, are to deter Iran from reaching to 
“nuclear weapons capability” (CISADA (2010), Sec.2 (4)), to adopt necessary measures for counter 
terrorism (CISADA(2010), Sec.3 (1)), and to promote human rights (CISADA (2010), Sec.3 
(6):A). 
The CISADA provides different lists of definitions in order to clarify penned terms and concepts69 
(CISADA (2010), Sec.101, 201, and 301). CISADA explicitly specifies the sanctions measures, 
however, in some cases it leaves the responsibility with the president and other designated 
institutions70. For instance, according to the CISADA, it is the responsibility of the president to 
identify Iranian officials who are responsible for the violation of human rights and it asks the 
president to adopt necessary measures such as imposing a travel ban and asset freezes 
                                                
69 For instance it provides the definition of an unclear terms such as “knowingly”: “The term ‘‘knowingly’’, with respect to conduct, a 
circumstance, or a result, means that a person has actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result.” 
(CISADA (2010), Sec.101). 
 “the President shall impose 3 or more of the sanctions described in section 6(a) with respect to a person if the 
President determines that the person knowingly, on or after the date of the enactment of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
Divestment Act of 2010—‘‘(i) makes an investment described in subparagraph(B) of $20,000,000 or more” (CISADA(2010), Sec.102 (1)). 
70 For instance, the list of sanctioned entities and individuals, called "Specially Designated Nationals" or "SDNs", are provided by the Office of 
Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") of the US Department of the Treasury.  
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(CISADA(2010), Sec.3(6)). In spite of unambiguous language, the U.S. sanctions against Iran, 
likewise the UNSCRs, have more non-evidentiary rather than evidentiary-based requirements. 
 
2.3. EU sanctions against Iran: Causes, objectives, and measures; 
The EU nuclear-related sanctions against Iran are in line with the UNSCRs in pursuing the same 
cause - the alleged Iranian nuclear program threat to world peace and security - and the same 
objective of non-proliferation (Council Common Position 2007/140/CFSP 27 February 2007), 
Preamble, para.(8) and  (10)). However, the EU has identified expanded measures based on its 
exceeded interpretation of UNSCRs, specifically UNSCR 1929 (2010). Generally, EU Common 
Positions and Regulations language is more precise than the UNSCRs. For instance, the Council 
Regulation 423/2007 provides a set of definitions to clarify the language of the restrictive measures 71 
(Council Regulation 423/2007 19 April 2007, Article 1). Moreover, the prohibited goods, services, 
entities, and individuals are identified and listed through different annexes, which are subject to 
frequent amendments (Ibid, Article 2 and 7). 
 
Ultimately, in Council Decision 2012/635, the EU takes a maximalist interpretation of the UNSCR 
1929(2010) and totally prohibits the EU members from a wide range of interaction with Iran, such as 
doing any transactions with Iranian banks, although it excludes some interactions such as interactions 
regarding humanitarian goods, under strict conditions (Council Decision 2012/635/CFSP 15 October 
2012, Article 10), importing Iran’s natural gas (Ibid, 7), purchasing and transporting Iranian oil and 
petroleum and petrochemical products (Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP, 23 January 2012, 9). Such a 
strict prohibition language appears to be unambiguous, yet the obscurity, likewise the UNSCRs, are 
hidden behind non-evidentiary requirements. The EU has designated numerous Iranian individuals 
and entities in its sanctions list without providing sufficient evidence to reveal their direct or indirect 
linkage with Iran’s nuclear program72 (Esfandiary 2013, 10). Later, the right of sanctioned individuals 
and entities to provide evidences for delisting was respected: 
“The procedure for amending Annexes I and II to this Decision should include providing to 
designated persons and entities the grounds for listing so as to give them an opportunity to 
present observations. Where observations are submitted or where substantial new evidence 
is presented, the Council should review its decision in the light of those observations and 
                                                
71 It provides eleven definitions: Sanctions Committee, technical assistance, goods, technology, investment, brokering services, funds, freezing 
funds, economic resources, freezing of economic resources, and territory of the Community (Council Regulation 423/2007, Article 1). 
72 The sanctioned Iranian individuals and entities have brought many complaints to the General Court of the European Union, and in some cases 
the Court has annulled the acts of the Council. 
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inform the person or entity concerned accordingly. “(Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP 26 
July 2010), Preamble, para.(24)). 
 
Nevertheless, evidence was still required for delisting but not for the listing stage. 
 
The EU human rights-related sanctions against Iran have a clear language in asserting the causes 
(violation of human rights) and objectives (promoting the human rights) of authorizing restrictive 
measures (Council Decision 2011/235/CFSP 12 April 2011, Preamble, para.1 and 3). The EU human 
rights-related sanctions clearly identify the measures that should be adopted by its members. The 
restrictive measures include prohibition on the export of monitoring equipment for the Internet and 
telecommunication and a ban on equipment which might be used for internal suppression and related 
services (e.g. financial, technical, brokering). 
 
Members are required to impose travel bans on individuals and assets freezes on entities and 
individuals who are responsible for the violation of human rights as listed in the provided annexes. 
The grounds for listing the individuals and entities should be included in the annexes (Ibid, Article 4 
(1)), and council should communicate with the sanctioned individuals and entities after the decision is 
made and provide them an opportunity to present evidence (Ibid, Article3 (2) and (3)). However, the 
sanctioned individuals and entities do not have a chance before listing and they can only attempt for 
delisting (Ibid). 
3. Well-defined termination mechanism and requirements 
It is a crucial criterion of the just authorization of sanctions to establish a well-defined termination 
mechanism and requirements. Any negligence in this regard would lead to open-ended sanctions even 
when the cause of sanctions does not exist anymore. 
The sanctions resolution should clearly state: 
A) How (Mechanism); and 
B) Under what condition (Requirements) 
the sanctions would be lifted. 
It would be unjust to set imprecise mechanisms and/or  “immeasurable requirements” for sanctions 
terminations in time of authorization. 
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3.1. UN termination mechanism and requirements 
 
a) Mechanism 
The UNSC should pass another resolution to terminate Iranian sanctions once Iran meets all the 
termination requirements. The mechanism of Iranian sanctions termination is defined through 
cooperation and coordination between the UNSC and the IAEA. Iran is required to comply with 
requirements of both the UNSCRs, and the IAEA Board of Governors’ resolutions. However, 
since all the requirements are nuclear-related, the IAEA is the reference body for verification and 
providing the final reports for the UNSC. Should the report acknowledge Iran’s compliance, a 
UNSC resolution is needed to authorize Iranian sanctions terminations. 
According to the UNSC voting system, there should be 9 ‘yes’ votes out of 15, with no veto from 




All UNSCRs against Iran have explicitly stated that the Security Council shall terminate its 
sanctions “as soon as it determines that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the 
relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of 
Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board.” (UNSCR1737 (2006) para.24(b); UNSCR 1747 
(2007) para.13(b); UNSCR (1803) para.19(b); UNSCR 1929(2010) para.37). 
 
According to the UNSCRs, Iran should comply with the following obligations in order to have 
sanctions lifted: 
I. Shall comply with the IAEA Board of Governors’ resolutions GOV/2006/14 and 
GOV/2009/82; 
II. Shall suspend “all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and 
development, to be verified by the IAEA; (UNSCR1737 (2006) para.2 (a)); 
III. Shall suspend “work on all heavy water-related projects, including the construction of a 
research reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the IAEA; 
(UNSCR1737 (2006) para.2 (b)). 
 
The UN sanctions against Iran have well-defined mechanisms and measurable requirements 
for termination. The termination requirements were modified after years of negotiation and the 
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new termination requirements defined in the Joint Comprehensive plan of Action (JCPOA) 
signed in Vienna on 14 July 2015 between Iran and the P5+1. 
 
3.2. The U.S. termination mechanism and requirements 
 
a) Mechanism 
The US sanctions termination mechanism is complicated and intertwined within the executive 
branch and legislative branch. Based on the sanctions authorization mechanisms, there are 
specific sanctions termination mechanisms. Sanctions could be authorized through an Executive 
order or legislation. In each case, the termination mechanism could be defined in a way in which 
one or both branches get involved. Different sanctions authorizations and termination mechanisms 
are illustrated in the table. 
 








(not codified by law) 
Administration has the 
termination authority 
A new executive order is 
needed 
Executive Order 
(codified into law) 
Law alteration is a 
prerequisite 
A “suspension” provision 
is applicable by the 
president 
Laws 
(the termination authority is 
delegated to the 
Administration) 
Administration has the 
termination authority 
The Administration 




(the exemption authority is 
delegated to the 
Administration) 
Administration has the 
exemption authority 
The Administration 
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Laws 
(with sunset provision) 
Automatic termination 
when the termination 
date (sunset) is reached73 
President could use the 
veto right to alter or 
remove the sunset 
provision 
Laws 
(no sunset, no delegation of 




A “suspension” provision 
is applicable by the 
president 
 
The U.S. sanctions against Iran have been authorized through all the mechanisms, thus the 
termination mechanisms are varied, entangled, and complicated. Nevertheless, there are different 
tactics with which the U.S. president could suspend, if not terminate, the sanctions. In fact, the 
president has latitude to suspend sanctions whether codified or not codified into law, in many cases. 
As Kenneth Katzman, a senior analyst of Iran at the Congressional Research Service suggests, if the 
U.S. Congress refuses to lift sanctions after the Iran nuclear deal “the Administration might decide to 
offer Iran, as an alternative fulfillment of the U.S. commitment, the indefinite suspension of 
sanctions… It is not clear whether Iran would accept that alternative or would instead hold out for 
termination or repeal.” (katzman April 22, 2014, 8). 
The president has the ability to terminate or suspend sanctions on Iran by appealing to the following 
provisions: 
I. “State of emergency” and “the International Emergency Economic Powers Act” 
(IEEPA); 
If the president of the United States declares a “state of emergency” with a country, then 
the IEEPA grants the president to authorize sanctions through executive order74 (Katzman 
2014, 2). The Executive Order against Iran under IEEPA would be lifted by another 
President Executive Order after the president declares that the “state of emergency” does 
not exist between the U.S. and Iran (Long and Luers 2012, 64-7). 
 
II. “State Sponsor of Terrorism” (the so-called “Terrorism List”); 
                                                
73 For instance, ISA has to be renewed every 5 years. Since it was renewed again in 2011, its sunset will be on December 31, 2016 	"Iran	
Sanctions	Act	,"	,	https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/isa_1996.pdf.	(1996), Sec. 13(b)). 
74 A “state of emergency” with Iran has been announced by the U.S. Government every year since 1995, when president Bill Clinton first 
announced it 	(Kenneth	Katzman,	"Easing	US	Sanctions	on	Iran,"	Atlantic	Council	South	Asia	Center	3	(2014)	, 2). 
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Since 1984, Iran has been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism by the Department of 
State and based on that, a set of sanctions have been imposed on Iran. An administration 
decision to remove Iran from the “Terrorism List” is another sanctions termination 
mechanism. However, the presidential decision to remove Iran from the “Terrorism List” 
is not enough and requires congressional approval (Katzman 2014, 3). 
 
III. “National security interest” 
The president could appeal to the national security interest provision to waive or suspend 
sanctions. For instance, the president can, on a case by case basis, exercise the waiver after 
certifying to the appropriate congressional committees75 that it is in the national interest of 




• Nuclear and terrorism-related sanctions termination requirements 
The U.S. nuclear and terrorism-related sanctions against Iran have an implicit set of interlinked 
termination requirements. For instance, according to ISA, which is the centerpiece of the U.S. 
sanctions, nuclear and terrorism-related sanctions would be lifted if: 
“ the President determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that 
Iran— 
(1 ) has ceased its efforts to design, develop, manufacture, or acquire-- 
(A) a nuclear explosive device or related materials and technology; 
(B) chemical and biological weapons; and 
(C) ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launch technology; 
(2) has been removed from the list of countries the governments of which have been 
determined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, to 
have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism; and 
(3) poses no significant threat to United States national security, interests, or 
allies.”(Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as Amended, Sec.8). 
 
                                                
75 Appropriate Congressional Committees: “the committee on finance the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on Financial Services, and the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.”(Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as Amended, Sec. 14 (2)). 
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Iran’s removal from the “Terrorism List” entails far-reaching and unspecific requirements.  In other 
words, the president has the authority to remove Iran from the “Terrorism List” after she/he certifies 
that: 
1. Iran has not been involved in terrorism sponsorship in the preceding six months; 
2. Iran has given the assurance of not supporting terrorism in the future 76 (Long and 
Luers 2012 , 64-7). 
 
Due to the interlinked nature of different U.S. sanctions on Iran, it is conceivable to assume that, 
provided Iran meets nuclear- related requirements, it could be removed from the “Terrorism List” 
even without meeting the terrorism termination requirements as has been the case in other sanctions 
regimes77  (Ibid, 64-7). Thus, politics plays an essential role when it comes to sanctions termination 
requirements. On one hand, digging into bureaucratic loopholes of the established termination 
requirements can deter sanctions termination, and on the other hand, sanctions termination can be 
facilitated by ignoring the termination requirements in exchange for concessions on other issues. 
 
• Human rights-related sanctions termination 
The U.S. human rights-related sanctions against Iran would terminate if the president certifies to 
the appropriate congressional committees that the four following requirements have been met by 
Iran. “Iran has__ 
(1) unconditionally released all political prisoners78, including 
the citizens of Iran detained in the aftermath of the June 
12, 2009, presidential election in Iran; 
(2) ceased its practices of violence, unlawful detention, 
torture and abuse of citizens of Iran while engaging in peaceful 
political activity; 
(3) conducted a transparent investigation into the killings, 
arrests and abuse of peaceful political activists that occurred 
                                                
76 In spite of the president’s certification to the Congress, sanctions relief can be blocked by the Congress joint resolution, although there needs 
to be a two-third majority to override the president’s veto (Austin	Long	and	William	Luers,	Weighing	Bene)its	and	Costs	of	Military	Action	
Against	Iran	Iran	Project,	2012)	,  64-7) 
77 For instance, North Korea, Libya, and Iraq were all removed from the “Terrorism List” not necessarily due to their compliance with the related 
requirements. North Korea’s cooperation with its nuclear program led to its removal from the list in 2008,without having changed its behavior 
regarding terrorism sponsorship. Libya was taken off the list when it gave up its weapons of mass destruction program in 2006. Iraq was also 
removed from the list after it expelled Abu Nidal in 1982, which could be considered a minor course of action in the terrorism sponsorship 
context	(Ibid, 64-7). 
78 The term “ political prisoner” requires the definition of “ political crime”, which does not exist in Iran’s constitution. Based on this definition 
deficit Iran has refused to have any political prisoners. 
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in the aftermath of the June 12, 2009, presidential election 
in Iran and prosecuted the individuals responsible for such 
killings, arrests, and abuse; and 
(4) made public commitments to, and is making demonstrable 
progress towards: 
(A) establishing an independent judiciary; and 
(B) respecting the human rights and basic freedoms recognized in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights.”(CISADA (2010), Sec.105(d)). 
 
In sum, the U.S. sanctions regimes against Iran have highly complicated termination mechanisms. 
The excessive degree of complication is due to the different authorization mechanisms, which are 
grounded on the entangled processes between the executive branch and legislative branch. Besides 
the complicated mechanisms, the termination requirements, which are in most cases broad and 
imprecise, add up to the difficulties. The large number of sanctions against Iran with different 
objectives and requirements would persuade one to believe that the termination of sanctions would be 
impossible, unless Iran completely changes its foreign and domestic policies and even its leadership 
to meet all of the U.S. sanctions termination requirements (Long and Luers 2012 , 31). On top of the 
termination requirements, the human rights-related requirements are the most immeasurable ones of 
them all, which almost suggests the imposition of endless sanctions. 
 
3.3. EU termination mechanism and requirements 
 
a) Mechanism 
EU sanctions against Iran need a unanimous Council decision to be lifted. Thus, the 28 EU 
members vote in favour would be sufficient to complete the sanctions relief mechanism. In fact, the 
EU sanctions termination mechanism is much less complicated than the US sanctions, in which the 
Congress is involved. According to Cornelius Adebahr, an associate at the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace,” -“Both the imposition of sanctions (EU sanctions) and their removal 
requires merely one ingredient: the political will of member states.”79 (Adebahr 2014). 
 
                                                
79 In spite of the fact that EU sanctions relief seems to have a simple mechanism, as in the case of Iran, EU sanction termination would not make 
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b) Requirements 
 
• Nuclear-related sanctions termination; 
Since the EU nuclear-related sanctions against Iran have been authorized to implement the binding 
UNSCRs, they have not defined separate requirements for sanctions termination. In other words, 
the same UNSCRs termination requirements are implicitly embedded in the EU nuclear-related 
sanctions against Iran. Thus, once Iran meets the UNSCRs requirements, both the UN sanctions 
and the sanctions of other Member States, including the EU nuclear-related sanctions are to be 
lifted. 
 
• Human rights-related sanctions termination; 
The conditions under which EU human rights-related sanctions against Iran would be lifted is not 
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Just Implementation of Sanctions (Part I) 
This chapter and the next two chapters focus on one main question (the second research question of the 
thesis): “Have the sanctions against Iran been implemented in a just manner?” (Just Implementation of 
Sanctions). In fact, regardless of whether the sanctions have been authorized in a just manner, their just 
implementation requires a separate line of scrutiny. The just implementation of sanctions refers to the 
conditions under which the implementation of sanctions would be closer to a just implementation. 
Consequently, in the case of Iran, the UN, U.S., and EU, sanctions implementations are examined against a 
set of principles and mechanisms including: Target Discrimination Principle, Civilian Immunity Principle, 
Proportionality Principle, Prospect of Success Principle, Negotiation Principle, Monitoring and Evaluation 
Mechanism, and Judicial Review Mechanism. In other words, the just implementation of sanctions should 
not violate a set of principles and at the same time it requires special mechanisms to do so. 
Upon assessing the implementation of sanctions by the UN, the EU, and the US and other actors, I 
demonstrate that the implemented sanctions against Iran are close to an unjust implementation of sanctions. 
They have a drastic impact on citizens in different grounds such as country’s infrastructures, public health 
and safety, science and education, culture and environment. These impacts go well beyond what might be 
expected in a just implementation of sanctions. 
 
The impacts of sanctions on Iran are so entangled and interlinked that in many cases it is impractical to 
distinguish a causal relation between a specific impact and a particular type of sanction. The most 
determinative indicators in the just implementation of sanctions are the “target discrimination” and “civilian 
immunity” principles.  
 
Table 5.1 Just Implementation of Sanctions’ Criteria 
Just Implementation of Sanctions 
Principles Mechanisms 
Target Discrimination * Monitoring and Evaluation 
Civilian Immunity* Judicial Review 
Proportionality  
Prospect of Success  
Negotiating  
* The core of both the target discrimination principle and civilian immunity principle is the same: The ways 
sanctions impact civilian populations. However, they have been magnified separately in this research due to 
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the controversial debates around the differences between targeted and comprehensive sanctions and how 
targeted sanctions are identified as more humane. 
 
1. Target Discrimination Principle 
The primary notion of Just Implementation of Sanctions is that the civilian population of the target state 
should not be harmed by the implementation of sanctions. In order to comprehend how deeply civilian 
populations are affected by sanctions, the level of centrality that the sanctioned targets play in civilians’ lives 
and the role of sanctioned targets in upholding the country’s economy and infrastructures should first be 
determined. In fact, it is constructive to study the specific implementation of sanctions on each target 
separately. Accordingly, target analyzing is a prerequisite for studying the impacts of sanctions, as a package, 
on civilian populations. 
1.1. Iran’s economic characteristics and vulnerabilities 
In order to recognize the role of sanctioned targets in Iran’s economy, it is advantageous to describe 
both Iran’s economic characteristics and vulnerabilities. 
• Iran’s economic characteristics 
a) Rentier state (Oil state); 
The state’s revenue mostly comes from oil revenue rather than domestic taxation; 
b) Mixed economic system; 
More than 70% of Iran’s economy is run by the state; the private sector is relatively weak in 
comparison. 
c) Single product economy; 
Iran’s economy is mainly based on exporting crude oil and importing consumer products 






     124 
 
Graph 5.1. Dependency of State Budget on Oil Export Revenues 
Source: Atieh International GmbH, Vienna in Khajehpour, Marashi, and Parsi March 2013, 23 
 
 
• Iran’s economic vulnerabilities 
Iran’s economic characteristics have triggered political economic vulnerabilities: 
a) Oil export dependency; 
Iran’s economy is highly dependent on oil and natural gas exports. Oil and natural gas 
exports respectively constituted 40% and 13% of Iran’s total exports prior to the 
multilateral sanctions on Iran’s oil and natural gas exports in 2010 (Bayat 2012, 936). 
b) Petrochemical product import dependency; 
Despite having vast oil and natural gas resources, Iran is extremely dependent on refined 
petroleum product imports. In 2009, gas was at the top of the imported items list - an 
Achilles heel of the economy. Iran had to import 40% of its gas from other countries, 
mainly India and United Arab Emirates (UAEs) (DW website, 2010.04.14). 
Iran’s high dependency on refined petroleum imports is due to  (a) poor technology in 
petrochemical industry and oil refinery; and (b) high domestic consumption (Bayat 2012, 
938-9). 
c) Foreign investment dependency; 
Iran is dependent on foreign investment in its energy sector. Energy sector development 
requires immense financial resources and the purchase of foreign technological advances; 
the country suffers from a shortage in both. 
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1.2. Sanctioned targets in Iran 
With the consideration of Iran’s economic characteristics and vulnerabilities, multilateral sanctions, 
(U.S. sanctions in particular), have targeted simultaneously the most vital and most vulnerable of Iran’s 
economic sectors. The major targets of sanctions against Iran fall in the following categories: 
energy, shipping and insurance, banking and financial, international lending, individuals, arms, dual 
use items, and multifunction entities. 
 
1.2.1. Energy sector 
• Oil Imports 
The UN imposed sanctions do not directly target Iran’s energy sector. At the same time, the 
language of the preamble to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 paved the way 
for different Member States to target it. The preamble states: “note[s] the potential connection 
between Iran’s revenues derived from its energy sector and the funding of Iran’s proliferation 
sensitive nuclear activities” 
In 2012, the EU banned its member states from purchasing Iran’s crude oil and petrochemical 
products (Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP). In the same year, the EU expanded its sanctions and 
prohibited the importation of Iran’s Natural Gas (Council Decision 2012/635/CFSP, 15 October 
2012). 
Already in 1980, the U.S. had imposed unilateral sanctions on all imports from Iran (Executive 
order 12211 April 17, 1980). However, Iran has been impacted more by the U.S. secondary 
sanctions on Iran’s energy sector rather than by its unilateral sanctions. According to the Executive 
Order 13622 (Executive Order 13622 July 30, 2012), the U.S. authorizes sanctions on any entity 
that purchases Iran’s oil and petroleum products. Iran’s oil custumers could acquire exemption 
provided they are “significantly reducing” the purchase of Iran’s oil each 180 days. The restrictions 
were also codified in law through the US Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act in 
2012 (Katzman May 7, 2014, 12). 
 
Sanctions on Iran’s oil imports have had a remarkable impact on Iran’s oil production and oil 
revenue. The combination of the EU and the U.S secondary sanctions resulted in the reduction of 
Iran’s oil sales by 60%. In 2011, Iran’s oil sales were 2.5 mbd with revenue of $100 billion, while 
in 2013; the sales were reduced to 1 mbd with a revenue of $ 35 billion (Ibid, 52-53). As Iran was 
not able to sell the oil, its oil production ended up being reduced from about 4.0 mbd in 2011 to 
roughly 2.6-2.8 in 2013 (Ibid, 52-53). This sharp reduction in oil production has caused the 
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complete shutdown of some oil wells.  This reduction is not only damaging to oil wells, but it 
would also be expensive to restart oil production from entirely shutdown oil wells. In order to avoid 
the complete shutdown of their oil wells, Iran started to store unsold oil barrels on tankers in the 
Persian Gulf. A longer-term solution would be for Iran to find customers and keep the same 
production capacity (Ibid, 52-53). In sum, Iran’s oil sector was significantly damaged when the EU 
sanctions and US secondary sanctions both targeted Iran’s energy sector. All EU members stopped 
purchasing Iran’s oil and Iran’s major customers opted to significantly reduce their purchasing to 
exempt the U.S. extraterritorial sanctions. 
 
• Investment on development of petroleum resources 
Iran’s oil fields are old and in dire need of outside technology and investments. Unfortunately, the 
threat of U.S. secondary sanctions triggered many big companies to withdraw from their projects in 
Iran. In 2010, the U.S. authorized sanctions stated that any country that invests 20 million dollars or 
more on the development of Iran’s petroleum resources would be subject to the U.S. secondary 
sanctions (CISADA (2010), Sec.102 (1)). 
In 2011, Iran lost nearly $60 billion in investments as the result of the withdrawal of foreign 
companies (Katzman May 7, 2014, 54). 
 
• Refined petroleum products Exportation 
According to the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act (CISADA), 
which was authorized in 2010 by the U.S. Congress as an amendment on ISA (1996), the U.S. 
would impose secondary sanctions on whomever sells refined petroleum products to Iran. These 
products include gasoline with a value of one million dollars in one contract or five million dollars 
paid over a year to Iran. In addition, those countries that helped  Iran import refined petroleum 
products would be sanctioned. These acts could include goods, technology, information, and 
services such as providing insurance, ships, or shipping would be subject to U.S. secondary 
sanctions (CISADA (2010), Sec.102 (3)). At the time when CISADA was authorized, Iran’s 
dependency on foreign gas was 40% (Katzman May 7, 2014, 11). 
 
• Contribution to production of refined petroleum 
According to U.S. sanctions, countries that may support Iran in a number of different ways would 
be sanctioned.  These ways included selling, leasing, or providing to Iran goods, services, 
technology, or information with a value of 1 million dollars or more that would have the following 
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consequences:  help Iran to increase its refined petroleum products, construct, modernize, and 
repair petroleum refineries. These actions would be subject to the U.S. secondary sanctions 
(CISADA (2010), Sec.102 (2)). Additionally, the EU Council Regulation of March 2012 banned all 
EU members from providing Iran with any technology and equipment that would contribute to 




In sum, in spite of the fact that the UN has not directly targeted Iran’s energy sector, it has 
implicitly paved the way for other actors to target Iran’s energy sector. Considering Iran’s 
economic characteristics and its dependency on oil revenue, the implementation of U.S. and EU 
sanctions – particularly those involving not purchasing Iran’s crude oil -- would hit the beating 
heart and core of Iran’s economy drastically. Accordingly, given Iran’s economic vulnerabilities 
and its need of outside investments and of technology in its energy sector, the implementation of 
the U.S. and EU sanctions and their disinvestments sharply harmed Iran’s energy infrastructure. 
 
1.2.2. Shipping and Insurance sectors 
The UNSCR’s called upon all Member States to exercise vigilance over activities of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and Iran Air Cargo. The UNSCR 1929 decides that the 
IRISL assets should be frozen (UNSCR 1803 (2008); Resolution 1929 (2010)). According to the 
UNSCR, Member States have the authorization to inspect IRISL and Iran Air cargos- provided there 
are “reasonable grounds” to believe they are carrying sanctioned goods (UNSCR 1929 (2010)). 
Additionally, Member States are required to exercise vigilance over supporting Iran’s trade 
financially by providing insurance or reinsurance as well as export credits. To wit, it would apply “if 
they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such services … could 
contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities” (UNSCR 1929 (2010), para.21). 
 
The U.S. and EU sanctions on Iran’s shipping and insurance sectors go well beyond the UNSC 
framework. They targeted IRISL itself and froze IRISL and its affiliates’ assets. The EU members 
were required to inspect all cargo when their destination or departure was Iran. In addition, Iranian 
cargo flights were to be  prohibited from landing in EU airports (Council Decision July 
2010/413/CFSP, 26 July 2010). The U.S. would even impose secondary sanctions on any entity that 
provides goods, services, and insurance for Iran’s shipbuilding and shipping sector ((H.R.4310 - 
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National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 ) , Subtitle D, “The Iran Freedom and 
Counter-Proliferation Act” (IFCA)). 
The EU sanctions prohibit its members from providing insurance from every step of purchasing, 
importing and transporting Iran’s crude oil or petroleum products. In general, EU members are 
banned from providing insurance or reinsurance to all Iranian shipping companies. Furthermore, 
according to the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (2012), the U.S. would impose 
secondary sanctions on any entity that was offered insurance for the National Iranian Oil Company 
(NIOC) or the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) (Katzman, May 7, 2014, 13). The U.S. 
secondary sanctions encompass any entity that provides insurance for Iran’s shipbuilding and 
shipping sectors ((H.R.4310 - National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013) ,Subtitle D, 




The implementation of targeted sanctions on Iran’s shipping and insurance sectors were 
comprehensive on the ground. According to a report by the Panel of Experts’ (POE), a UN expert 
body, many transport companies preferred to stop (instead of exercising vigilance) doing business 
with Iran to avoid the risk of violating the UNSC resolutions (POE report June 2012 (S/2012/395), 
para.162.). Likewise, some international companies decided to withdraw from trading with Iran or 
providing insurance so as to avoid U.S. secondary sanctions. As a general rule, insurance and 
reinsurance are a necessary requirement for international trade. Accordingly, the implementation of 
targeted sanctions both on shipping and insurance made a strong contribution to curbing Iran’s 
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1.2.3. Banking and Financial sectors 
In 2007, the UNSC imposed targeted sanctions on two Iranian banks: Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah 
International (UNSCR 1747 (2007)). Furthermore, the UNSC had been calling upon all Member 
States to exercise vigilance over their activities with all Iranian banks, especially Bank Meili, Saderat 
and the Central Bank of Iran (UNSCR 1803 (2008) and 1929 (2010). The UNSCR 1929 (2010) also 
requires Member States to exercise vigilance in doing any financial interaction with Iran, including 
financing and offering trade credits 80. In addition, the EU gradually expanded sanctioning banking 
and financial relationships with Iran beginning in  2007. Ultimately, in 2012, the EU sanctions 
encompassed all transactions with all Iranian banks with an exception on authorized transactions 
under strict conditions (Council Decision 2012/635/CFSP, 15 October 2012). In 2012, the EU 
designated 14 Iranian banks to be cut off from access to the electronic payments system of SWIFT 
(Society of Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications)81. SWIFT is the largest financial 
messaging service in the world. In  2011, financial institutions in Iran had more than 2 million 
financial messages being processed by SWIFT (Ebner 2013, 131). Cutting Iran off from SWIFT 
sharply affected Iran’s financial transactions in every area (Jorjani and others 2014, 1333). 
 
The U.S. sped up its efforts in 2006 to encourage foreign banks to stop their transactions with Iran on 
the grounds that it could contribute to the funding of terrorist groups. The Treasury Department 
approached 145 banks in 60 countries out of which more than 80 foreign banks were convinced to 
stop their transactions with all Iranian banks (Katzman May 7, 2014, 26-7). The U.S. has been 
imposing financial punishment on those foreign banks that have contributed to help Iran to 
circumvent U.S. sanctions. For instance, in 2004, UBS was fined $100 million and in 2012, Dutch 
bank IMG was fined $619 million by the Treasury Department for moving dollars to Iran (Katzman 
May 7, 2014, 27). 
 
Finally in 2011, the U.S. targeted the Central Bank of Iran and decided to cut it off from the 
international financial system. Accordingly, any foreign bank that was to make transactions with the 
Central Bank of Iran would be subject to the U.S. secondary sanctions. Consequently, foreign banks 
that were to violate U.S. sanctions would face financial measures. For example, they would not be 
permitted to open accounts in the U.S. or their current U.S account would encounter strict restrictions 
(H.R. 1540, signed on December 31, 2011, [P.L. 112-81]). In addition, the U.S. Executive Order, 
                                                
80  Kenneth Katzman, a senior analyst of Iran at the Congressional Research Service, describes the term “vigilance in the UNSCRs as  “a 
nonbinding call to cut off” or “ voluntary restraint” (Katzman, March 5, 2014, 32). 
81 The EU requested the Brussels-based SWIFT to ban Iranian banks from the SWIFT system. On March 17, 2012 blacklisted Iranian banks were 
cut off from the SWIFT system (Katzman May 7, 2014, 36). 
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signed by president Obama, targeted Iran’s currency, the Rial, in 2013 (Executive Order 13645 of 
June 3, 2013). Accordingly, the U.S. could block U.S based properties and ban the U.S. bank 
accounts of any foreign bank that either conducts transactions or holds accounts in Rial (Katzman 
May 7, 2014, 12). 
 
Implementation: 
Although the UNSCR calls upon Member States to exercise vigilance over activities with Iranian 
banks, the vagueness of their language paved the way for the U.S., EU and some other actors to go 
well beyond the UNSC resolution and expand the banking and financial sanctions. As a result, almost 
all transactions with Iranian banks were terminated and Iran was cut off from the international 
financial system, which affected Iran’s entire trading and economy systems (Gordon 2013, 1000).  
Furthermore, Iranian companies could not open Lines of Credit (LC) for their businesses. They had 
therefore been forced to do their businesses through brokers at higher costs (Jorjani and others 2014, 
1333). The Panel of Experts’ (POE) report sheds some light on how even legitimate trades with Iran 
could be deterred as the result of implementation of unilateral sanctions on financial transactions 
(POE report June 2012 (S/2012/395)). Furthermore, the implementation of sanctions on Iran’s 
currency led to the sharp devaluation of the Rial and a rise in prices of all goods and services for 
Iranians. Some of Iran’s trading partners, especially some of Iran’s neighbors, were conducting their 
transactions in Rial or held Rial accounts. Now, however, they were forced to discontinue their 
transactions in Rial after the U.S. announced that it would impose secondary sanctions on any entity 
that does  business in Rial or that holds Rial accounts (Katzman May 7, 2014, 14). 
In sum, the targeted sanctions against Iran’s banking system and financial sector had been 
implemented in a comprehensive manner. Consequently, Iran was completely cut off from the 









     131 
1.2.4. International Lending 
The UNSC “calls upon” all Member States and International institutions not to provide loans to Iran 
unless for humanitarian and development reasons (UNSCR 1747 (2007)). The EU set a similar 
prohibition for its members in 2010 (Council Decision July27, 2010). Accordingly, the members were 
not only banned from granting loans, grants or aid to Iran, but also they were prohibited from voting 
for Iran to receive International lending from institutions like the IMF and the World Bank (Gordon 
2013, 991-995). 
Since the 1980s, the U.S. banned direct financial assistance to Iran (Section 620A of the Foreign 
Assistance Act, FAA (P.L. 87-95) and Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 95-92, as 
amended) (Katzman May 7, 2014, 3). Later the U.S. representatives were asked to vote against 
international lending to Iran at institutions such as the World Bank (§1621 of the International 
Financial Institutions Act (P.L. 95-118) (Katzman May 7, 2014, 3 and 45). The U.S would not only 
withhold its foreign assistance to any country that intervened to financially assist Iran (any country in 
the “terrorism list”), but to also withhold its contribution to any international organization that was to 
assist Iran (Katzman May 7 2014, 3-4). For instance, if an organization were to provide assistance to 
Iran by 3% of its budget, the U.S. would withhold 3% of its contributions to that organization 
exempting humanitarian aids (Katzman May 7, 2014, 4). 
 
Implementation 
The multilayered implementation of restrictive measures against international lending to Iran made it 
extremely difficult for Iran to provide International loans and aids for its infrastructural projects. 
These included environmental projects, especially since 2010. 
 
1.2.5. Individuals 
According to the UN sanctions against Iran, individuals who are significantly involved in (a) Iran’s 
nuclear or ballistic missiles programs, (b) the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), and 
(c) the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are subject to two types of sanctions: (a) freezing 
assets and (b) travel bans (POE report June 2012 (S/2012/395)). The aftermath incidents of the June 
12, 2009 presidential elections in Iran triggered the EU to take the UN blacklist a step further; they 
targeted Iranians who were responsible for political repression (Council Decision 2011/235/CFSP, 
April 2011). The U.S. took even further steps and announced that it would impose secondary 
sanctions on any person or entity which contributed to the so-called abuse of human rights in Iran. 
They did so by selling the equipment and technology necessary for repression and Internet ad 
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communication monitoring and censorship (The Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act, 
2012, and Executive Order 13628 of October 9, 2012). U.S. secondary sanctions target individuals 
who have significant interactions with Iran in a broad spectrum. This sanction stretches from the 
nuclear and ballistic missiles programs to the alleged terrorism activities and human rights abuses. 
 
Implementation: 
The implementation of targeted sanctions on individuals does not have comprehensive impacts on the 
civilian population. However, the rights of targeted individuals could be violated from a lack of due 
process and absence of transparency in listing and delisting procedures. Many Member States have 
expressed their doubts over transparency and due process in targeting individuals (Portela 2009, 27). 
 
1.2.6. Arms 
The UN imposed a total arms embargo on Iran and prohibited all Member States from selling, 
supplying, and transferring Conventional Arms to Iran directly or indirectly. The embargo includes 
combat aircrafts, helicopters, vehicles, warships, tanks, missiles, and any related spare parts82 
(UNSCR 1929 (2010)). Likewise, the EU prohibited all EU members from selling, supplying, or 
transferring all types of arms and related materials to Iran directly or indirectly (Council Decision 
2010/413/CFSP).  The selling of U.S. arms to Iran has been prohibited under the U.S. Arms Export 
Control Act (1986). Moreover, the U.S. would impose a wide range of secondary sanctions on any 
entity that provides Iran with advanced conventional weapons (The Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation 
Act (P.L. 102-484,1992). The secondary sanctions spectrum stretches from a ban on trading and 
military cooperation to a ban on U.S assistance, and support for international lending (Karzman May 
7, 2014, 23-4). 
 
Implementation: 
Although the complete arms embargo on Iran has affected Iran’s military capabilities, its 
implementation has not had vast impacts on the ground. In fact, the experience of eight years of war 
with Iraq had contributed to Iran’s relative self-sufficiency in a military aspect. 
 
                                                
82 Earlier in 2007, The UNSC had prohibited Iran from exporting arms and had call upon States to exercise vigilance in providing Iran with arms 
(UNSCR 1747 (2007)). Yet, in 2010, the UN imposed a complete arm embargo on Iran (UNSCR 1929 (2010)). 
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1.2.7. Dual use items 
The UNSCRs banned the sales of almost all dual use items to Iran (UNSCRs 1737 (2006) and 1747 
(2007)). In line with the UNSCRs, the EU imposed sanctions on the export of dual use items to Iran 
(Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP). Likewise, the U.S. sanctioned dual use items exported to Iran 
(Arms Export Control Act (1976) and Export Administration Act, §6(j) (1979)). In general, suppliers 
of financial aid, arms and dual use items to the “terrorism list” countries, including Iran, would face 
secondary sanctions by the U.S. The U.S. not only targeted dual use items, which are significant for 
Iran’s auto industry, but also targeted Iran’s automotive sector directly (Executive Order 13645 of 
June 3, 2013). Accordingly, any firms that were to provide Iran’s automotive sector with goods and 
services, or any banks that were to conduct transactions with this sector could face U.S. secondary 
sanctions (Katzman May 7, 2014, 12). 
Dual use items have many applications both in military and civil industries. Dual use items include 
goods, software, and technology that in addition to their application in military industries are used in 
a wide spectrum of nonmilitary areas stretching from research and development (R&D), high-tech, 
energy, telecommunication, electronics, computing and automotive industries to chemical, medical 
and pharmaceutical industries (European Commission Website: Dual-use export controls). 
 
Implementation: 
While dual use items exports to Iran have been subjected to sanctions due to their military 
applications, they have clearly affected civil applications as well. In particular, sanctions on dual use 
items have impacted Iran’s automotive industry, which is in need of dual use materials. There are 25, 
000 companies active in car manufacturing throughout the country. The auto sector is a significant 
source of Iran’s revenue. According to the Ministry of Industries and Mines of Iran, automotive 
manufacturing industry data illustrates 66.2% of a reduction in various types of cars in Sep. 2012 and 
a 42% reduction in the first six months of 2012 compared to the same period the previous year (Alef 
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1.2.8. Multifunction entities 
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has been subjected to UN sanctions due to its 
involvement in Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missiles programs. The UN has accumulatively targeted 
IRGC entities and individuals (UNSCRS 1737(2006), 1747 (2007), and 1929 (2010)). The UNSCR 
1929 (2010) “calls upon” all Member States to exercise vigilance in transactions with IRGC to avoid 
potential contributions to Iran’s nuclear and missiles program (UNSCR 1929 (2010), para.12). 
Furthermore, the EU expanded the sanctions on IRGC with the allegation of its involvement in 
violation of human rights and internal repression after the controversial presidential elections in 2009 
(Council Decision 2011/235/CFSP). The U.S. sanctions on IRGC were authorized not only because 
of nuclear and human rights but also because of the allegation of IRGC’s support of terrorism. The 
U.S. took a step further and announced that it would impose secondary sanctions on any entity that is 




The IRGC is a military body that also has many other non-military activities. In other words, IRGC is 
not only involved in military and weaponry activities, but also in the economy, especially the energy 
sector, and the construction sector. In fact, IRGC is an influential economic actor and some 
estimation indicates that IRGC controls 25% to 40% of gross domestic product (GDP); however there 
is no accurate official statistic (POE report June 2012 (S/2012/395)). In addition to the construction 
wing, IRGC has a business wing, which is involved in agriculture, shipping and finance sectors 
(Ibid). IRGC has a powerful construction wing named Khatam al-Anbia (KAA) that is involved in 
both military and civil constructions. Khatam al-Anbia (KAA) has been designated as the sanctions’ 
target mainly due to its involvement in uranium enrichment facility constructions, such as the Fordow 
site in Qom (POE report June 2014 (S/2014/394)). KAA is highly involved in civil and infrastructural 
projects such as roads, dams, ports, telecommunication, water and sewage lines, and oil and gas 
infrastructure in particular (POE report June 2012 (S/2012/395)). Therefore, the implementation of 
sanctions on multi-function entities, such as IRGC and KAA, has impacted Iran’s economy and some 
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1.3. Examining the criterion: Target Discrimination Principle 
As it was elaborated in chapter two, the implementation of sanctions would be unjust under the 
following circumstances: 
• Comprehensive implementation: 
The impacts of targeted sanctions go beyond the sanctioned target (Population-wide impacts); 
• Implementation curbs the access to humanitarian goods, e.g. food, medication, medical equipment 
and services; 
• Implementation curbs the right to development; 
• Implementation destroys given target’s infrastructures. 
 
 
This examination of the Target Discrimination Principle in sanctions against Iran is summarized through the 
following two tables. 
 
Table 5.2 The unjust implementation of sanctions from the perspective of the Target Discrimination Principle 
 Unjust Implementation of Sanctions 
(a) Comprehensive implementation: 
The impacts of targeted sanctions go beyond the sanctioned target (Population-wide 
impacts) 
(b) Implementation curbs access to humanitarian goods, e.g. food, medication, medical 
equipment and services 
(c) Implementation curbs the right to development 
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Table 5.3 UN, US, and EU sanctions implementation on Iran from the perspective of the target 
discrimination principle 









































































(b) Curbs access 





































Arms Total Restrictive Unilateral (a) Targeted 
  


















































(c) Curbs the right 
to development 
  






Chapter 6: Just Implementation of Sanctions (Part II) 
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Just Implementation of Sanctions (Part II) 
1. Civilian Immunity Principle 
Similar to the target discrimination principle, the civilian immunity principle stresses the necessity to avoid 
harming the civilian population if sanctions are to be implemented in a just manner. The focus of the target 
discrimination principle is on the targets and the specific impacts of sanctioning each one of the targets. The 
civilian immunity principle’s attention is on the impacts of sanctions, as a package, on civilians’ daily lives. 
This section elaborates on how the implementation of sanctions against Iran has been affecting Iranian 
civilians. 
As a general rule, sanctions have uneven and disproportionate cost distributions which makes some groups of 
people benefit and others suffer from their implementation (Wood 2008, 493). Sanctions are supposed to 
target the government and not the civilian population.  But in most cases, the government has the capability 
to shift costs from itself to the population. Thus in many cases, sanctions cost distributions are downward and 
hit the most vulnerable groups of people (Ibid, 493-4). Accordingly, sanctions against Iran have been 
affecting different aspects and layers of ordinary peoples’ lives. 
 
1.1. Impacted areas of civilian population lives 
According to the dominant narrative by the sanctioners, the sanctions against Iran are targeted to 
reduce the inhumane impacts on Iranians. For instance, there is no ban on trading humanitarian goods 
and legitimate items and services with Iran. Yet the implementation of so-called targeted sanctions on 
Iran has revealed a different reality in the daily lives of Iranians. The implementation of sanctions has 
had diverse impacts in the following areas: market psychology, economic, public health and safety, 
science and education, culture, and environment. 
1.1.1. Impacts on Iranian’s market psychology 
The implementation of sanctions has deeply affected Iran’s market psychology. It has damaged Iran’s 
market’ reputation in the world for every business, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Many countries 
have been unwilling to get involved in business with Iran, even over unsanctioned and lawful sectors. 
The following characteristics of Iran’s market psychology arose by the implementation of sanctions. 
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• Controversial market 
Many companies and firms across the world have opted voluntarily to discontinue their businesses 
or withdraw from their projects with Iran because they found Iran to be a “controversial market” 
(Katzman May7, 2014, 46). The imposition of a variety of types of sanctions by different 
sanctioners against Iran made the country a controversial market, which means that any trading and 
business with Iran, including the legitimate ones, could bear political and reputational damages 
(Katzman May7, 2014, 46). The attempts for naming and shaming companies that are doing 
business with Iran have been relatively successful in cutting down its business channels. In 
particular, the United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI)83, an influential U.S. lobby, has run the most 
active campaign in running the name and shame system globally against Iran. It has been able to 
convince many corporations to discontinue their businesses, even the unsanctioned ones, with Iran 
(Gladstone June 20, 2013). 
 
• Uncertain market 
Even if some corporations were not concerned about the political and reputational ramifications of 
doing business with Iran, they were encouraged not to do so due to the difficulties of compliance 
with the highly complicated and technical nature of sanction regimes against Iran. In other words, 
compliance with sanction regimes against Iran has not been an easy task since there are many 
caveats for entities that wish to do business with Iran. For instance, some goods, especially dual use 
items, make trading complicated as elevated expertise is needed to distinguish legitimate items 
from illegitimate ones and ensure that the goods would not contribute to Iran’s nuclear program. 
According to the UN Panel of Experts’ (POE) report, many companies adopted the “highly risk 
averse approach” in order to comply with the UN sanctions against Iran and avoid any unintended 
violations of UNSCRs (POE report June 2012 (S/2012/395), para.198). These entities have asserted 
that complying with UN sanctions against Iran requires a great deal of technical information and 
financial allocation to identify illegitimate business or transactions. Accordingly, they are 
convinced to adopt risk avers approaches and not to do any business, even the legitimate ones, with 
Iran at all (POE report June 2012 (S/2012/395)). In addition, the U.S. secondary sanctions and 
punishment system have convinced many economic actors to take a risk averse approach towards 
Iran’s market in order to avoid U.S. economic and financial punishment. Additionally, many 
traders are uncertain if they would be able to receive money from the exported commodities to Iran 
                                                
83 UANI is a U.S. base advocacy group, which was founded in 2008 with the objective of mobilizing international actors to combat the so-called 
nuclear Iran threat. UANI was founded by influential features such as by Ambassador Mark D. Wallace, the late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, 
former CIA Director Jim Woolsey and Middle East expert Dennis Ross :	www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com.	 
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due to banking and financial sanctions. An Asian trader who exported palm oil to Iran once stated 
"I can confirm that Singaporean firms have stopped. We don't want to go anywhere near Iran at this 
moment, it is too risky," (Parent and Hafezi Feb 9, 2012). 
 
Table 6.1 The impacts of sanctions implementation on Iran’s market psychology 
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1.1.2. Impacts on Iranians economic situation 
The interplay between sanctions implementation and domestic economic mismanagement triggered 
the economic downturn in Iran. However, it is difficult to verify the share of sanctions in the 
upheavals of the economic indicators. In this section, the focus is on selective economic indicators, 
for which the trace of sanctions implementation is more identifiable. Examples of this analysis are: 
the value of Iranian national currency (Rial), Iran’s export and import abilities, and the “Iranians’ 
misery index”. 
 
• The value of Iranian national Currency (Rial) 
Iran’s currency, Rial, devalued abruptly after Iran was cut off from the International banking 
system (katzman July 26, 2013). Later, the Rial, the currency itself, was targeted by the U.S. 
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secondary sanctions which affected Rial trading (Executive Order 13645 June 3, 2013). Rial 
devaluation, which has been the result of both the sanctions and domestic mismanagement, led to a 
rise in the cost of foods, services and goods, especially imported goods and goods with dependency 
on imported raw material. Consequently, the cost of living for Iranian civilians has escalated, 
particularly since 2011. 
 
 
Chart 6.1 Iran Currency tracker 
 
 
* Yellow line (upper line): official exchange rate (Set by the Central Bank of Iran (CBI)). 
** Blue line: unofficial (black market) exchange rate (Used by private sector in daily transactions) 
Source:  United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) Website   
 
As is illustrated in the graph above, in 2010, the value of Iran’s currency against the US dollar was 
10,000 Rial ($1 =10,000 Rial, the official and unofficial rates were very close). In January 2012, the 
Rial’s value dropped by half in one month ($1= 20,000 , unofficial rate). In Febraury 2013, the Rial 
dropped to a quarter of its value, compared to 2010, and Iranian civilians experienced the lowest 
currency value of all-time ($1= 40,000, unofficial rate). 
The following chronological devaluation of Rial is noticeable: 
a) $1 =10,000 Rial (July 2010) 
Zoom
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CISADA, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, which is 
the most comprehensive US sanctions against Iran was signed by president Barak Obama in 
2010. 
b) $1 = 15,500 Rial (Dec. 2011) 
About a year after CISADA was signed, the U.S. Senate sanctioned the Central Bank of Iran 
(CBI) in December 2011. 
c) $1 = 25,500 Rial (Sep. 2012) 
In January 2012, the EU banned its members from purchasing Iran’s crude oil and petroleum 
products (Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP, 23 January 2012). In the same year, the EU 
banned its members from conducting financial transactions with Iranian banks and Iran was 
cut off from the Swift system. 
d) $1 = 34,500 Rial (June, 2013) 
In June 2013, the Obama administration targeted Iran’s currency and auto industry (Executive 
Order 13645 June 3, 2013). 
 
• Iran’s Export and Import 
Iran’s export and import industries were profoundly harmed by the implementation of sanctions, 
particularly due to the generated difficulties in shipping, insurance, and payment sectors. 
 
a) Shipping and insurance 
The implementation of sanctions on Iran’s shipping and insurance sectors profoundly impacted 
imports and exports. In the absence of major shipping companies, secondary-shipping companies 
began charging Iran three times more than before. Consequently, it was Iranian civilians who had to 
pay the extra costs to access imported goods (Zahedi 2013, 94). 
 
• Payment 
In addition to transportation, shipping and insurance difficulties, Iran had financial transaction 
difficulties with its imports and exports. Since Iran was cut off from the international financial 
system, it turned to other payment mechanisms such as: (a) bartering and (b) trading in currencies 
other than the US dollar. For instance, because Iran was not able to receive money from exporting 
oil to India, it had to barter its oil for items from India such as rice, tea, thread, fabric, beef barley, 
medicine, iron, steel and paper (Dana News Agency Feb.27, 2014). Consequently, Iranian 
civilians had to purchase the highly priced but low quality imported goods provided from 
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uncompetitive markets (Iran’s oil customers).84 Furthermore, the bartering system affected some 
domestic industries such as textiles. India took advantage of sanctions against Iran and offered its 
goods in return for its oil debt to Iran. The subsequent import of thread and fabric from India 
harmed Iran’s textile industry and Iranian textile factories began closing (ILNA News Agency 
July 27, 2014).  In addition to bartering its oil, Iran turned to trading oil in currencies other than 
the U.S. Dollar such as the Japanese Yen, South Korean Won and the Indian Rupee. This 
financial situation imposed extra costs on Iran’s trading system (Parent and Hafezi Feb 9, 2012). 
 
Conclusively, the shipping, insurance and payment obstacles in Iran’s export and import systems, 
triggered by the implementation of sanctions, burdened Iran with extra costs when trading any 
goods. According to Mohammad Nahavandian, the chief of staff of the President of Iran and 
former president of Iran Chamber of Commerce Industries and Mines, sanctions have imposed at 
least an extra cost of 15 billion dollars annually over the eight years from 2008 to 2015 on Iran’s 
trading transactions and at least an extra 15% cost has been imposed on Iran’s imports and exports 
industries/systems. Nahavandian, who spoke in support of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA) in Iran parliament’s special commission on the JCPOA, asserted that all Iranian 
families would have to pay the extra costs to purchase imported goods. He added that as a result 
of sanctions, Iran’s crude oil exports dropped from 2.5 mbd to 1 mbd. Such a drop means a 75 
million dollar daily loss if the oil price was considered to be $50 per barrel and not $130 (when 




In sum, the implementation of sanctions has imposed multi-faceted difficulties on Iran’s 
import/export industries, in particular on the shipping, insurance and payment sectors. In addition, 
import/export barriers have paved the way for two other economic disruptions: corruption and 





                                                
84 India became a major rice exporter to Iran in 2012 by providing more than 60% of Iran’s rice imports. It was eventually revealed that India had 
taken advantage of sanctions against Iran to export its arsenic infected rice in return for the oil money  
http://danakhabar.com/fa/news/1162376/شد-خبرساز-ھندی-آلوده-ھای-برنج-ھم-باز.  
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• Iranians’ Misery indicator 
The misery index is “the sum of the inflation, interest and unemployment rates, minus the annual 
percentage change in per capita GDP” (Hanke October 2012, 19). The inflation and unemployment rate 
in Iran increased as sanctions tightened and as more actors implemented sanctions against Iran. 
According to the Iran Central Bank Report, the annual inflation rate reached its highest point in 2013 by 
34%. However, some outside experts question the authenticity of the official rate and estimate that the 
actual number was over 50% (Iran Central Bank (ICB) website; katzman July 26, 2013) . 
 
Table 6.2 The official annual inflation rate in Iran since the UN sanctions were authorized in 2006 
Annual inflation rate (%) 2006-2014 
Year Inflation rate (%) 
2006 (1385) 11.9 
2007 (1386) 18.4 
2008 (1387) 25.4 
2009 (1388) 10.8 
2010 (1389) 12.4 
2011 (1390) 21.5 
2012 (1391) 30.5 
2013 (1392) 34.7 
2014 (1393) 15.6 
2015 (1394)  
Source: Iran Central Bank’s website: https://www.cbi.ir/datedlist/10807.aspx 
 
Steve H. Hanke, Professor of Applied Economics at The Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore and a Senior 
Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C., believes that the sanctions “are imposing a great deal of 
misery on Iranians” (Hanke October 2012, 20). According to Hanke, Iranian citizens experienced the highest 
level of misery in October 2012, when the monthly inflation rate reached 69.6% (Hanke May 28, 2014). The 
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Chart 6.1 Iranian misery index 
Source: Hanke May 28, 2014 
 
There is a high possibility that the actual rate of inflation, interest rates and unemployment are higher than 
official numbers, yet “the pattern of “ups” and “downs”” is reliable (Hanke October 2012, 19). Iran’s misery 
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Table  6.3 The Impacts of Sanctions Implementation on Iranians’ economic situation (selective indicators) 
 Impacts Consequences 
The value of Iranian 
national currency (Rial) 
Devaluation Economic hardship for 
Iranian people 
Iran’s export/import Difficulties in shipping, 
insurance and payments to 
foreign states 
Economic hardship for 
Iranian people 
Iranians’ misery index - High inflation 
-Low employment 




1.1.3. Impacts on Public Health and Safety 
The implementation of sanctions has affected the health and safety of Iranians in three different areas: 
(a) medicine and medical equipment, (b) air pollution and (c) civil aviation. 
 
a) Medicine and medical equipment 
Sanctions on Iran do not directly target humanitarian goods like medicine, but they have still had 
severe indirect impacts on the entire Iranian health care system. Patients with special diseases 
such as thalassemia, dialyses, hemophilia and chronic diseases such as cancer and MS are the 
most vulnerable groups, who have been affected by indirect impacts of sanctions. According to 
Fatemeh Hashemi Rafsanjani, Head of Charity Foundation for Special Diseases, providing 
medicine for patients with cancer and MS has become difficult. Patients with thalassemia and 
dialyses are experiencing difficulties due especially to sanctions on banking and financial 
transactions (BBC Oct.17, 2012). 
Ahmad Ghavidel, head of Iran’s hemophilia center acknowledges the shortage of medicine for the 
hemophiliacs: 
“…because of sanctions, access to medicine for people with hemophilia has decreased. 
As a result of medicine shortages these patients are unable to store medicine at home 
and use it in cases of emergency…by imposing sanctions on banks it is essentially 
difficult to import medicine” (Khabaronline News Agency Nov.13, 2012). 
 
He draws attention to the danger of people gaining disabilities due to hemophilia medicine 
shortages: 
  
     148 
” In American and European countries, people with hemophilia are able to take their 
medicine before bleeding … but in Iran, patients have to take medicine after 
bleeding. Severe bleeding can cause disability and because of the medicine 
shortage, we cannot prevent disabilities …we are running out of hemophilia 
medicine.” (Ibid). 
 
According to Dr. Mahmoud Najafi Arab, the head of Iranian Holder of Human Pharmaceutical 
Industries Syndicate, Iran has acted relatively independently in medication as it produces 97% 
of its medicine.  Iran has to import 50% of the raw material necessary for internal medicine 
production and the share of internal medical equipment production is 50% (ISNA March 2, 
2015; Trade Promotion Organization of Iran website Nov. 2, 2015). However, in spite of the 
fact that humanitarian goods including medicine are excluded from all sanctions, many 
international companies were reluctant to do any trade with Iran, including the legitimate 
ones, because of the difficulties of trading with Iran in general. Difficulties in payment, 
shipment, insurance and dual use items trading were enough to persuade many companies to 
take a high risk averse approach towards Iran in order to avoid any possible violations of 
sanctions. As a result, in some cases, Iran had to provide necessary medicine and equipment 
from international brokers at unreasonable prices (Dehshiri and Sharif Shaahi 2013, 182-197) 
 
The implementation of sanctions has impacted Iranians’ public health in the following ways: 
 
• Payment for medicine and medical equipment 
Imposing sanctions on Iranian banks and cutting Iran off from the international financial 
system have caused many difficulties for Iranian medicine and medical equipment. They have 
made it difficult for importers to open LC and pay for their purchases and to import the 
medicine, medical equipment and raw material necessary to produce medicine domestically 
(Ibid, 182-197). 
Dr. Seyed Alireza Marandi, President of the Iranian Academy of Medical Sciences and a 
former Health Minister, in a letter to the UN secretary-general, challenged the sanctioners’ 
narrative that medicine is exempted from sanctions on Iran: 
"(The sales of) medicines have not been banned directly. Of course there are some 
pharmaceutical companies that refuse to sell drugs to us but those which sell medicine 
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to us want their money and the money should be paid by the Central Bank of Iran 
(CBI) though the CBI is under sanction and cannot pay the money." 
(Fars News Agency Nov. 11, 2013) 
 
Iran has also been struggling with the importation of medical equipment. Seyyed Hassan Hashemi 
Ghazizadeh, the minister of Health and Medical Education of Iran under Rohani’s presidency, asserts 
that “although we had negotiated purchasing 800 ambulances from Mercedes-Benz and we had 
defined the prices more than seven months ago, we have not been able to import them yet due to the 
sanctions and difficulties of payment through banks” (ISNA June 19, 2015). 
 
• Shipments of medicine and medical equipment 
Sanctions on Iranians shipping lines and bans on international insurance companies from 
providing insurance for Iranian consignments have resulted in an increase in transportation 
costs, including medicine and medical equipment transportation. Thus the final price of 
medicine and medical care increased significantly for Iranian families (Dehshiri and Sharif 




The implementation of sanctions has indirectly impacted the availability and use of medicine and the 
medical equipment shipment and payment system, as well as nuclear medicine production and research. 
These impacts have had consequences for Iranians such as (a) medicine shortages, (b) a rise in medicine 
and medical care costs, and (c) the trafficking of counterfeit medication. The rise in cost of medicine and 
medical care for Iranian patients is not only due to shipment and payment system difficulties, but is also 
due to the devaluation of Iran’s national currency, Rial. The implementation of sanctions, especially on 
the banking and financial sectors, has contributed to the devaluation of the Rial against foreign 
currencies. Consequently, providing medicine and medical equipment from other countries became much 
more expensive and the availability of some medicines to Iranian patients became costly and limited. 
Furthermore, the difficulties in purchasing medicine from original producers paved the way for 
counterfeit medication trafficking to Iran. Pakistan and Iraq’s Kurdistan are the epicenters of producing 
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In sum, by the implementation of sanctions, Iranian access to some medicine, especially expensive 
Western-made medicine, has been remarkably restricted and the price of medicine and medical care has 
sharply risen. Consequently, all patients, in particular those with chronic disease, who have to take 
lifetime medications and medical care have been affected not only by low quality, high costs and 
shortages in medications and medical care, but also by psychological pressure and stress resulting from 
the more difficult treatment paths that they and their families have had to endure after the implementation 
of sanctions. However, the Ahmadinejad government’s policies and mismanagement have played a 
significant role in deteriorating Iran’s medicine market. The government’s mismanagement will be 
elaborated on in more detail in a separate section. 
 
b) Air pollution 
Sanctions on refined petroleum, including exportation, investment, and contributions to its 
production, drove Iran to unstandardized ways of producing fuel in order to meet domestic needs. 
The Ahmadinejad government decided to produce gas in petrochemical complexes instead of 
refineries. The gas produced in petrochemical complexes triggered a controversial debate 
regarding its dangers for both Iranian health and the environment. Some members of the Tehran 
City Council and Iran’s parliament publicized information that the fuel produced in petrochemical 
complexes is polluted with toxic substances and causes cancer85 (ISNA Nov.25, 2014). Many 
reports, research and statistics on the fuel produced in petrochemical complexes and its effects on 
Iranians’ health have remained confidential. In June 2014, three Iranian lawyers filed a lawsuit 
against Masoud Mirkazemi, Iranian oil minister under Ahmadinejad presidency from 2009 to 
2011 (1388-1390), after conducting independent research on the dangerous effects of 
petrochemical complex’s gas on public health. Mostafa Tork Hamedani, one of the lawyers, 
asserts that the confidential statistics illustrate the progressive increase in cancer among children. 
(Tabnak News Site September 3, 2014). 
Alireza Daghighi, another of the three lawyers, asserted that benzene directly affects the nervous 
system and reduces IQ. Therefore, the high level of benzene in petrochemical gas has reduced IQ 
in Tehran and other cities in which this gas has been distributed (Kalameh News Website Nov.11, 
2014). 
                                                
85 Mohammad Esmaeil Akbari, Chairman of the Cancer Research Center (CRC) in Iran, stresses that air pollution is more effective in causing 
cancer than smoking. He asserts that air pollution plays a key role in causing almost all kinds of cancer, but most particularly lung cancer, 
prostate cancer and leukemia (Mehr News Agency, February 15, 2014). 
 
  
     151 
Asgar Jalalian, a member of the energy commission of Iran’s parliament, warned that the 
danger of public dissatisfaction over the fuel shortage is less than danger of cancer (ISNA 
Nov.25, 2014). The government denied the accusation and affirmed that the petrochemical 
complex’s gas was standard. In Tehran and other big cities, the air pollution and fatalities 
linked to it were increasing. According to Kamaladin Pirmoazen, member of the environment 
commission of Iran’s parliament, unstandardized fuel causes 4000 fatalities annually (Mehr 
News Agency May 25, 2014). Based on what was announced in the 16th National Congress on 
Cardiovascular Updates (NCCU) in 2014, in Tehran alone, 2400 to 4800 people lost their 
lives in 2012 (1391) due to the air pollution. According to Masoud Eslami, scientific secretary 
of the congress, that number is equal to a passenger airplane crash occurring every week 
(Mehr News Agency September 17, 2014). 
Tehran’s air had been extremely polluted by toxic substances from 2009 to 2013 (1388-1392). 
The capital city experienced its most polluted days in December 2011 (1390), when not even 
one day was recorded as a “clean day” (ISNA Nov.25, 2014). Gradually, more and more 
authorities began to speak out. Masoumeh Ebtekar, head of the Environmental Protection 
Organization and Rahmatoallah Hafezi, head of Health Commission of the Tehran City 
Council, warned and acknowledged that the gas produced in petrochemical complexes is 
polluted and causes cancer because of a high level of benzene (ISNA Nov.25, 2014). 
According to the official letter of the National Iranian Oil Refining & Distribution Company 
(NIORDC), the level of benzene in the gas produced in petrochemical complexes from 2010 
to 2013 (1389-1392) had been 40% more than the permitted and standard level. Based on the 
International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC)’s classification in 2010, benzene is in 
the highest group of materials that cause cancer86 (ILNA News Agency Agust 27, 2014). The 
analysis of distributed gas in Tehran by ASG laboratory in Germany in 2012 and 2013 (1390-
1391) revealed that the Sulphur level was 20 times higher than the standard (Mehr News 
Agency July 7, 2014). In 2014 (1393), the production of petrochemical gas was finally halted 
(ISNA Nov.25, 2014). 
 
In sum, the implementation of sanctions on refined petroleum drove the Iranian government to 
look into alternative ways to circumvent sanctions and avoid fuel shortages for domestic use. 
The Ahmadinejad government’s ill-made decision to produce fuel in petrochemical complexes 
                                                
86 The statistic of Mofid Hospital in Tehran illustrates that the number of children diagnosed with leukemia who reached the hospital increased in 
2013. In addition to leukemia, benzene has other dangerous effects on health such as somnolence, dizziness, headaches, as well as irritation of the 
skin, eyes and breathing systems, blood disorders, effect on bone marrow, chromosome abnormalities and harm to nervous system (ILNA News 
Agency August 27, 2014). 
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instead of refineries took a great toll on the Iranian population by causing civilian misery on 
the ground. 
 
c) Civil aviation 
Iranian airlines were more widely used than any other country’s in the region in the 1970s. 
However after decades of sanctions against Iran, they ended up among countries with the 
worst safety records in the world87. In 1995, U.S. sanctions on Iran’s aviation sector were 
authorized under President Bill Clinton. The sanctions banned all U.S. aviation companies 
from selling aircrafts and spare parts (new or used) and from providing maintenance and other 
services to Iran. Additionally, all other countries and firms in the world were neither allowed 
to resell the U.S-origins aviation equipment to Iran even if they have possessed them for many 
years, nor were they permitted to provide maintenance and other services for U.S. parts 88 
(ICAO working paper, A36-WP/275, EC/34 September 20, 2007, 3-4). However, during the 
Bush and Obama administrations, selling spare parts to Iran was permitted on a case-by-case 
basis by receiving export licenses from OFAC. In 2011, such permissions were reversed, 
when the U.S. accused Iranian airlines of transferring arms to Syria and authorized targeted 
sanctions on almost all main Iranian airlines89 (Katzman May 7, 2014, 1-79; Middle East 
Report N°138 25 Feb 2013, 36). Iran tried to draw the attention of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) to the impacts of sanctions on Iran’s civilian aviation safety. 
Iran claimed that U.S. sanctions contradict Article 44 of the Convention on International Civil 
Aviation (Chicago Convention December 7, 1944)90. In response to Iran’s claim, the ICAO 
deployed a Fact-Finding mission to Iran and then published its report on May 9, 2005. 
According to the ICAO, “the findings of ICAO should be upsetting to anyone who is 
committed to the safety of civil aviation” (ICAO working paper, A36-WP/275, EC/34 
September 20, 2007, 4). The report affirmed that “in fact, the United States’ sanctions had 
endangered the safety of civil aviation in Iran and they are contrary to the provisions, aims and 
objectives of the Chicago Convention.”(Ibid, 3). According to the ICAO, U.S. unilateral 
sanctions against Iran and U.S. extraterritorial sanctions of the re-export provisions have had 
                                                
87 Iran’s safety record is available at: 
http://aviation-safety.net/database/dblist.php?Country=EP 
88 In 2010, the U.S. authorized extraterritorial sanctions in which countries and entities were banned from selling aviation fuel to Iran 
(Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA). 
89 Iran Air was sanctioned under Executive Order 13382 and other major Iranian airlines were sanctioned under Executive Order 13224 
(Katzman May7, 2014, 6-7). 
90 The Chicago Convention is a document on rules of airspace, aircraft registration and safety. This document, which was signed on December 7, 
1944 in Chicago, U.S., defines the rights of signatories in regard to air travel. The U.S. is a founder and party to Chicago Convention 
 (Wikipedia website: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicago_Convention_on_International_Civil_Aviation) 
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detrimental effects on Iran’s civil aviation safety. And they have been inconsistent with both 
the letter and spirit of the Chicago Convention, in particular Articles 4 and 4491 (ICAO 
working paper, A36-WP/275, EC/34 September 20, 2007, 4). 
After decades of implementation of sanctions, Iran’s aviation system is in dire need of new 
aircrafts and spare parts. According to Iran Air chief Farhad Parvaresh, the implementation of 
sanctions has driven Iran to provide its needs from black markets, where in some cases it had 
to pay more than 30% of the original price (Traufetter October 1, 2012). What is more, the 
process of purchasing an airplane could last for about 9 months (Zare Chahaki 2008, 174). 
Moreover, providing aviation needs from black markets always come with safety uncertainties 
and safety delays. Regrettably, the toll has been taken on Iranian civilians. 
The implementation of sanctions on Iran civil aviation has caused the following 
consequences: 
 
• Old fleet 
The average age of an aircraft that operates in Iran Air, the country’s national airline, is 26 years while it 
is only 7 years in Emirates (The Economist July 21, 2015). Iran Air’s ageing fleet causes dangerous 
troubles: wheels may not open, electronic systems may die, breaks may not work properly and wheels 
may blow up (Zare Chahaki 2008, 174). The process of properly renewing aircrafts is almost impossible 
due to sanctions on Iran’s aircraft purchasing abilities, maintenance, post-sell services, and spare parts.92 
 
• Less advanced aircraft 
Iran’s aviation system is mostly constituted of Boeing aircraft. When Boeing was banned from selling 
aircraft, providing spare parts and other services to Iran due to sanctions, Iran had to stay with old 
Boeings as well as purchase less advanced aircraft from Russia (Pourhassan 2007, 94). 
 
In sum, the implementation of sanctions on Iran’s civil aviation system has caused poor air safety and has 
jeopardized the lives of Iranian civilians. Regretfully, statistics illustrate that Iranian airlines’ accidents 
occur 40 times more frequently than North America’s airlines (Middle East Report N°138 25 Feb 2013, 
36). 
 
                                                
91 Article 4 of the Chicago Convention requires signatories to avoid using civil aviation for any objectives which are inconsistent with the 
Convention. Article 44 lists the objectives of the Convention such as: the promotion of aviation safety and avoiding discrimination between 
contracting states (Convention on International Civil Aviation Done at Chicago on the 7th day of December 1944: 
http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_orig.pdf 
92 The value of Iran’s current aviation is only $ 1 billion while it needs $11 billion to purchase new aircrafts (Zare Chahaki 2008, 174). 
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Table 6.4 The Impacts of Sanctions Implementation on Public Health and Safety 
Areas of impact Impacts Consequences 
Medicine and medical 
equipment 
Difficulties in: 
(a) Payment for medicine and 
medical equipment; 
(b) Shipment of medicine and 
medical equipment; 
(c) Nuclear medicine 
production and research. 
(a) Shortage; 
(b) High expenses; 
(c) Trafficking of 
counterfeit medication. 
Air pollution Difficulties in: 
(a) Importing standard fuel to 
avoid domestic shortage; 
(b) Increasing the refined 
petroleum products, and 
constructing, modernizing, and 
repairing petroleum refineries. 
(a) Production of 
unstandardized and 




(b) Deterioration of air 
quality 
Civil aviation Difficulties in: 
(a) Purchasing aircrafts and 
spare parts; 
(b) Access to post-sell 
maintenance and services 
(a) Old fleet 
(b) Less advanced 
aircrafts 





1.1.4. Scientific and Educational Impacts 
The implementation of sanctions has exacerbated preexisting hardships faced by Iran and added to the 
disappointment and hopelessness of Iranians, especially the educated class. Many educated Iranians 
decided to leave the country. There is no reliable statistic on “brain drain” in Iran. But, according to 
Seyyed Shahabedin Chavoshi, Political-security Deputy of the Province of Tehran, 180,000 elite 
people have left Iran over the recent years, and caused 50 billion dollars in losses for the country 
(Alef News Website August 25, 2014). Hassan Moslemi Naeini, former Vice President of Deputy of 
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Scholarship and Students Affairs Abroad, estimates that around 5, 000 Iranian students leave the 
country annually to study in other countries mainly Malaysia, U.S., Canada, and the UK. This statistic 
only includes students who aimed to finance their studies themselves and does not include students 
who received scholarships (Khabaronline News Agency October 12, 2013). Unofficial statistics, 
therefore, show a massive brain drain in Iran. 
The scientific and educational impacts of sanctions against Iran are classified into four categories: 
students, universities, publications, access to scientific journals and participation in online courses 




a) Ban on studying sensitive topics 
The UNSCR prohibits all Member States from providing “any technical assistance or training” in 
sensitive areas to Iranians (UNSCR 1737(2006), para.6). According to the Panel of Experts’ (POE) 
report, Member States have adopted different approaches to comply with the resolution. For instance, 
one country has prohibited Iranian students to study in engineering or science courses (POE Report 
June 2013 (S/2013/331)). Furthermore, many countries that have adopted policies such as rejections 
of student visa requests and closely monitor students from the Islamic Republic of Iran (Ibid, 32). The 
Netherlands and Norway were two such countries who remarkably expanded the implementation of 
scientific sanctions by not offering admissions to Iranian students in many fields. Furthermore, the 
residence permits of some post graduate Iranians in Norway were canceled in 2014. They received 
letters from the Directorate of Immigration to leave the country since their studies could contribute to 
Iran’s nuclear industry (BBC July 27, 2014). In 2013, around 60 Iranian student visa requests were 
rejected based on the Norwegian police security service recommendation (Ibid). The Norway 
embassy warned Iranian students that they may not be able to get student visas if they were seeking to 
study in the following fields: 
Biotechnology, biochemistry, pure chemistry, nuclear physics, information and communication 
security, electronic engineering, aviation, aerospace engineering, mechanical engineering, 
material engineering, and cybernetic science. Some countries have included petroleum 
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b) Tuition payment hardship 
The implementation of sanctions has directly (through sanctions on the banking and financial 
system) and indirectly (through the devaluation of the Rial) have impacted Iranian students 
studying abroad. Tuition remittances from the Iranian government and Iranian families became 
impossible as Iranian banks were cut off from the international financial system. Consequently, 
many Iranian students were not able to pay their tuition fees and continue their studies. Along 
with difficulties in tuition remittances due to banking and financial sanctions, there was the sharp 
devaluation of Iran’s national currency against the US Dollar added to the difficulties faces by 
Iranian students. Subsequently, continuing to study abroad became extremely expensive. 
According to Moslemi Naeini, more than 3000 Iranian students opted to return to Iran in 2012 
(1391) mostly due to a sharp devaluation of the Rial and inabilities to provide their tuition 
payments (Khabaronline News Agency October 12, 2013). 
 
• Universities 
Sanctions have directly targeted two Iranian universities: 
a) Malek Ashtar University: has been subjected to UN and EU sanctions due to the 
allegation of its link to the Ministry of Defense and cooperation with Aerospace Industries 
Organization (AIO) (UNSCR 1929 (2010), Annex I, page:12, and Council Common 
Position 2008/479/CFSP, Annex) 
b) Sharif University of Technology (SUT): was added to the EU sanctions list in 2012 due 
to the allegation of its contributions to Iran’s proliferation activities (Council 
Implementation Regulation (EU) No 1264/2012 December 21, 2012).93 
 
Iran has objected to sanctions against its universities and believes that such actions are in violation of 
the International Convention against Discrimination in Education (IRNA Nov.9, 2014). The 
implementation of sanctions against Iranian universities has caused difficulties in (a) purchasing 
laboratory equipment and materials, (b) scientific exchanges including invitations of foreign 




                                                
93 In addition to those two Iranian universities, approximately 75 research institutes in the world sanctioned Iran’s Foreign Affairs Ministry 
research branch in 2007 sanctioned or were sanctioned? (Tabnak News Site, July 27, 2013). 
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• Publications and access to scientific journals 
According to the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) laws, all U.S. owned journals are 
prohibited from publishing papers by authors employed by the government of Iran (Tasnim News 
Agency July 31, 2013). Consequently, some outstanding publishing companies adopted restrictive 
measures against Iran. 
 
a) Elsevier publishing company 
Elsevier, one of the largest scientific publications in the world, has been legally obliged to comply 
with the OFAC rules, as Elsevier is a US owned journal94. 
Elsevier blocked the access of two Iranian universities, Shahid Beheshti and Maaleke Ashtar, to 
its scientific database following the US and EU sanctions implementations on Iran (Daavari and 
Azizi May 2012, 2-3). Elsevier sanctions have had a remarkable impact on Iran’s scientific 
society, as Iranian researchers have had their most scientific exchanges with Elsevier (Daavari 
and Azizi May 2012, 5). 
 
b) Taylor & Francis Group 
Taylor & Francis, a distinguished publisher of scientific books and journals, requested that its 
affiliated journals not publish Iranian papers in accordance with U.S. and EU sanctions against 
Iran (Tanbnak News Site July 28, 2013). 
Furthermore, some other international scientific sites halted their services to Iran, as Iran was not 
able to pay its membership fees due to the financial sanctions placed on the country (BBC June 6, 
2014). 
 
• Participation in online courses and scientific conferences 
a) “Coursera”, one of the largest companies offering online courses with the cooperation of top 
universities, restricted Iranians’ access to all of its online courses in compliance with U.S. export 
control regulations. It, however, amended its policy after five months and announced that 
Iranians’ access is blocked only in advanced STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and 
Math) areas. According to Coursera’s estimates, more than 20,000 Iranians had participated in 
courses before access was blocked (Coursera blog June 3, 2014). 
                                                
94 Elsevier is based in Amsterdam and publishes about 350,000 articles per year in 2000 journals. The article topics mainly include science, 
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b) Scientific conferences focused on specific fields have restricted the participation of Iranian 
researchers. Additionally, researchers and professors from some American and European 
universities have been prohibited from attending conferences in Iran (BBC June 6, 2014). 
 
Table 6.5 The impacts of sanctions implementation on Iran’s science and education fields 
Areas of impact Impacts 
Students Difficulties in: 
(a) Studying in sensitive topics 
(b) Tuition payment 
Universities Difficulties in: 
(a) Purchasing of laboratory 
equipment and materials 
(b) Scientific exchange 
Publication and access to scientific 
journals 
Difficulties in: 
(a) Publishing scientific papers 
(b) Access to scientific databases 
Participation in online courses and 
scientific conferences 
Difficulties in: 
(a) Access to online courses 





1.1.5. Cultural impacts 
Sanctions have cultural impacts even if they do not target cultural sectors. As a general rule, sanctions 
trigger dissatisfaction and outrage in their target society (Boghairy 2013, 118). The more protracted 
sanctions are, the greater the possibility that cultural changes on the population will be perceivable. 
While sanctions are imposed to change the target regime, they have the potential to change the 
behavior of a society (Andreas 2005, 338). 
The impacts of sanctions on Iran’s culture and behavior are noticeable at two levels of the state and 
the society. Yet, the cultural impacts of sanctions on Iran are too great to be measured and studied 
independently. They could be pointed out for further research as follows: 
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a) State level 
• Culture of rationalizing irrationality 
Prolonged sanctions provide grounds for the irrational behavior of the target state. 
Irrational policies and decisions can be justified as necessary policies to circumvent 
sanctions. Circumvention polices are usually costly and in some cases are harmful 
to civilians. For instance, the production of unstandardized and harmful fuels in 
petrochemical complexes was “irrational circumvention policy” by the 
Ahmadinejad government. This step was not only rationalized and justified under 
the pressure of sanctions but was also depicted as an achievement in self-
sufficiency. 
 
b) Society level 
The prolonged implementation of sanctions has contributed to factors that have caused 
desensitization, inferior feelings and aggressive behaviors among Iranians. 
• Desensitization 
As a general rule, sanctions provide grounds for corruption and smuggling in the 
target country. The target society gradually loses its sensitivity as more cases of 
smuggling and corruption take place (Andreas 2005, 336). Iranians’ reaction to the 
news of embezzlements, corruption, smuggling and sanctions mafias have not been 
proportionate. In fact, Iranians have been getting more accustomed to practices of 
law breaking. 
• Inferior feelings 
A fraction of Iranian society has been developing a feeling of inferiority when 
compared to the international community. One of the reasons for this inferior 
feeling among Iranians is because Iran has been stigmatized for a long time as a 
threat to international peace and security and as a country that deserves the 
punishment of sanctions (Karimikia March 2013, 180-1). However, some other 
Iranians have been developing a proud feeling since they perceive their country as a 
sole resistance front against U.S. cruelty. 
• Aggressive behavior 
The general logic behind sanctions is that the pain of the populace will result in 
political gain (Biersteker and others 2012, 10). In other words, the dissatisfaction 
and anger of civilians would translate to violence and pressure against the target 
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state and would eventually result in a change in the behavior of the state. However, 
this logic does not work for Iran because there is no organic relation between the 
state and society. In other words, the state is not dependent on society for providing 
its resources; rather it is dependent on oil. Therefore, it is not dependent on the 
society to set the policies as well. 
While sanctions have impacted the daily lives of Iranians, there has not been a 
noticeable, organized, and widespread opposition out of economic hardship against 
the government. On the contrary, the statistic shows a rise in aggressive and violent 
behavior among the people themselves. Based on the Iranian Legal Medicine 
Organization’s report, street conflict has increased in Iran and Tehran has the 
highest ranking. According to the report, a street conflict occurs every minute in 
Iran (Arman Newspaper June 15, 2015). Economic and family problems, 
psychological pressures, unemployment and air pollution are among the reasons for 
a decrease in Iranian tolerance and an increase in local violence (Jamejamonline 
News Website April 5, 2015). 
This increase in violence and anger among Iranians is observable and is supportable 
by statistics.  But it is difficult to ascertain to what degree it is linked to sanctions. 
 
Table 6.6 The Impacts of Sanctions implementation on Iran’s Culture 
Areas of Impact Impacts 
 
State level 






(b) Inferior feeling 
(c) Aggressive behavior 
 
 
1.1.6. Environmental impacts 
The implementation of sanctions has indirectly impacted Iran’s environment. On the one hand, 
sanctions have contributed to the creation of a new environmental deteriorating cause, while on the 
other, it has exacerbated the pre-existing environmental problems. 
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• Contribution to a new environmental deteriorating cause 
The most tangible environmental impact of sanctions implementation is observable in the air quality of 
big cities of Iran. Big cities have been suffering from air pollution for a long time, but the implementation 
of sanctions exacerbated even further air pollution. As elaborated in the section “Impacts on Public 
Health and Safety”, sanctions on selling refined petroleum to Iran and any contribution and investment to 
develop this sector drove the Ahmadinejad government to adopt the unprecedented and irrational decision 
of producing unstandardized fuel in order to overcome the domestic shortage caused by sanctions. As a 
result, the environment, especially in large cities, was deteriorated further by a new cause. According to 
Masoumeh Ebtekar, Vice-President and Head of Iran’s Department of Environment, Iran’s access to the 
standards of air pollution, air quality and fuel was delayed by the implementation of sanctions (IRNA 
October 4, 2014). 
 
• Exacerbating pre-existing environmental problems 
Iran’s fragile environment has been struggling with difficulties such as drying ponds and lakes, an 
inadequate water supply, and air pollution. The implementation of sanctions has significantly worsened 
the pre-existing environmental problems in the following ways: 
 
a) Reduction of government revenue 
Environmental projects require vast financial resources and budgets. The implementation of 
sanctions, especially sanctions on purchasing Iran’s crude oil, remarkably reduced the 
government’s revenue, which is highly dependent on oil exports. Consequently, environmental 
projects received less priority in governmental budget allocations and the allocated funds were far 
less than required. 
 
b) Suspension of international aid 
Sanctions have affected the payment of international aid allocated to Iran’s environmental 
projects. The Global Environment Facility (GEF) has paid only 4.2 million dollars out of 30 
million dollars of its financial commitment to Iran. According to Masoumeh Ebtekar, the GEF has 
suspended the payment of the remaining 26 million dollars due to the sanctions and pressure from 
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c) Insufficient foreign investment, technical aid and regional-international cooperation 
Iran has been struggling with large-scale environmental problems with regional impacts such as 
the Lake Orumieh crisis95 and “dust storm phenomenon”96. Tackling these problems requires 
foreign investments, technical aid and regional-international cooperation, which have become less 
accessible due to the sanctions against Iran. The Rouhani administration has paid special attention 
to environmental crises, to the extent that it has labeled itself an environmental government. 
President Hassan Rouhani has stressed that sanctions have had devastating impacts on Iran’s 
environment and solving environmental problems will be possible only when sanctions are lifted 
and foreign investments are allocated (ISNA June 7, 2015). 
 
d) Restricted access to advanced and environment-friendly technologies 
Iran is in need of advanced and environment-friendly technologies to improve its environmental 
standards in different sectors such as energy and fuel, air quality, water and waste management 
and green industries. The implementation of sanctions has impeded Iran’s access to these 
technologies. Masoumeh Ebtekar has warned UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in a letter, that 
the implementation of sanctions has had devastating impacts on Iran’s environment by hindering 
Iran’s access to advanced and environment-friendly technology (Fars News Agency Nov 11, 
2013). 
 
Table 6.7 The Impacts of Sanctions implementation on Iran’s Environment 
Levels of impact Impacts 
Contribution to creation of a new 





Further delay in tackling the 
environmental problems and 
reaching environmental standards 
 
 
                                                
95 Lake Uromieh was the largest lake in the Middle East before it shrunk to 10% of its initial size (Wikipedia website: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lake_Urmia). Reviving the lake is one of the largest and most difficult environmental projects undertaken by Iran.  
96 “Dust storms” are a new phenomenon in Iran that have mostly affected the southwestern parts of Iran. In some cases, schools were shut down 
and hospitals were filled. The source of dust storms in Iran is deserts in countries around the Persian Gulf. Dust storms could reach distances as 
far as Tehran and Afghanistan. Regional and international cooperation is necessary for tackling the dust storm phenomenon ( Ali	Boghairy,	"the	
Impact	of	Iran	Sanctions	on	Persian	Gulf	Environment,"	Middle	East	Studies	Quarterly	5,	no.	3	(2013), 126).  
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1.2. Iran’s government mismanagement 
Iran’s government mismanagement coupled with the implementation of sanctions took a great toll on 
the Iranian population. Ahmadinejad’s major mismanagements in this regard are classified in the 
following four main categories: 
 
a) Mismanagement in healthcare policies 
The shortage of medicine was not only due to the implementation of sanctions and difficulties in 
providing western-made medicine, but also because of inadequate policies during Ahmadinejad’s 
presidency. Marzieh Vahid Dastjerdi, Iran’s Minister of Health and Medical Education under 
Ahmadinejad’s presidency, was the first to officially disclose a series of financial violations 
supported by the government which interfered with the process of importation of medicines. She 
publicized the fact that some corporations were using subsidized dollars allocated for medicine 
importation to import unnecessary luxury goods such as Porsche cars and cosmetics. In an 
interview with Iran’s National TV, she announced that only 41 million dollars out of 2.5 billion 
dollars allocated for the Ministry of Health was paid  (Marzieh Vahid Dastjerdi's interview video). 
She was discharged shortly after she publicized her criticisms. 
 
b) Mismanagement in fuel policies 
Although sanctions on Iran’s energy sector, especially on refined petroleum, caused a severe 
shortage of gas, the Ahmadinejad government adopted a harmful and unethical policy of 
producing highly unstandardized gas at petrochemical complexes to meet domestic consumption 
rates. Consequently, sanctions on refined petroleum and Iran’s government fuel policy 
jeopardized the health and lives of Iranians and caused long-term irremediable harm. 
 
c) Mismanagement in monetary policies 
President Ahmadinejad adopted the “targeted subsidies reform” in December 2010 (1389). This 
policy, which he called economic “surgery”, was based on gradual subsidy cuts on fuel, hydro, 
and some edible product and cash-handouts to people in return (Reza Farzin, Guillaume, and 
Zytek 2011, 3). In October 2010, around 80% of Iranians had these government payments (from 
the oil revenue, not taxes)97 in their special bank accounts (Ibid, 3). 
                                                
97 The Ahmadinejad Government started to pay the cash subsidies from oil revenues when the crude oil was $100 pb in 2010. The decline of the 
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As a general rule, such policies have the potential to reduce inequality in societies. However it has 
had reverse effects in Iran due to the following reasons: 
a) The implementation of the “targeted subsidies policy” was hasty, ambitious, and without 
enough expertise studies done in advance; 
b) The necessary economic infrastructure was not provided prior to the implementation of the 
targeted subsidies policy; 
c) The payments were distributed unjustly; the cash subsidies were paid to both high-income 
and low-income classes at the first stages; 
d) The government was in noncompliance with the law and was repeatedly violating the law 
in paying the cash subsidies (e.g. withdrawing from the Central Bank of Iran resources to 
provide the payments); 
e) The government was not providing transparent reports on the implementation of the 
targeted subsidies policy implementation; the misleading information delayed criticisms 
and reforms to the policy. (Dadgar and Nazar 2011, 362-70). 
Hence, the targeted subsidies policy resulted in inflation, inequality, unemployment, budget deficits 
and economic growth reduction (Ibid, 362-8). 
In sum, Ahmadinejad’s government targeted subsidies reforms is one of the policies to be blamed due 
to its negative economic consequences (Khajehpour, Marashi, and Parsi March 2013, 12). Some 
Iranian officials asserted that 50% of Iran’s dire economic situation is due to the sanctions and the 
other 50% is the result of domestic mismanagement and detrimental decisions (Ibid, 12). 
 
d) Mismanagement in sanctions circumvention policies 
Sanctions are a recipe for corruption. Hadi Haghshenas, an economic expert and former MP in 
Iran, asserts that the country has never been more prone to economic corruption than the time of 
sanctions implementation (Fararu News Website Aug.3, 2015). He adds that since some official 
trades were impossible under sanctions, the government allowed some individuals to conduct 
unofficial trades in order to circumvent sanctions. For instance, some individuals were authorized 
to sell Iran’s oil through unofficial channels (Ibid). Some of these individuals, known as 
“sanctions traders”, took advantage of the given privilege to earn money. The most well-known 
and controversial sanctions trader, who was authorized under the Ahmadinejad government to sell 
Iran’s oil, is Babak Zanjani. He was arrested and put in jail in 2013 for withholding around $2 
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billion of oil income (BBC Dec.30, 2013). Zanjani’s case is one of the biggest economic 
corruption cases in Iran’s history. 
Ali Ghanbary, an Iranian economic expert and the CEO of the Government Trading Corporation, 
affirms that a lack of transparency during the implementation of sanctions paved the way for 
sanctions traders to work in pursuit of their self-interests. Yet it is the responsibility of the 
government to observe and impede their activities in accordance with national interests (Fararu 
News Website Aug.3, 2015). In fact, Iran had to circumvent sanctions, especially for selling its 
crude oil. However, insufficient supervision by the government over sanctions traders paved the 
way for profiteers. The policies created to circumvent sanctions resulted in the creation of 
sanctions traders and added to the lack of transparency, economic corruption and financial 
scandals. Many of these scandals were revealed after Ahmadinejad’s presidency. 
Iran’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) became worse when Ahmadinejad became Iran’s sixth 
president in 2005 and when UNSC sanctions were authorized in 2006. The CPI refers to 
“perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts”  
(Transparency International: http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi) . 
 
Table 6.8 Iran’s annual ranking based on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 
Year Rank Number of 
Countries/Territories 
2003 78 133 
2004 87 146 
2005 88 159 
2006 105 163 
2007 131 180 
2008 141 180 
2009 168 180 
2010 146 178 
2011 120 183 
2012 133 174 
2013 144 177 
2014 136 175 
2015 130 168 
Source: Transparency International: http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi 
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In sum, Ahmadinejad’s poor policies and mismanagement exacerbated the impacts of sanctions on the 
Iranian population. 
 
















Areas of major mismanagement Impacts 
Healthcare policies Shortage of medicine 
Rise in medicine and medical care costs 
Fuel policies Air pollution 
-Harm to Iranians’ health 




-Economic growth reduction 
Sanctions circumvention policies Emergence of sanctions traders 
Corruption 
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Just Implementation of Sanctions (Part III) 
1. Proportionality Principle (Inflicted harm & Committed wrongs) 
As mentioned earlier, proportionality in authorization refers to the equivalence between the breached 
rule/norm and its consequences on one hand and the nature and scope of the countermeasures on the other 
(Cannizzaro 2001, 891). Proportionality should be maintained during the implementation of sanctions. In 
fact, there should be proportionality between applying the chosen tool (sanctions), including its impacts or 
inflected harms, and the original and additional committed wrongs. In other words, “measures must remain 
proportional to the original wrong. Only when the wrongdoer commits new wrongs may more or different 
measures be taken” (O'Connell 2002, 77). 
The implementation of sanctions should therefore be monitored and adjusted for the purpose of retaining 
proportionality. For instance, if the UN comprehensive sanctions against Iraq, due to its invasion of Kuwait, 
were proportionate, it ceased to be proportionate when the reason for sanctions changed from invasion to the 
allegation of WMD possession. The sweeping sanctions could have been adjusted to lesser countermeasures 
such as arms embargo to retain proportionality (Ibid, 78). Furthermore, it should be taken into account that 
the standard of countermeasure proportionality is unconnected with standards of effectiveness (Ibid, 78). 
Therefore, it would be unjust to implement sanctions disproportionately in order to increase effectiveness. 
 
1.1. Sanctioners’ narrative 
According to the sanctioners’ narrative, proportionality has been maintained during the implementation 
of sanctions. In other words, the pressure against Iran has been intensified in step with the increase in 
Iran’s wrongs in being noncompliant with the UNSCRs, and in escalating its nuclear program and 
getting close to the nuclear breakout capacity. 
 
• Iran’s noncompliance with the UNSCRs 
According to the UNSCR, Iran had to suspend all of its enrichment activities including R&D and all its 
heavy water reactor projects (UNSCR 1737 (2006) para.2 (a) and (b)). Not only did Iran not comply with 
the requirements, but it also accelerated its nuclear program by increasing its uranium enrichment level, 
enriched uranium stockpile, the number of centrifuges it possessed, production of new generation of 
centrifuges, and by working on its heavy water projects. Thus, while the implementation of sanctions has 
inflicted harm on the civilian population, they had to be intensified and implemented at full force in order 
to force Iran to comply with the UNSCRs. 
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• Iran's Breakout capacity threat 
Based on the sanctioners’ narrative, the implementation of sanctions had to be broad in order to prevent 
Iran from reaching its “breakout capacity”. Breakout capacity or critical capability refers to “the time it 
would take to produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon, should Iran at some point 
decide to build one”98 (Thielmann and Wright June 18, 2014). According to some estimations, it would 
take roughly a month for Iran to reach its breakout capacity while it would take over a year to actually 
make one nuclear bomb, provided the political decision is made (Hirsch March 30, 2015; Katzman March 
5, 2014, 23-24). 
In sum, the magnitude of Iran’s breakout capacity threat and the urgency to deter it overshadows the 
harm inflected on the Iranian population through the implementation of sanctions. In other words, not 
only has the full force of the implementation of sanctions been proportionate to Iran’s breakout capacity 
threat, but it could still be proportionate even if it was followed by a military attack to defy the exposed 
threat. 
 







20 kg HEU 90% 
(or 1000-1500 kg 
LEU, after further 
enrichment) 




be sufficient for 4-7 
nuclear bombs) 
Estimation varies 
from 45 days to 
several months (to 
reach to 20 kg 
HEU required for 
one nuclear bomb) 




1.2. Iran’s narrative 
According to Iran’s narrative, the implementation of sanctions against Iran have been disproportionate 
due to the following arguments: 
 
                                                
98 A common mistake is the interpretation of the “breakout capacity” as the time it would take to actually make a nuclear bomb  (Thielmann and 
Wright, 2014). 
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• Hypothetical global threat 
Nuclear-related sanctions were authorized because of the alleged original mistake committed by Iran of 
not reporting some of its legal nuclear activities. Sanctions were intensified and implemented in full force 
because of the alleged secondary wrong committed by Iran of pursuing its inalienable right to a peaceful 
nuclear program. Iran has constantly affirmed that it is not seeking nuclear weapons. Moreover, it has 
demonstrated remarkable cooperation and transparency in its nuclear program by suspending its uranium 
enrichment for two years and by its voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol. Thus, the 
dominant narrative in Iran is that sanctioners’ concern is far beyond nuclear allegations. Sanctioners have 
depicted Iran as a threat to international peace and security, as it is always justifiable to do everything, 
including the disproportionate implementation of sanctions, to deter a hypothetical global threat. In other 
words, once an actor has been depicted as a global threat, the only thing that matters is the effectiveness 
of the countermeasures, not proportionality or justice. In sum, proportionality is meaningless in the face 
of a hypothetical global threat. 
 
• Scope of inflicted harm 
According to Iran’s narrative, even if the sanctions were authorized proportionately, they were merely 
supposed to block the channels that could contribute to Iran’s nuclear program. Yet in practice, they 
blocked the entire economy and curbed even legitimate trades and financial transactions directly and/or 
indirectly. In fact, the comprehensive implementation of the so-called “targeted sanctions” turned out to 
be a collective punishment for all Iranians. Sanctions implementation began by targeting Iran’s arms 
trade and some Iranian individuals and assets. But the actions changed in that disproportionately 
encompassed sanctions came to affect almost all aspects of Iran’s economy including energy, shipping, 
insurance, banking and financial sectors. The implementation of sanctions has vastly and deeply inflicted 
harm to 77 million Iranian civilians. They have directly and/or indirectly impacted almost every aspect of 
Iranian life including the entire market and economy, public health, science, education, culture and 
environmental sectors. Consequently, the scope of the inflicted harm to civilians has been 
disproportionate to Iran’s alleged wrongdoings. 
 
• Duration of inflicted harm 
Considering the scope of the inflicted harm to civilians and Iran’s infrastructures, it is conceivable to 
conclude that the longer harms are inflicted, the more irreversible the occurred damages will be. The 
prolonged implementation of sanctions has deeply affected Iran’s infrastructure to the point that there is 
no promising prospect of compensation for the foreseeable future. In addition, there are many post-
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sanctions ramifications to be revealed later. In sum, the implementation of sanctions for a long period of 
time fundamentally challenges the proportionality principle. 
 
Table 7.2 proportionality of the implementation of sanctions against Iran 
Sanctioners’ narrative Iran’s narrative 
Proportionate: 
(a) Iran’s noncompliance with 
the UNSCRs 
(b) Iran’s Breakout capacity 
threat 
Disproportionate: 
(a) Hypothetical global threat 
(b) Scope of the inflicted of harm 
(c) Duration of the inflicted harm 
 
2. Prospect of Success Principle 
The high possibility of success should not only be predictable before authorizing sanctions, but also it 
should be reconsidered and reassessed during the process of implementing sanctions. In fact, it would be 
unjust to continue the implementation of sanctions when there are indications that sanctions are not 
working and the prospect of success is poor. 
There are three approaches towards the success of Iran sanctions: 
2.1. Iran sanctions have been successful 
Sanctions against Iran have been successful because of the following arguments: 
 
• Economic hardship 
Sanctions against Iran, especially sanctions on energy and banking sectors have been successful because 
they have had crippling effects on Iran’s economy (Dubowitz February 10, 2010). 
• Political isolation 
Sanctions against Iran have been gradually expanded and more countries have joined the sanctioners’ 
cluster. The increasing consensus in the international community against Iran resulted in the political 
isolation of Iran, a sign of the success of sanctions (Levitt October 25, 2007). 
 
2.2. Sanctions on Iran have not been successful 
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• Sanctions’ objectives were not met 
The core objective of nuclear-related sanctions against Iran was to halt Iran’s nuclear program. Since 
Iran’s nuclear program progressed after the authorization of sanctions, it should be concluded that 
sanctions were not working (Esfandiary Oct 11, 2012) Iran never gave up uranium enrichment and 
nuclear R&D whereas according to the UNSCRs, Iran should have suspended “all enrichment-related and 
reprocessing activities, including research and development” (UNSCR 1737 (2006), para.2 (a)). In fact, 
Iran’s nuclear program not only remained unaffected by the sanctions but also escalated along with the 
escalation of sanctions (Khajehpour, Marashi, and Parsi March 2013, 26-7). 
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Graph 7.1 Nuclear Escalation vs. Sanctions Escalation 
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• Sanctions logic did not work 
The logic behind sanctions, especially economic sanctions, is that the suffering of the general population 
will boost opposition groups, weaken the regime and force it to change its policies and comply with the 
sanctioners’ demands (Gareis 2012, 130). The economic hardship in Iran neither triggered unrest nor 
destabilized the political system (Kordzadeh Kermani 2014, 96). Thus, the logic that sanctions pain 
would lead to political gain failed in the case of Iran. 
 
2.3. The middle ground approach 
The success of sanctions requires the assessment of sanctions against their general objectives: coercion, 
constraint, and signaling (Biersteker and others 2012, 14). 
 
• Coercion 
The nuclear-related sanctions against Iran have not been able to coerce Iran to abandon its nuclear 
program, yet they had a share in the nuclear talks and the final nuclear deal. In fact, even under the most 
unprecedented and toughest sanctions ever imposed on a country, Iran did not give up on its nuclear 
program. In fact, Iran was able to achieve the following nuclear developments: 
 
a) Centrifuge number: 
In 2003, when nuclear negotiations started and before the UN and EU authorized any sanctions, 
Iran was assembling only 164 centrifuges. During the implementation of toughest sanctions 
imposed by the U.S., UN and EU, Iran was able to increase its number of centrifuges to more than 
18,000 (Vaez Oct.9, 2013). 
 
b) Centrifuge generation: 
In 1986 (1365), Ali Akbar Velayati, former Iranian foreign minister and representative of the 
Iranian Supreme Leader, brought Iran’s first centrifuge from Pakistan (Panjareh Weekly 
Magazine April 24, 2010). Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, 
asserts that in 1991, (1369) Iran purchased some centrifuges from the black market and it took 
Iran about 15 years to run the imported machines and start uranium enrichment with the 
combination of Pakistani centrifuges (P-1) and its Iranian copies (IR-1) in the mid 2000s (1380s) 
(DW Website April 10, 2015). During the implementation of sanctions, Iran made remarkable 
progress in designing and running the indigenous centrifuges. In 2010 (1389), Iran built the third 
generation of its centrifuge, IR-3 (Ahmadinejad’s official website Nov.23, 2013). 
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According to Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran has accomplished the design of more advanced generations of 
centrifuges, IR-4, 5,6,7, and IR-8 (IRINN April 10, 2015). 
 
c) Enrichment: 
During the implementation of multilateral sanctions, Iran gained the ability to increase its level of 




Iran was able to increase its uranium stockpile during the implementation of sanctions. According 
to some sources, as of November 2015, Iran’s low-enriched uranium (5% enriched) stockpile 
reached to 8,306 kg (Iran Watch Website November 18, 2015). 
 
e) Heavy water reactor (Arak): 
Iran had been working on the heavy water reactor in Arak since 1998 (1377) and was able to 




Since Iran is dependent in its nuclear activities, multilateral sanctions have been able to constrain Iran’s 
nuclear program by curbing its access to foreign technologies and materials  (Esfandiary and Fitzpatrick 
2011, 143). In spite of Iran’s remarkable progress in its nuclear and missiles programs, in particular in 
making these technologies indigenized, sanctions have had a partial success in their “constraining” 
objective in the sense of “slowing down” Iran’s activities (Semati and Hormozi 2014, 14). 
 
• Signaling and stigmatizing 
Sanctions against Iran, especially UN sanctions, have had the most success in achieving the signaling and 
stigmatizing objective of sanctions. Sanctions have been successful in stigmatizing Iran as a threat and 
they have also been successful in signaling other countries on the importance of the non-proliferation 
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Table 7.3 The prospect of success of nuclear-related sanctions against Iran during implementation 
Approaches Arguments 
Sanctions on Iran have been successful Signs of success: 
(a) Economic hardship 
(b) Political isolation 
Sanctions on Iran have not been 
successful 
Signs of failure: 
(a) Sanctions’ core objective was not 
met 
(b) Sanctions’ logic did not work 





(c) Signaling & stigmatizing: 
Successful 
 
Terrorism and human rights-related sanctions have had the least success in coercion and constraint objectives 
and the most success in the stigmatizing objective. 
 
3. Negotiation Principle 
There are two dominant narratives regarding the role of sanctions in Iran’s nuclear talks. Some believe that 
sanctions against Iran have promoted the nuclear talks whereas some others deem that they have curbed 
negotiations. 
3.1. Sanctions have promoted negotiations with Iran 
Proponents of this narrative argue that even if sanctions against Iran were not successful in meeting 
their initial core objectives, at least they have been able to drive Iran to the negotiating table (Canada 
Parliament. Senate. Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2012, 17). 
 
• Sanctions along with military threat promote negotiations; 
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Some believe that sanctions would better promote negotiations with Iran if there had been an open 
military option (Takeyh and Lindsay 2010). Accordingly, the U.S. has implemented sanctions along with 
military threats against Iran to enhance its leverage in nuclear talks. Proponents of this strategy do not 
consider sanctions as a sufficient coercive tool to drive Iran to serious negotiations unless they are paired 
with a credible military threat. 
 
• The JPA was the result of sanctions; 
One of the dominant discourses is that not only was the interim nuclear agreement with Iran, the Joint 
Plan of Action (JPA) agreed on November 24, 2013 possible because of sanctions, but also the election of 
Hassan Rouhani as the president of Iran. In other words, sanctions on Iran’s energy and financial sectors 
drastically impacted Iran’s economy and drove desperate Iranians to vote for the candidate who had 
pledged to resolve Iran’s nuclear issue (Katzman May 7, 2014). Thus, the argument goes, sanctions had 
harmed Iran’s economy so intensely that Iran had no choice but to accept the JPA in return for sanctions 
relief. 
 
3.2. Sanctions have curbed negotiations with Iran 
Iran has frequently stated that strengthening sanctions curbs constructive negotiations, especially 
when sanctions are coupled with military threats. 
 
• Sanctions along with military threat harms negotiations; 
Iran’s supreme leader has repeatedly asserted that sanctions and military threats are destructive to nuclear 
talks and Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA (Delavar pour aghdam , Mostafa and Moadi roodsary 2014, 
121-148). Velayati states that the U.S. military threat “endangers the negotiation principle”. He asserts 
that negotiations require an engaging and not a threatening atmosphere (Entekhab News Website May 17, 
2015). Iran perceived that economic pressure and military threat as an insult to its dignity and threatened 
to abandon negotiations if sanctions strengthening and military threats continued to be forced on it. 
• The JPA was not merely the result of sanctions; 
Although the implementation of sanctions against Iran played a role in Iran’s reaching the nuclear deal, 
one should be careful about how much credit is given to the role of sanctions. There is a combination of 
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Avoiding a war has been an incentive for both Iran and the U.S. to seriously follow the nuclear 
talks. On one hand, Iran had reached the conclusion that although the probability of war is 
tremendously low, the risk would be extremely high. On the other hand, the U.S. had reached the 
conclusion that a military attack would not halt Iran’s nuclear program. On the contrary, it would 
probably lead Iran towards weaponizing its nuclear program. Hence, negotiation was the best 
option for both sides to avoid a potential war (Hadian Dec.25, 2013). 
 
b) Sanctions; 
Sanctions persuaded both Iran and the sanctioners to take more serious steps in the nuclear talks. 
Sanctions had been taking a great toll on Iran’s economy and its impacts were becoming more 
visible and tangible. At the same time, the sanctioners were convinced that further sanctions 
would no longer be effective in the sense that they were unable to stop Iran’s nuclear program 
(Ibid). In 2010, Robert Gates, United States Secretary of Defense (2006-2011), had secretly 
warned the White House over the inefficacy of the US long-term strategy in halting Iran’s nuclear 
progress (Sanger and Shanker April 17, 2010). According to President Obama, neither further 
sanctions nor war, but only diplomacy could resolve the issue. He defended diplomacy over other 
options and asserted that “either the issue of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon is resolved 
diplomatically through a negotiation or it’s resolved through force, through war” (Saenz Jul.15, 




The election of Hassan Rouhani in Iran’s presidential elections in June 2013 generated a 
momentum for both sides to bring the nuclear negotiations to a historic success. In fact, the 
Obama Administration and Iran’s new government both had the political will to resolve the 
nuclear issue. Furthermore, negotiations with Rouhani’s moderate government would have had 
less political costs for Obama’s administration in comparison with Ahmadinejad government 
(Hadian Dec.25, 2013). If Rouhani was not elected, it is likely that the same policies could have 
continued and the nuclear deal could have been very far off from reaching a final point. In a 
counterfactual approach, if another presidential candidate like Saeed Jalili, Iranian conservative 
politician and chief nuclear negotiator, who was conducting the nuclear negotiations for six years 
(2007- 2013), could win the election, reaching a nuclear deal would hardly be conceivable. In 
other words, sanctions and the dire economic situation could hardly result in a nuclear deal if 
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Saeed Jalili were the president of Iran99 (Semati and Hormozi 2014, 13-14). In sum, both sides 
took advantage of the opportunity. 
d) Nuclear capability; 
One of the reasons that Iran followed the negotiations seriously was that Iran was able to reach to 
its desirable nuclear capability when it started the final round of nuclear talks resulted in the JPA. 
In fact, the nuclear technology had become indigenous by the time the final round of nuclear talks 
began (Hadian Dec.25, 2013). 
e) Regional developments; 
The civil war in Syria, Iran’s regional strategic ally, the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS), and the increasing instability in Iraq fundamentally changed the security matrix of 
the region and Iran’s perception of threat. Consequently, Iran was driven to recalculate its 
priorities and policies including its nuclear policies. In fact, the emergence of new regional threats 
and increasing instability persuaded Iran to resolve its international problems quicker, and focus 
on the regional and national problems. Furthermore, Iran was provided with an opportunity of 
cooperation in the region. Therefore, the new regional security matrix had a share in enhancing 
Iran’s political will for nuclear reconciliation (Hadian Dec.25, 2013). 
 
Ultimately, it is important to notice that even though sanctions had a share in reaching the JPA, the multi-
layered nature of sanctions turned out to be a serious barrier in reaching the final deal, the JCPOA. One of 
the main obstacles that prolonged the period between the interim agreement (JPA in Nov.24, 2013) and the 
final deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 14, 2015) was the difficulties in finding a 
strategy for sanctions’ relief. In fact, sanctions against Iran have been so intertwined, multilayered, and with 
different objectives and termination requirements that it was extremely difficult to find an action-for-action 
settlement strategy. Thus, even if sanctions had a share in bringing Iran to the negotiating table, they turned 






                                                
99 Those who have closely observed Iran’s domestic politics development know that the election of someone other than Rouhani was highly 
possible and many Iranians were not convinced to vote even under economic hardship. It was only in the last week to the elections that a strong 
wave in support of Rouhani emerged among Iranians (	Hadi	Semati	and	Shani	Hormozi,	"The	Effect	of	the	Geneva	Accord	on	the	Sanctions	in	
Iran,"	Iranian	Review	of	Foreign	Affairs	5,	no.	2	(2014)	, 13-14). 
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Table 7.4 The dominant narratives on negotiation principle under sanctions against Iran 
Sanctions have promoted nuclear 
negotiations with Iran 
 
Sanctions have curbed nuclear 
negotiations 
with Iran 
Sanctions along with military threats 
promote negotiations 
Sanctions along with military threats 
destabilize negotiations 
 
The JPA was the result of sanctions The JPA was not merely the result of 
sanctions, but also: 
(a) War; 
(b) Momentum; 
(c) Nuclear capability; 
(d) Regional developments. 
 
4. Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism 
It is the responsibility of sanctioners to watch the impacts of sanctions and to adjust the sanctions to 
reduce humanitarian harms and unintended damages. The implementation of sanctions in a just manner 
requires regular monitoring and evaluation. The regular evaluation of sanctions impacts during the 
implementation of sanctions is one of the ways to ensure that sanctions would be more compatible with 
the fundamental humanitarian principle (Momtaz 2009, 348).  There are bodies to monitor sanctions 
implementation yet in most cases what is being monitored is the possible violation of sanctions rather 
than the impacts of sanctions on civilians. Consequently, the major objective of monitoring is to tackle 
the implementation problems and improve the efficacy of sanctions, not to reduce their inhumane 
impacts. 
 
4.1. UN monitoring and evaluating mechanism 
The UN has different monitoring bodies on sanctions regimes, but the duty of the monitoring bodies is 
identifying the violations and obstacles of sanctions implementation. There are two UN monitoring 
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a) Sanctions committee (SC) 
Sanctions committees were the first UN mechanism to monitor sanctions implementation. SCs are 
subsidiary bodies to the UN and are constituted of the UNSC members. Each SC forms pursuant to a 
specific sanctions regime on an ad hoc basis (Weschler 2009, 37-8). However, not all sanctions 
regimes have SCs (Farrall 2009, 123-143). In 1968, the first UN sanctions committee was formed 
pursuant to the UN sanctions against Rhodesia (Weschler 2009, 38-9). SCs collect information and 
reports on the relevant sanctions regime and make their decision by consensus (Charron 2011, 15). 
The SC’s monitoring responsibility is focused on collecting reports on violations of sanctions and 
ways to strengthen the implementation of sanctions. It is not monitoring the impacts of sanctions on 
civilians, which is critical to the just implementation of sanctions. 
 
In 2006, Iran’s SC was formed pursuant to paragraph 18 of UNSCR 1737 (2006). Iran SC has the 
following duties: 
§ Seek information from all Member States and the IAEA on their taken measures to 
implement sanctions effectively; 
§ Take necessary measures on the collected information on the alleged violation of 
sanctions; 
§ Consider and decide on exemption requests; 
§ Designate additional individuals and entities to be sanctioned; 
§ Publish guidelines to facilitate the implementation of sanctions; 
§ Report to the UNSC on sanctions implementation every 90 days. 
(UNSCR 1737 (2006), para.18). 
 
In sum, though the Iran SC is a monitoring body, it has not watched the unintended consequences of 
sanctions implementation. As it is confirmed in UNSCR 1929(2010), Iran SC’s responsibility is “to 
promote the full implementation” of all resolutions against Iran (UNSCR 1929(2010), para.27). 
 
b) Panel of experts (POE) 
In addition to SCs, the UNSC has established diverse expert bodies to conduct monitoring tasks for 
different sanctions regimes. These expert bodies include a variety of forms such as commissions, 
panels and groups with an ad hoc nature, in the sense that every single expert body is mandated to 
monitor a specific sanctions regime. The expert bodies are technically independent and work for 
different intervals from weeks to years (Farrall 2009, 195-6). 
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In 2010, the UNSCR 1929(2010) requested the Secretary-General establish a POE for the Iran 
sanctions regime. In 2011, 8 experts were elected (renewable each year) and in June 2012, the POE’s 
first report was published. In fact, however the first UN sanctions against Iran were authorized in 
2006, the POE as a monitoring body on the Iran sanctions regime was absent until 2011. The POE on 
the Iran Sanctions Regime has the following duties: 
• Assist the Iran SC to conduct its duties; Collect information on sanctions implementation, 
“in particular incidents of non-compliance”; (UNSCR 1929(2010), para.29). 
• Provide recommendations to improve sanctions enforcement; 
• Provide annual reports. 
(Ibid). 
 
The POE on Iran was established with 8 experts mostly in areas such as non-proliferation, arms 
control, and export control. None of the experts elected in this monitoring body were specialists in 
human rights. In sum, the POE on Iran, similar to the Iran SC, was not mandated to monitor the 
impact of sanctions implementation on Iran’s civilian population100 (Gordon 2013, 986). 
 
Table 7.5  Members of the first UN POE on Iran in 2011 
                                                
100 The UN has established the Office of the Ombudsperson as a monitoring body that is mandated to ensure the fair and clear procedure of 
listing and delisting individuals and entities. Although the Office of the Ombudsperson has a human rights agenda, it is only applicable to the Al-
Qaida Sanctions List. In 2006, pursuant to UNSCR 1730(2006), the Focal Point was established for receiving delisting requests on the Al-Qaida 
Sanctions List. In 2009, the Focal Point was superseded by the Office of the Ombudsperson, which was established pursuant to UNSCR 1904 
(2009). (The United Nations website: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/dfp.shtml , and Wikipedia website: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-
Qaida_Sanctions_Committee#Monitoring_Team) 
Name Nationality Expertise 
Salomé Zourabichvili 
(Coordinator) 









Japan Maritime transport 
Thomas Mazet 
(Expert) 
Germany Logistic transport 
Jacqueline Shire 
(Expert) 
US Nuclear issues/ defense 
trade/ non-proliferation/ 
  
















Source: Letter by the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, addresses the President of the Security Council 
(S/2011/405), July 1, 2011 
 
The POE on Iran sanctions has conducted pervasive activities to ensure that the sanctions are fully 
implementing against Iran and to block all the possible ways for Iran to circumvent sanctions. According to 
the reports of the POE on Iran, this body has been highly involved in the following activities: 
• Investigating the cases of violation and non-compliance; 
The POE investigated the cases of non-compliance and violation such as illicit shipments reported 
by the Member States, especially by Turkey (POE report June 2012 (S/2012/395), para.16, 30). 
 
• Increasing awareness on the sanctions and identifying the challenges of implementation; 
The POE on Iran reached out to many Member States, private sector, international organizations, 
NGOs and individual experts, to increase the awareness about the implementation of sanctions, 
especially on the importance of export controls (Ibid, para.18, 22, 26, and 137). It consulted many 
experts from different UN bodies. But human rights experts were absent in the processes101. 
Additionally, the POE has worked actively at the ideational level by reaching out to think thanks 
                                                
101 The consultations were conducted with the “United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament 
Research, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Economic Commission 
for Europe, the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, the International Civil Aviation Organization” (POE report June 2012). 





proliferation/ arms control/ 
export control 
Olasehinde Ishola Williams 
(Expert) 
Nigeria 
(The only member from 
Africa is from Nigeria, 
where Iran is accused of 
violating UN arms embargo 





China Export control/arms control 
and disarmament 
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and universities102 and by participating in conferences and seminars to deepen the actors’ 
understanding on sanctions’ implementation and to discuss the challenges (Ibid, para.23,24, and 
25). 
 
• Making recommendations to enhance sanctions implementation; 
The POE has provided recommendations for the effective implementation of sanctions based on 
the identified implementation challenges and Iran’s strategies to circumvent sanctions. In spite of 
the fact that the POE has received reports and comments by Member States on the excessive 
implementation of sanctions against Iran, it has not made any recommendations to prevent 
excessive implementation, which goes beyond the UNSCR framework. For instance, according to 
the POE report, many countries have acknowledged that all trade “including legitimate trade”, has 
ceased with Iran (POE Report June 2013 (S/2013/331)), para.138). Likewise, the report reflects a 
Member State behavior in denying Iranian students admission in all science and engineering 
courses (Ibid. para.156). However, the POE is silent in providing recommendations on sanctions 
adjustment and modification even when the cases of excessive implementation were revealed. 
 
Table 7.6 UN monitoring bodies on Iran sanctions 
                                                
102 The POE has been working actively with think tanks and universities such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the 
Institute for Security Studies, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
Columbia University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Princeton University, RAND Corporation, King’s College London, the Brazilian 
Center for International Relations, the BRICS Policy Center, the Stockholm International Security and Peace Research Institute and the Geneva 
Centre for Security Policy (POE report June 2012, para.23). 
 Structure Duties Deficits 
(a) Sanctions 
Committee (SC) 
Pursuant to UNSCR 
1737(2006) 
 
(a) Subsidiary body 
to the UNSC 
(b) Constitutes of 15 
members of the 
UNSC 
(c) Ad hoc nature 
(d) Filter between the 
UNSC and POE 
(e) Decisions are 
made by consensus 
 




from the IAEA, 
Member States, and 
POE 









(b) Not an 
independent body 
  




























a) POE members should include specialists in diverse fields such as human rights, public health and 
socioeconomic; 
b) POE members should be appointed from evenhanded geographical distribution (Ryan March 
2014, 8); 
c) POE should be mandated to monitor and report the humanitarian consequences of sanctions 
implementation as well as the excessive implementation of sanctions; 





(e) Providing reports 
every 90 days to the 
UNSC 
(b) Panel of Experts 
(POE) 




subsidiary body to 
the SC 
(b) Constituted of 8 
experts 
(c) Ad hoc nature 
(d) Renewable each 
year 
 
(a) Investigating and 
reporting cases of 
violation and non-
compliance to the SC 
(b) Increasing the 










(d) Providing annual 
reports to the SC 




(b) Created years 
after sanctions were 
authorized against 
Iran 
(c) No diversity of 
experts for 
multifaceted 
sanctions        
(expertise were 
limited in arms 
control and export 
control) 
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d) POE should make judgments and provide recommendations for more humane implementations of 
sanctions; 
e) POE reports and assessments should be provided in shorter frequency (similar to the rule that the 
SC should report on sanctions violations every 90 days, not annually) 
f) Information sharing should be boosted (Ibid, 9); 
g) POE or any other monitoring body should be established immediately after sanctions 
authorization (a delay may add to impacts on target civilians). 
 
4.2. U.S. monitoring and evaluating mechanism 
The U.S. has a number of monitoring and investigating bodies on Iran sanctions. Specifically, they 
monitor how effectively sanctions have impacted Iran’s economy. The U.S. monitoring and 
investigating bodies include: 
a) Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC):  an administrative body for U.S. 
financial sanctions against Iran. Additionally, it identifies cases of sanctions violations, and 
issues forfeits for violators (Ebner 2013, 122). 
b) The office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes: mandated to identify illegal financial 
transactions by Iran related to WMD and terrorist activities sponsorship (Ibid, 122) 
c) The Financial Crimes Information Network: mandated to collect banking and financial 
information and monitor Iran’s compliance with U.S. banking and financial sanctions (Ibid, 
122). 
d) The Office of Intelligence Analysis:  collects and analyzes all the information regarding the 
impacts of U.S. sanctions on Iran, in particular Iran’s economy. It gathers information from 
Iran on trade, gold, real estate and other economic indicators (Ibid, 122-3) 
e) GAO (United States Government Accountability Office): an independent agency, which 
provides reports on different topics including the impacts of U.S. Sanctions and their efficacy. 
These reports are often provided upon the U.S. congress’ request (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) website). 
f) Department of Justice: conducts investigations on possible violations of the U.S. sanctions 
against Iran. For instance, it has conducted criminal investigations against several banks and 
has issued forfeitures due to their violations of the U.S. sanctions against Iran103 (GAO-13-
326 in Ebner 2013, 128-9). 
                                                
103 The Department of Justice has conducted investigations and issued forfeitures for the following banks: 
a) HSBC Bank USA N.A. ($1.256 billion)  
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In sum, none of the U.S. monitoring and investigating bodies are mandated to watch the humanitarian 
impacts of the U.S. sanctions on Iran’s civilian population. 
 
4.3. EU monitoring and evaluating mechanism 
The EU has delegated the responsibility of monitoring sanctions to the following bodies: 
a) Member States: should inform the Commission of cases of violation and any difficulties in the 
full implementation of sanctions against Iran (Council Regulation 423/2007 19 April 2007, 
Article 14). 
b) The Commission: mandated to exchange information with Member states on Iran sanctions 
violations and enforcement impediments (Ibid, Article 14). 
 
In sum, the EU monitoring mechanism is mostly mandated to ensure the effective implementation of 
sanctions against Iran rather than monitoring the humanitarian consequences. 
5. Judicial Review Mechanism 
The sanctioners are responsible to not only establish a monitoring and assessing body on their own 
initiative to watch the impacts of sanctions on the target, but also to establish a judicial review 
mechanism so that the listed individuals and entities can exercise their right to due process and can plead 
for justice. 
 
5.1. UN Judicial review mechanism 
There are two UN mechanisms for delisting and exempting from Iran sanctions: (a) Sanctions 
Committee (SC) and (b) the Focal Point. 
 
a) Sanctions Committee (SC) 
The Sanctions Committees are responsible for delisting and granting exemptions to sanctioned 
individuals and entities (petitioners) that are seeking delisting or exemption. The Sanctions 
                                                                                                                                                                          
b) Standard Chartered Bank ($227 million) 
c) ING Bank N.V. ($619 million) 
d) Barclays Bank PLC ($298 million) 
e) ABN AMRO Bank N.V. ($500 million) 
f) Credit Suisse AG  ($536 million) 
g) Lloyds TSB Bank PLC ($350 million) (Source: GAO analysis of court documents in Ebner 2013, 128-9). 
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Committees conduct this responsibility in collaboration with the Focal Point (also with the 
Office of the Ombudsperson merely on the Al-Qaida sanctions regime). Delisting and granting 
exemptions to sanctioned individuals and entities only became possible from 2006 with the 
creation of the Focal Point. The development took place only after criticisms mounted against 
the UNSC transparency on listing without following the due process standard and on the lack 
of due process mechanism for delisting (United Nations Security Council Website: Focal 
Point for De-listing). 
 
b) The Focal Point (2006) 
In 2006, the UN adopted the Resolution 1730 under which the Focal Point was established. 
The Focal Point was amended to receive de-listing requests (petitions) from sanctioned 
individuals and entities of any sanctions regime (Smeulers and Grünfeld 2011, 434). A total 
number of 85 requests from petitioners (sanctioned individuals and entities) were received by 
the Focal Point until December 2012, out of which 31 petitioners were delisted (Eckert and 
Biersteker 2012, 13). Only one Iranian entity, which was listed under Sanctions 
Reginme1737, had sent a request to the Focal Point until 2012, which was rejected and 
remained listed (Ibid, 13). The Focal Point is an intermediate loop between petitioners and the 
Sanctions Committee. It receives de-listing requests from petitioners and after collecting and 
verifying information from states; it forwards the request and relevant information to the 
Sanctions Committee though the requests could also be sent directly to the Sanctions 
Committee (UNSCR 1730 (2006)). The Focal Point would also convey the Sanctions 
Committee’s final decision (whether it is de-listed or will remain on the list), to the petitioner 
(Ibid). The Focal Point role has been like a “ UN mailbox” that exchanges requests and 
decisions (Huber 2012, 107-142). The Focal Point has a procedural role to receive requests, 
gather relevant information and convey the final decisions rather than be an independent 
judicial authority (Ryan March 2014, 6). 
 
In spite of the progressive steps taken by the UNSC to provide targeted individuals and entities with 
mechanisms for delisting and exemption, there is still a long way to go before reaching the standards of due 
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• Political decision-making process; 
Delisting and granting exemptions by Sanctions Committees are conducted through a “political 
decision-making process” rather than a “judicial review” mechanism (Smeulers and Grünfeld 
2011, 434). 
 
• Conditional review; 
There is no guarantee that a delisting request be reviewed by the Sanctions Committee. A request 
would be rejected without review if neither the states consulted by the Focal Point (designating 
government(s) and the government(s) of petitioners’ citizenship and residence) nor any member 
from the Sanctions Committee support delisting (UNSCR 1730 (2006), para.5 and 6). 
 
• Member-based rejection; 
Since all the members of the Sanctions Committee should unanimously approve a delisting 
request, disapproval by just one of the members would result in the rejection of the request 
(Cortright and others November 2009, 3). 
 
• Classified information; 
The listing process is sometimes grounded on classified information. The designated state would 
refuse to disclose the evidence either during the listing or delisting processes. 
 
• Right to a hearing 
The sanctioned individuals are not allowed to attend revision processes at Sanctions Committees 
(Aminzadeh and Gholamy 2013, 196) 
 
In sum, both listing and delisting procedures by the UNSC “do not fully respect internationally recognized 
human rights law[s]” (Cortright and others November 2009,1). The UNSC’s permanent members have 
always opposed proposals aiming to establish a mechanism to review the UNSC process of listing and 
delisting individuals and entities. Since the prospect of the establishment of any independent judicial review 
mechanism to oversee the UNSC decisions is poor, it would be more feasible to take steps towards enhancing 
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Recommendations: 
• The role of Focal Point should be boosted (Ryan March 2014, 8); 
• The role of the Office of the Ombudsperson should be more inclusive. The Office of the 
Ombudsperson is a more progressive body to oversee delisting related to the Al-Qaida sanctions 
regime. It should become comprehensive, and encompass all the UN sanctions regimes104 (Ibid, 
8). 
• All of the delisting requests by the petitioners should be placed on the SC agenda105 (Cortright 
and others November 2009,12). 
 
5.2. US judicial review mechanism 
There are two bodies in the U.S. where sanctioned individuals and entities could petition: (a) OFAC 
(Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of the Treasury) and (b) district courts. 
 
a) OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of the Treasury) 
Listed individuals and entities may submit their reconsideration requests to OFAC. They may 
seek delisting by providing OFAC with argument and/or evidence, which refute the foundation 
for designation. They may also request a meeting, however OFAC may reject. Eventually, OFAC 
would review the request and declare its decision (U.S. Government Publishing Office (GPO): 31 
CFR 501.807 ). Reconsideration review by OFAC suffers from serious deficits. There is no 
judicial review and no response timeframe. Alike the listing process that is not necessarily 
evidence-based, or could be based on classified information, reconsideration procedure could go 
through the same path. Furthermore, it may take a long time, even years, until OFAC provides a 
designee with its decision (Ensign and Rubenfeld  Jan. 9, 2014). 
                                                
104 In 2009, the UNSC established the Office of the Ombudsperson through Resolution 1904(2009). Its mandate was later stretched in 2011, 
2012, and 2014 (http://www.un.org/en/sc/ombudsperson/). The Office of Ombudsperson is an independent overseeing body (Jane Boulden and 
Andrea Charron 2009, 6).  The Office of Ombudsperson receives delisting and exemption requests from petitioners, gathers information from 
relevant states and organizations and provides the sanctions Committee both with a comprehensive report and that includes recommendations. If 
the sanctions Committee has no objection within 60 days, the delisted request would be accepted, otherwise the Sanction Committee could decide 
to keep the sanctions on the targeted individual or entity or it could refer it to the Security Council (http://www.un.org/en/sc/ombudsperson/). The 
Office of Ombudsperson is more progressive than the Focal Point, however it “does not constitute formal judicial review of Security Council 
decisions”. It is closer to “de facto judicial review” (Eckert and Biersteker December 2012, 24). According to an evaluating report conducted by 
Eckert and Biersteker, the Ombudperson mechanism has become more progressive over the past years in terms of providing due process for 
sanctioned individuals. It provides “the right to review by an independent and impartial authority, the right to be informed of the case against 
them and to be heard (and respond), and approximates the provision of effective remedy – removal from the list “(	Sue	E.	Eckert	and	Thomas	J.	
Biersteker,	"Due	Process	and	Targeted	Sanctions.	an	Update	of	the"	Watson	Report,"	Watson	Institute	for	International	Studies,	Brown	
University.Providence,	Rhode	Island	(2012).	 
105 For more policy recommendations on listing and delisting procedures, read: 
 “Human Rights and Targeted Sanctions, An Action Agenda for Strengthening Due Process Procedures”, David Cortright, with George A. Lopez, 
Linda Gerber-Stellingwerf, Eliot Fackler, Sarah Persinger, and Joshua Weaver, The Sanctions and Security Research Program, Policy Brief SSRP 
0911-01, November 2009: 
http://sanctionsandsecurity.nd.edu/assets/110270/human_rights_targeted_sanctions.pdf 
  
     191 
b) Federal district courts 
Designated individuals and entities may file a lawsuit against OFAC in the U.S. district courts if 
their reconsideration requests are denied by OFAC. For instance, Yassin A. Kadi, a Saudi Arabian 
businessman, who was placed on the terrorist list, filed a lawsuit in a U.S. district court against 
OFAC, when his reconsideration request was rejected by OFAC. He had also appealed to the EU 
courts, but unlike the EU courts, which ruled in favor of Kadi, the U.S. district court rejected his 
claims  (Charity & Security Network April 3, 2012) . 
Iran has never appealed to the U.S. courts on sanctions related issues. According to Abbas 
Araghchi, Deputy for Legal and International Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, 
the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) of the Islamic Republic of Iran has forbidden 
Iran’s attendance in the US courts (Shargh Newspaper April 26, 2016). To wit, Iran does not 
recognize the US courts and their verdicts on issues related to Iran. 
 
5.3. EU judicial review mechanism 
The EU has a well-defined mechanism for judicial review. There are three bodies that are assigned to 
review requests of annulment from individuals and entities vs. institutions of the EU, including the EU 
Council, which authorizes restrictive measures (sanctions). (European Union website). 
 
a) European General Court (EGC) 
The General Court reviewed some of the EU’s restrictive measures against Iranian individuals 
and entities and decided to annul some and leave others. Some of the EGC verdicts on EU 
sanctions against Iran include: 
 
• 9 Iranian entities and an individual: 
In 2013, the General Court annulled the EU restrictive measures on freezing the assets of 7 
Iranian companies and an individual who were claimed to be involved in Iran’s nuclear 
proliferation. According to the EGC, the EU Council had “not proved the facts” and had 
“made an error of assessment”. The GC decided to uphold the EU restrictive measures 
against two other entities106 (Judgment of the General Court of the European Union, Press 
release No 99/13 September 6, 2013). 
                                                
106 The general court annulled the EU Council action on freezing the assets of the following entities and individuals: 
Persia International Bank plc; Export Development Bank of Iran; Iran Insurance Company; Post Bank Iran; Bank Refah Kargaran, Good Luck 
Shipping, Iranian Offsore Engineering & Construction Co. v Council and Naser Bateni. 
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• Sharif University of Technology (SUT): 
In 2014, the General Court annulled the EU restrictive measures (assets freeze) against 
Sharif University of Technology (SUT). The EU Council had claimed that the SUT was 
providing support to Iran’s nuclear program. The EGC found that the EU Council 
“committed a manifest error of assessment” and was unable to provide evidence to support 
its claims (Judgment of the General Court of the European Union, Press release No 91/14 
July 3, 2014). 
• National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC): 
In 2014, the National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC), the biggest tanker company in the 
Middle East, won their case against the EU Council. The NITC was targeted by the EU 
Council on the grounds that it was “effectively controlled” by the Iranian State and was 
providing financial support to it, and eventually funding Iran’s nuclear program. 
According to the General Court, the EU Council had “committed a manifest error” in its 
assessment and was unable to provide evidence to support its claims (Judgment of the 
General Court, case T-565/12 July 3, 2014). 
• National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC) and Bank of Industry and Mine (BIM): 
In 2015, the General Court rejected the annulment applications by the National Iranian 
Gas Company (NIGC) and Bank of Industry and Mine (BIM). The EU Council had frozen 
the funds of the NIGC and BIM on the grounds that since they are State owned, they 
provide financial support to the Iranian state and possibly to Iran’s nuclear 
program(Judgment of the General Court, cases T-9/13, and T-10/13 April 29, 2015) .107 
 
The EGC verdicts would not be effective immediately. The EGC gives the EU Council 
two months, after the notification of the decision, to fix the irregularities (Judgment of the 




                                                                                                                                                                          
According to the General Court decision, Bank Melli Iran and Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank’s assets remained frozen (General Court of the 
European Union, Press release No 99/13, 6 September 2013). Shortly after the GC annulled the restrictive measures on the Export Development 
Bank of Iran, the EU Council sanctioned it again with a new allegation. According to the Iranian lawyer of the Bank, Gholam Nabi Feizi chakab, the EU Council has opted a re-sanctioning strategy 




107 The GC have annulled the EU Council restrictive measures against Iran in some other cases such as: Bank Mellat (Case T-496/10, 29 
Jan.2013), Bank Saderat (Case T-494/10, 5 Feb.2013), Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and 17other shipping companies (Case T-
489/10, 16 Sep. 2013), Central Bank of Iran (partial annulment) (Case T-262/12, 18 Sep. 2014). 
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b) European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
Petitioners would bring an appeal against the General Court’s decision through the Court of 
Justice (Judgment of the General Court of the European Union, Press release No 99/13 
September 6, 2013). For instance, after the General Court decided to uphold the EU restrictive 
measures against Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank, Iran brought the appeal to the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ). The Court of Justice rejected Iran’s appeal against the General Court. 
It was acknowledged that the bank had conducted transactions with listed entities and the 
General Court was right to reject Iran’s annulment request (Order of the Court of Justice, Case 
C-585/13 July 9, 2015). 
 
The EGC and ECJ considered the necessity of whether hearing (oral stage) was needed, and 
would respected the right of hearing before issuing its judgement (European Union website ). 
For instance, in the cases of the Bank of Industry and Mines (BIM) (restrictive measures 
remained), and Sina Bank108 (restrictive measures partially annulled), the GC judgements 
were issued after both written and hearing procedures were conducted (Judgment of the 
General Court, case T-10/13, 29 April 2015, and Case T-10/13, 4 June 2014). 
 
c) The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
The targeted individuals and entities could also appeal to the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) especially, in cases where the process of listing is in contradiction with due 
process and/or the implementation of sanctions is in violation of human rights. For instance, 
the “Nada case” is an example that illustrates how the implementation of UNSC sanctions was 
affected by the ECHR decision. In 2001, Youssef Moustafa Nada, an Egyptian-Italian 
businessman, was listed under the anti-terrorism sanction by the UNSC (UNSCR 1267 
(1999)). The implementation of the sanction largely affected his life in Switzerland where his 
assets were frozen and he was banned from traveling. After the Swiss Federal Court rejected 
his claim, Nada appealed to the ECHR. The ECHR found that the implementation of UNSC 
sanctions has violated Nada’s rights109 (The European Conventions on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) Blog).Eventually, after both Switzerland and Italy’s 
                                                
108 In spite of the GC verdict on the Sina Bank case to annul the restrictive measures, the EU did not implement the decision (Feizi chakab, 
Shargh newspaper, October 27, 2014). 
109   The implementation of sanctions was in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights an Fundamental Freedoms, “Article 8 
ECHR (respect for private and family life) and Article 13 ECHR (effective remedy)” 
(ECHR blog: http://echrblog.blogspot.ca/2012/09/nada-grand-chamber-judgment.html). 
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investigations found no evidence against Nada, even the UNSC removed his name from the 
terror blacklist in 2009. 
 
5.4. General mechanisms for judicial review 
There are general judicial review mechanisms for targeted individuals and entities who for any reason, 
such as lack of proper judicial review mechanism or lack of hope for fair process, wish to appeal to a 
judicial body. 
 
a) International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
In general, all States have access to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), a UN organ, to file 
a lawsuit (including sanctions-related lawsuits) against another State. Accordingly, Iran has 
had the option to appeal to the ICJ against the U.S. and EU. In 2006, Francis A. Boyle, a 
professor of international law at the University of Illinois, was asked by the Iranian 
government to represent Iran in ICJ to sue the U.S. over its unilateral sanctions against Iran. 
Boyle submitted his proposal, yet the Iranian government eventually opted for diplomacy 
instead of taking the case to the Court110(Boyle April 6, 2013). 
 
b) National and regional courts 
In general, targeted individuals and entities have the opportunity to appeal to the national 
and/or regional courts. Depending on the court’s jurisdiction, sanctions could be annulled or 
the national and regional implementation of sanctions could be stopped. For instance, the 
EGC, a regional court, could order the EU Council to annul its unilateral sanctions against an 
entity. Furthermore, the same court or a national court (e.g. Switzerland’s court), could order 
that the national/regional implementation of sanctions be stopped where the court has no 
jurisdiction over the body that has authorized sanctions (e.g. the UNSC). In this case, the 
implementation of UNSC sanctions could be stopped due to its contradiction with the 
national/regional fundamental values and rules. 
One of the most well-known examples in which the UNSC sanctions were challenged by 
regional and national courts, is the Kadi case. Kadi (Yasin al-Qadi), a Saudi Arabian 
businessman, was listed in the absence of due process, by the UNSC under the Al 
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Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime. Kadi challenged the UNSC mechanism for listing him and 
for violating his rights, such as his right to a hearing and access to information, by filing 
lawsuits in several national courts and one regional court, ECJ (Heupel 20 Feb. 2015). He won 
the cases in national courts, a Swiss court (2007) and a United Kingdom court (2008) and the 
regional court, ECJ (2008) (Wikipedia website: Yassin Kadi )  . The Kadi case was a 
consequential and critical challenge to the UNSC due process mechanism and swayed the 
UNSC to improve its listing and delisting mechanisms in accordance with human rights 
values, such as the establishment and enhancement of the Office of the Ombudsperson for Al 
Qaida-related sanctions (Heupel 20 Feb. 2015). Hence, although the regional and national 
courts do not have jurisdiction over the UN, targeted individuals and entities have the 
opportunity to initiate legal proceedings before them and stop the national and regional 
implementation of the UNSC sanctions. 
 
Table 7.7 Sanctioners’ Judicial Review Mechanisms on Iran sanctions 
Sanctioners Mechanism Process 
UN Access to: 
(a)Sanctions 
Committee 







U.S. Access to: 
(a) OFAC 






















Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
• The implications of the research for the sanctions tool 
• Iran 
• Authorization of sanctions against Iran 
• Implementation of sanctions against Iran 
• Has the implementation of sanctions against Iran been comprehensive? 
• How globalization has served the comprehensive implementation of sanctions 
against Iran? 


















In this final chapter, I draw the conclusions of my research into two main sections: (1) sanctions, and (2) the 
case study of Iran. In the first section, I describe the implications of my research for sanctions, as a global 
governance and/or foreign policy tool. In the second section, I single out some of my important findings in an 
assessment of justice in the “authorization” of sanctions against Iran. Additionally, the “implementation” of 
sanctions against Iran will be reviewed from the perspective of “comprehensive” and “targeted” sanctions. 
To this end, I probe on the question: “How has globalization served the comprehensive implementation of 
sanctions against Iran?” Lastly, given recent developments in Iran’s nuclear case and the partial sanctions 
relief the country has been granted, I briefly discuss “Just Post Sanctions” in Iran’s case with a focus on the 
“Compliance” criterion. Here I assess the compliance with the agreed nuclear deal and the implementation of 
sanctions relief. 
1. The implications of the research for the sanctions tool 
My research illuminates serious deficits in both the authorization and implementation of sanctions. 
Considering the growing interest in appealing to sanctions as a global governance and/or foreign policy 
tool, I believe that there is a legal and ethical obligation to reform the sanctions tool. 
This research sheds light on the following urgent requirements when it comes to sanctions: 
a) A humane well-developed and multifaceted theoretical framework for the use of sanctions; 
b) An international legal framework on sanctions: “Law of Sanctions” (like the  “Law of War”); and 
c) The establishment of global bodies for overseeing sanctions, including monitoring, assessing and 
judicial review bodies. 
 
As Reisman and Stevick have asserted, the UNSC “has given inadequate considerations to International 
Law standards” in appealing to the sanctions tool, and there is a need for a comprehensive “legal 
framework” for the sanctions regime (Reisman and Stevick 1998, 86-7). In recent decades, the UN and 
powerful States have been increasingly appealing to sanctions as a global governance tool or as a foreign 
policy tool despite there being no specific International Law on sanctions. Nor are there legal restrictions 
on sanctioners either in their authorization or implementation. Furthermore, sanctioners are not held 
accountable - both during the carrying out of sanctions and in the post sanctions era - for their inflicted 
harm to the targets despite the fact that they had authorized sanctions unjustly and vastly violated human 
rights. In fact, there is no international law and competent body first to recognize the wrongdoer(s) in the 
authorization and implementation of sanctions and second to designate proportionate countermeasures. 
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My research reveals how sanctions drastically impacted the country of Iran and its citizens for years. 
Sanctioners had complete latitude to squeeze Iran as much as and as long as they desired. In the absence 
or weakness of well-defined global norms, international laws, and competent authoritative bodies on 
sanctions, targets of sanctions have had little voice to plea for justice. “Global Justice” will continue to 
suffer from a serious deficit as long as global governance tools such as sanctions are authorized and 
implemented in a non-legally binding context. 
In order to move towards more just sanctions, sanctions norms should firstly be generated and cascaded. 
The cascaded sanctions norms should then be codified into law (Law is codified norms). Eventually and 
in accordance with the “Law of Sanctions”, international, governmental and nongovernmental bodies 
and networks should be established. These might include an “International Sanctions Monitoring 
Organization”, and an “International Sanctions Tribunal”. 
 
In sum, a humane and well-developed theoretical framework for sanctions is an integral building block 
in the path towards more just sanctions. I attempted in my research to take a step forward in this vital 
path first by generating norms, values and discourse on sanctions, and second by bridging theory and 
practice through a study of sanctions’ standards and norms in the case of Iran. The focus of the existing 
literature on sanctions is largely based on the efficacy of sanctions, while unfortunately morality and 
legality are at the margins.  Given the inhumane impacts of some sanctions, as demonstrated by the 
devastating impact of the different types of sanctions that have been imposed on Iran for decades, I 
believe that a humanitarian perspective is required.  It should be the center of sanctions studies in order 
to promote justice in appealing to sanctions and to promote Global Justice. 
I hope that the generating and cascading of sanctions norms could lead to a global consensus on creating 
an international “Law of Sanctions”. I believe that there is an indispensable need for defining legal terms 
in sanctions such as “recognition of illegitimate authorizer”, “illegitimate sanctions”, and “sanctions 
crime”, similar to what exists in the “Law of war” These include “war crime”, “recognition of 
aggressor”, “compensation to victims”, and “crime against humanity”. 
• If a war of aggression can be condemned by the UNSC and there could be ramifications for 
the aggressor, the same should be possible when an actor authorizes unjust sanctions against a 
target; 
• If a war party who attacks civilians or civilian targets can be condemned for committing a war 
crime, the same should be possible when a sanctioner commits a sanctions crime by targeting 
civilians and illegitimate targets; 
  
     199 
• If a recognized war aggressor can be ordered to compensate inflected damages and would face 
punishment and deterrence measures, the same should be possible in the case of a sanctioner 
who authorizes and implements sanctions in an unjust manner. 
 
Even if sanctions norms do not codify into International law, more developed studies on just sanctions 
would generate a new or more progressive international tradition (trend) regarding just sanctions. For 
instance, after the revelation of widespread inhumane impacts by the UN’s comprehensive sanctions 
against Iraq, the UN stopped authorizing comprehensive sanctions.111 The UN began to adopt “targeted” 
or “smart” sanctions to reduce such inhumane and unintended consequences. Such a shift in the UN 
policy was never codified into law but became a tradition or norm. 
 
2. The case study of Iran 
In examining my hypothesis regarding justice in the authorization and implementation of sanctions 
against Iran, I attempted to reflect reality in a balanced way. Scholars and researchers are expected to 
respect objectivity in their studies; I felt that this responsibility was even greater for me, a citizen of Iran, 
as I was writing about justice. Therefore I was watchful throughout my thesis to not only present my 
argument in a just manner, but also to choose a “just” writing style. Accordingly, in all chapters on the 
“Just Authorization of Sanctions”, I followed a “one to one correspondence” writing style while I 
reflected on the narratives of both sides: the opposing countries and Iran. I also provided summarizing 
tables on the two narratives at the end of each criterion to state clearly the comparisons. My aim was to 
provide readers with organized and simplified judgment tools, and to leave it to them to consider which 
party had the most just cause for its course of action. Though I believe that the facts, evidence, and 
explanations in the research substantiate my hypothesis, I have attempted to leave enough space for the 
reader to make their own judgment. 
 
My approach in the chapters on the “Just Implementation of Sanctions” was different. The impacts of 
sanctions on Iran and its citizens are not something to be judged based on sanctioners’ and target’s 
narratives and perceptions. They are tangible realities that have to be observed and should be discussed 
based on official and unofficial statistics and statements. In addition, they should be assessed as changes 
in the country’s economic indicators, education standards, public health and safety situations over time, 
                                                
111 The UN has increasingly appealed to targeted rather than comprehensive sanctions since the early 1990s, in order to decrease the 
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maintaining cultural norms, and the status of environmental situations. Even for an individual such as 
myself, who has lived in Iran under sanctions, it was not an easy task to provide reliable data. The 
Iranian government has been denying the impacts of sanctions in the country for a long time. 
 
Furthermore, it has been almost redlined for Iranian scholars and journalists to write on this issue. It was 
only after President Rouhani was elected to serve as Iran’s 7th president in June 2013 and mostly after 
the interim nuclear agreement --the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) -- was signed in November 2013, that the 
unspoken reality crept out of the dark. The JPA was a turning point because it revealed some of the 
statistics and data on the impacts of sanctions on Iran. It split Iran’s domestic political forces into two 
groups of opponents and proponents of the JPA. Proponents aimed to turn the interim agreement (JPA) 
into a final nuclear agreement. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed in July 
2015, while opponents sought to derail the JPA. The debates and challenges between them in seeking to 
reach their goals resulted in more revelations about the impacts of sanctions. 
 
I will single out some of the most significant findings of my research on the authorization of sanctions 
against Iran. Then, I will review the implementation of sanctions from an alternative perspective that has 
been presented in the research. Reading the chapters on the implementation of sanctions against Iran is a 
prerequisite for comprehending my new angle of assessment in this conclusive chapter. I will end the 
conclusion by taking a glimpse at Just Post Sanctions in the case study of Iran. 
 
2.1. Authorization of sanctions against Iran 
The findings of my research substantiate the first part of my hypothesis: the authorization of non-UN 
sanctions against Iran has not been just and the authorization of UN sanctions on Iran was less unjust. 
Some of the main arguments are summarized as follow: 
 
d) Nuclear deviation dilemma 
The most important chapter of the thesis on the authorization of sanctions against Iran is Chapter Two: 
Comparative Just Cause. In this chapter, I illustrated how the narratives of sanctioners and Iran differ 
from each other, and how each side has a share of reasonable causes for their course of actions. Iran 
admitted its failure to report some of its nuclear activities yet insisted that the unreported activities were 
legal. Iran rejected the opposing countries’ allegation on the violation of the NPT. 
The sole legal reference on this dispute is the IAEA. In spite of the IAEA negative reports on Iran, until 
now it has never been able to conclusively prove Iran’s purported violations as well as military dimension 
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to Iran’s nuclear program 112. Unfortunately, the alleged nuclear deviation turned out to be the basis of 13 
years of dispute, which had been escalating in the context of hostility and misperception. In fact, the 
process of Iran’s nuclear dossier was more political than technical; thus it could have been resolved 
earlier if there had been enough political will on both sides and more mutual understanding instead of 
enmity. 
In a counterfactual approach, it is not unconceivable to imagine that if a country other than the Islamic 
Republic of Iran had the same failure in its nuclear program, it would not have gone through the same 
path. Furthermore, if a more experienced government were in power instead of Ahmadinejad’s 
government, the nuclear dispute wouldn’t have escalated so drastically. The antagonistic political 
atmosphere between Iran and its opposing countries played an essential role in how the issue unfolded 
and escalated over time. 
 
e) Controversy on ballistic missiles 
Iran’s missiles program has always been a controversial issue along with its nuclear program. According 
to the opposing countries, Iran’s ballistic missiles could potentially be a delivery vehicle for nuclear 
warheads. Considering Iran’s chaotic security environment (having the headquarters of the most 
frightening terrorist groups: ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and Taliban in its neighborhood), it is unreasonable to 
expect Iran not to advance its military capabilities.  This argument is especially unreasonable given the 
fact that Iran was left alone during its eight years of defensive war with Iraq. Great powers stood behind 
Iraq by supplying weapons for it and remained silent when Saddam Hussein attacked Iran with chemical 
weapons. 
 
f) Complexity of proportionality 
As mentioned in the first chapter, first, proportionality refers to the equivalence between the breached 
rule/norm and its consequences on one hand and the nature and scope of the countermeasures on the other 
(Cannizzaro 2001, 891). Secondly, according to the logic of proportionality, the standards of 
countermeasure proportionality is unconnected with standards of effectiveness (O'Connell 2002, 78). 
Lastly, proportionality is only measurable against wrongdoing/violation, not a hypothetical threat. 
 
                                                
112 Gholamali Khoshroo, Iran’s ambassador to the UN, affirmed in his speech to the UNSC, on the day the Res. 2231 was passed in 
endorsement of the nuclear deal, that no proof was found other than that Iran’s nuclear program has been peaceful. He underscored: 
“They (sanctions) were grounded on nothing but baseless and pure speculation and hearsay. Nobody has ever presented any 
proof indicating that Iran’s program has been anything but peaceful.” (	"UNSC	Resolution	on	Nuclear	Conclusion	A	
Major	Development:	Iran's	Envoy,"		http://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2015/07/20/805225/unsc-
resolution-on-nuclear-conclusion-a-major-development-iran-s-envoy	(Tasnim News Agency July 20, 2015). 
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Nuclear related sanctions (the countermeasures) against Iran were authorized due to (a) Iran’s alleged nuclear 
deviation (the wrong), and (b) Iran’s nuclear threat (hypothetical threat). Concerning Iran’s hypothetical 
threat: Iran seeks to possess nuclear weapons and then use them against its enemies; proportionality is 
immeasurable, or more precisely irrelevant. It can always be claimed that any countermeasure that could 
deter the threat of nuclear war would be acceptable. In Iran’s case, the validity of the threat should be 
verified. 
Proportionality is measurable by looking at Iran’s alleged nuclear deviation (the wrong), and the authorized 
sanctions (the countermeasures). The UNSC sanctions against Iran were, therefore, more proportionate in 
comparison with the U.S. and EU expanded and extensive sanctions. Iran had inflicted no harm. whereas the 
authorized sanctions impacted the entire population of Iran (around 77 million citizens). This outcomes was 
not through collateral damage, but intended damage which was not unknown the sanctioners in time of 
authorization. The authorized nuclear-related sanctions against Iran were the most comprehensive and 
unprecedented in the history of sanctions. As it is described in Chapters 5 and 6 (on Target Discrimination 
Principle and Civilian Immunity Principle), the country’s infrastructures and many aspects of its citizen’s 
lives were affected. According to the sanctioners’ narratives, tightening sanctions (the authorization of new 
sanctions) during the time was indispensable if the efficacy of sanctions against Iran had to increase. 
However, it is unjust to authorize sanctions disproportionately in order to increase their effectiveness. 
 
g) Extraterritorial sanctions phenomenon 
The authorization of secondary sanctions (extraterritorial sanctions) by the U.S. against Iran is a vivid 
example of the actions of an illegitimate authorizer of sanctions and the negligence of an important 
criterion of justice in sanctions. National legislations should be territorial and no single state should be a 
legitimate authorizer of unilateral sanctions with extraterritorial applications. The UN is the sole 
legitimate authorizer for international sanctions. But the U.S. has positioned itself in the UNSC’s place 
by designing a complicated and intertwined web of secondary sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program 
and allegations of human rights violations and terrorism sponsorship. Under the threat of the U.S. 
secondary sanctions and penalties, major companies and banks are still reluctant to resume transactions 
with Iran even after the UNSC lifted the nuclear-related sanctions against Iran. In sum, not only were the 
U.S. secondary sanctions illegitimate and unjust from the very beginning, but also they have turned out to 
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h) Expanded and extensive sanctions in the context of ambiguity 
The language of sanctions’ resolution/document should not be vague, contain undefined terms or non-
evidentiary requirements. An ambiguous sanctions resolution/document would obstruct from justice as it 
paves the way for misinterpretation, auto-interpretation and consequently the authorization and 
implementation of expanded sanctions beyond the original framework. This kind of development occurred in 
the case of UNSC sanctions resolutions against Iran. In the UNSCRs against Iran, Member States are 
repeatedly required to “exercise vigilance” towards Iran while it is not clear what vigilance precisely 
constitutes. The ambiguity of the UNSCRs facilitated the authorization of extensively expanded sanctions 
against Iran by the U.S. and the EU. Accordingly, some actors decided to ban all interactions (legitimate or 
illegitimate) with Iran. These actions could always be justified as the full or maximum exercising of 
vigilance. 
Aside from the language of vigilance, the UNSCRs contain non-evidentiary requirements. The Member 
States are required to impose additional prohibitions on trading, shipping and financial transactions if they 
believe that such activities could contribute to Iran’s nuclear program. Therefore the authorizers and 
implementers of sanctions did not have to go through the trouble of providing any evidence to substantiate 
their allegations against Iran. In sum, the vague language and non-evidentiary requirements of sanctions’ 
resolutions added to injustice in the authorization of sanctions against Iran. 
 
2.2. Implementation of sanctions against Iran 
The findings of this research substantiate the second part of the hypothesis: non-UN sanctions have not 
been implemented justly and the implementation of UN sanctions on Iran were less unjust. However, 
the impacts of sanctions implementation against Iran, in general, have been overarching and 
indiscriminate. Therefore, I would like to use another angle to assess the implementation of sanctions. 
Considering the arguments I made in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 (on criteria of Just Implementation of 
Sanctions) the multifaceted impacts of sanctions on Iran and its population, I would like to ask and 
discuss two important questions: (1) Has the implementation of sanctions against Iran been 
comprehensive? and (2) How has globalization served the comprehensive implementation of sanctions 
against Iran? 
 
2.3. Has the implementation of sanctions against Iran been comprehensive? 
As a general rule, any form of collective punishment including comprehensive sanctions is 
unacceptable and unjust. The indiscriminate nature of comprehensive sanctions triggered the 
criticisms of human rights advocates and paved the way for the emergence of  “targeted” or “smart” 
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sanctions. These sanctions were supposed to be more humane by targeting the responsible individuals 
and entities.   In spite of the theoretical distinctions between comprehensive and targeted sanctions, 
the practical framework of targeted sanctions may cause them to turn into comprehensive ones. In 
fact, targeted sanctions may have comprehensive implementations under the following circumstances: 
§ If they were targeting core economic infrastructures; 
§ If they were combined with other sanctions. 
Sanctions against Iran are claimed to be “targeted” or “smart”, whereas different sanctions have not only 
been in place in an intertwined web arrangement, but also they have targeted both wings of Iran’s economy: 
(a) energy sector and (b) banking and financial system. Therefore, sanctions against Iran are far from being 
smart or targeted due to their indiscriminate nature and comprehensive implementation. Chapters 5 and 6 on 
target discrimination and civilian immunity are the most central chapters to the Just Implementation of 
Sanctions which reflect how sanctions have been implemented comprehensively. It is also important to notice 
that the comprehensive implementation of sanctions against Iran was possible due to the characteristics of 
globalization. 
 
2.4. How globalization has served the comprehensive implementation of sanctions against Iran? 
 
The comprehensive implementation of sanctions against Iran was possible because of globalization’s 
characteristics. 
 
• Global economy 
The world economy has been increasingly intertwined and connected to the point where a country would 
face critical consequences were it to be excluded. However, the ramifications vary based on the extent the 
country is integrated into the global economy. One of the most remarkable characteristics of the global 
economy which has contributed to the comprehensive implementation of sanctions against Iran, is the 
electronic payment system/method. In the purported globalized world, economic actors conduct their 
financial transactions through electronic methods. The emergence of multinational banking and financial 
services companies such as HSBC, and the global payments network SWIFT (Society of Worldwide 
Interbank Financial Telecommunications) have changed global finance arrangements.  Secure 
international payment have integrated financial transactions worldwide. This incorporated globalized 
financial network has contributed to the comprehensive implementation of sanctions against Iran in at 
least three ways: 
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a) Financial transactions 
When Iran was cut off from SWIFT and major financial institutions were banned from doing transactions 
with Iran, the country was essentially excluded from the global financial system. Therefore, Iran had 
serious difficulties in conducting its international financial transactions for almost all goods and services; 
 
b) Circumvention policies 
With electronic financial transactions, it is easy to trace the record of payers, payees, sources and destinations 
of transactions. Consequently, the tractable mechanism has made it difficult for Iran to circumvent sanctions 
without being traced. For instance, some banks had to pay millions of dollars of forfeit to the U.S. when it 
was revealed that they were involved in financial transactions with Iran in violation of U.S. secondary 
sanctions against Iran. Hence, the less chances Iran had for sanctions circumvention the more comprehensive 
sanctions could be implemented. 
 
c) World business currency 
The global business currency is dominated by US dollars, especially for oil and gold. Whereas, according to 
U.S. sanctions, not only US financial institutions, but also foreign ones are prohibited from conducting U.S. 
dollar-based transactions with Iran. This prohibition was not lifted even after the final nuclear deal was 
reached. The domination of US dollars in global markets has vastly contributed to the comprehensive 
implementation of sanctions against Iran. 
 
• Global transportation 
In the globalized world, international shipping companies and insurance firms have a fundamental role in 
international transportation of goods across the world. Their significance was even greater for Iran, as its 
own shipping sector was targeted by sanctions. Most of the major international shipping and insurance 
companies refused to provide services to Iran in compliance with sanctions. Therefore, Iran was 
fundamentally excluded from global transportation. In sum, exclusion from the global transportation 
network along with exclusion from the global market and global financial system, constituted some of the 
pieces in the comprehensive implementation of the sanctions’ puzzle. 
 
• Global media 
The global mass media, such as international satellite TV channels and the Internet, have played an 
important role in convincing the audience of the threat of Iran’s nuclear program. Iran and its nuclear 
program were successfully securitized and consequently Iran’s market was depicted as a controversial 
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one that all economic actors should avoid. The widespread acceptance across the globe of this perception 
provided the ideational support for comprehensive implementation of sanctions against Iran. The 
comprehensive implementation of sanctions was possible, despite its inhumane impacts on Iranians. The 
sanctioners’ narratives and discourses were so dominant in the global mass media that any voice against 
years of sanctions and inflicted harms to Iranians could hardly be heard. 
 
 
• Global and international bodies and treaties 
Global and international organizations and institutions also contributed to the comprehensive 
implementation of sanctions against Iran either by their actions, (the UNSC’s ambiguous resolutions) or 
inactions (human rights organizations’ silence). Furthermore, being a partner to the international treaties 
such as the NPT turned out to be the basis for Iran’s nuclear crisis instead of contributing to its nuclear 
program. If Iran had not voluntarily committed itself to the NPT, perhaps it could pursue its nuclear 
program free of international scrutiny similar to Israel. Despite regional and international pressure, Israel 
has never accepted to sign the NPT and therefore it has always been exempted from monitoring by the 
IAEA. How would Iran’s nuclear story have unfolded, if like Israel it had not committed itself to the 
international treaty: the NPT? 
 
 
3. Just Post Sanctions; the next step of the research 
As it is mentioned in Chapter 1 (on Theoretical Framework), Just Post-Sanctions encompasses five 
criteria: (a) Compliance, (b) Compensation and Punishment, (c), Proportionality, (d) Deterrence, and 
(e) Collateral damage responsibility. Since the UN and the EU nuclear-related sanctions and the U.S. 
secondary sanctions have been partially lifted since 2016, I had the opportunity to briefly study the first 
criterion of “compliance” in the case of Iran and include it in my research conclusion. However the 
other criteria are not yet applicable to the case of Iran. I hope that in my next research project I will be 




According to the “compliance” criterion, when sanctions are lifted through a designated mechanism 
(for instance a new UNSC Resolution) sanctioner(s) should comply with the agreed upon time of 
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termination of sanctions. It would be unjust to keep sanctions in place or hinder and delay the 
termination process. 
 
Iran and P5+1 were able to put an end to the 13 years dispute over Iran’s nuclear program through the 
final nuclear deal: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on 14 July 2015. Shortly after, the 
UNSC Resolution 2231 was passed on 20 July 2015 in which it endorsed the JCPOA and asked for its 
full implementation (UNSCR 2231 (2015), 2). According to the resolution, should the IAEA present 
a positive report on Iran’s compliance with the agreement, nuclear-related sanctions on Iran should be 
lifted in accordance with the JCPOA. On the historic day of 16 January 2016, the IAEA presented a 
positive report on Iran and verified that Iran has met its nuclear commitments. Correspondingly, 
January 16, 2016 was marked as “Implementation Day” of the JCPOA (U.S. Department of Treasury 
January 16, 2016). 
 
 
• Compliance and commitments 
Compliance of the participants of the JCPOA is measured against their commitments in accordance with 
the nuclear deal. According to the JCPOA, nuclear-related sanctions relief would happen in 10 years. 
During this period of time, Iran, the EU and the U.S have different commitments to meet. For instance, 
when Iran met the first round of its nuclear commitments (verified by the IAEA) the new phase 
“Implementation Day” began, and it was the turn of the EU and the U.S’ to comply with their obligations 
by taking necessary actions to lift certain sanctions. 
 






“Transition Day” “ Termination 
Day” 
Oct.18, 2025 
“Adoption Day is 
the date 90 days 
after the 
endorsement of this 
JCPOA by the UN 
Security Council, or 
such earlier date as 
“Implementation 
Day is the date on 
which, 
simultaneously with 
the IAEA report 
verifying 
implementation by 
“Transition Day is 
the date 8 years 
after Adoption Day 
or the date on which 
the 
Director General of 
the IAEA submits a 
“UN Security 
Council resolution 
Termination Day is 
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may be determined 
by mutual consent 
of the JCPOA 
participants, at 
which time this 
JCPOA and the 
commitments in this 
JCPOA come into 
effect” 
Iran of the nuclear-
related measures 
described in 
Sections 15.1. to 
15.11 of Annex V, 
the EU and the 
United States take 
the actions 
described in 
Sections 16 and 17 
of Annex V 
respectively and in 
accordance with 
the UN Security 
Council resolution, 
the actions 
described in Section 
18 of Annex 
V occur at the UN 
level. “ 
 
report stating that 
the IAEA has 
reached the Broader 
Conclusion that all 
nuclear material in 






according to its 
terms, which is to be 
10 years from 
Adoption Day, 
provided that the 
provisions 
of previous 
resolutions have not 
been reinstated” .” 
*Source of definitions: JCPOA 14 July 2015, Vienna, 16 
 
The EU and the US commitments differ largely from each other. While the EU is committed to lift all the 
nuclear-related sanctions against Iran (human rights-related sanctions will remain in place), the U.S. is only 
committed to remove secondary sanctions with some exceptions and it would keep almost all of the primary 
sanctions. U.S. primary sanctions ban “US persons” from any transactions dealing with Iran. “US person” 
refers to all US individuals (citizens and green card holders all over the world and anyone in the US territory) 
and all the entities under US law (including non-US entities in the U.S. territory)  (Sherman & Sterling LLP 
January 20, 2016, 3). In fact, the U.S. would largely maintain its sanctions (nuclear, human rights and 
terrorism-related) that have been accumulated and tightened since the hostage crisis in 1979. Iran and the 
U.S. would not resume their economic relations even after the JCPOA. However, following the 
Implementation Day, some exceptions were made in the U.S. primary sanctions and OFAC issued licences 
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for the importation of pistachios, rugs, Saffron and caviar from Iran and the exportation of medical supplies 
to Iran. U.S. secondary sanctions have largely been removed with some critical exceptions. The most 
important secondary sanction still in place is the prohibition on US dollar-based transactions. Accordingly, 
non-US financial institutions would be subject to US secondary sanctions (such as exclusion from the U.S. 
financial system and penalties) in cases of non-compliance (Ibid, 4-5). 
 
 
Given that it would be unjust to keep sanctions in place or to hinder and delay the termination process, and 
considering that the IAEA has verified Iran’s compliance with its nuclear commitments in the first phase, it is 
important to ask the following question:  have sanctioners been in compliance with the implementation of 
sanctions relief so far? The compliance challenges suggest that it will take a long time for sanctions relief to 
become a reality in practice. 
 
• Compliance challenges 
The main compliance challenges are classified as follows: 
 
a) Remaining sanctions 
The remaining sanctions against Iran have been affecting the implementation of the JCPOA. One of the 
most important barriers in the compliance of sanctions relief is the prohibition on transactions in U.S. 
dollars - the most dominant currency in global business. Since 1995, U.S banks were banned from any 
direct transactions with Iranian banks. However, transactions in U.S. dollar were permissible via “U-turn” 
banking113 (Bauer April 5, 2016). In 2008, the U.S. revoked the “U-turn” exemption to tighten sanctions 
against Iran (Ibid). Thus, Iran’s reintegration into the international financial system in the post nuclear 
deal era has turned out to be impossible, because U.S. and non-U.S. banks are still banned from U.S. 
dollar transactions with Iran. 
 
b) The vague statements of the US Treasury Department 
Since the Implementation Day, the US Treasury Department and its’ Office of Foreign Assets Control 
(OFAC) have issued vague statements instead of providing clear guidance. For instance, on 
                                                
113 “A U-turn transaction, generally speaking, is a banned financial transaction done by a bank in country A (example: USA) for the benefit of 
a bank in country B (example: Iran) through offshore banks (example: Switzerland). This loophole is used by Iranian banks to avoid U.S. 
sanctions on US dollar based transactions. The phrase "U-turn" applies because the funds are transferred to a U.S. bank and instantly turned back 
as dollars to a European bank” ("U-Turn	(Banking),"	https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U-turn_(banking).	 
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Implementation Day, the US Treasury Department issued an explanatory document on sanctions relief 
which could add to concerns rather than to clarity: 
“Foreign financial institutions should continue to undertake their customary due diligence to ensure 
that they are not facilitating transactions that remain sanctionable.” (The Treasury Department 
January 16, 2016). 
 
Major banks need to be assured on legal bases and through precise guidance that they would not violate U.S. 
sanctions if they were to financially work with Iran (Cullis March 31, 2016). The head of the French banking 
federation, Marie-Anne Barbat-Layani, believes that the U.S. should resolve all the legal uncertainties 
regarding dealing with Iran. She affirms "To be able to intervene, we banks need to have complete legal 
security and clarity … We're not there yet." (Press TV Feb.16, 2016) . The delays of the U.S. in providing an 
accurate roadmap for major banks and economic actors has made sanctions relief unworkable. 
 
c) Risk aversion approach 
The confusion, vagueness and complicated regulations around re-engaging with Iran have swayed major 
economic actors towards risk aversion and consequently resulted in unworkability of sanctions relief. 
According to a survey conducted by Clyde & Co, more than 50% of companies across the globe, who are 
willing to do business with Iran have been held back mainly because they are confused with the 
remaining sanctions and are fearful of U.S. penalties (Nasseri May 17, 2016). Furthermore, they are 
concerned with uncertainties regarding the future of the nuclear deal and possible sanctions snapback, 
especially after Obama’s presidency and the first term of Rouhani’s presidency. Trump has vowed to tear 
up the "disastrous" Iranian nuclear deal and Ted Cruz has promised that he would "rip to shreds this 
catastrophic Iranian nuclear deal" (Chicago Tribune April 7, 2016). The fact is that most Republicans are 
against the deal and wish to renegotiate it or at least impede its implementation. Likewise, hardliners in 
Iran call the JCPOA a “disaster” and they have done their best to derail the deal (Khabaronline News 
Agency October 5, 2015). 
 
I elaborate more on the compliance challenges through explaining some of the most important examples in 
sanctions relief implementation. 
 
1) SWIFT and banking transactions: 
Iranian banks were disconnected from SWIFT in March 2012 and consequently Iran was excluded from the 
global financial system. Upon the implementation of the JCPOA, some of the Iranian banks have been slowly 
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reconnecting to SWIFT after four years. However, this development does not mean that normal banking has 
been resumed (Reuters Feb 17, 2016). Prohibition on US dollar transactions is still in place so even though 
Iran is reconnected to SWIFT, it cannot conduct transactions in US dollars which is the dominant currency of 
global business. Asadollah Asgar-Oladi, a member of Iran’s Chamber of Commerce asserts that reconnecting 
to SWIFT has been useless so far and has had no advantage for the Iranian economy. He affirms that Iranian 
banks are able to send messages through SWIFT but they cannot transfer money. Asgar-Oladi stresses that 
the European banks still do not trust Iran and are not ready to sign necessary contracts for money transfers 
because they are afraid of sanctions snapback (Fars News Agency March 5, 2016). Likewise, Mohsen 
Rezaee, secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran, compares the 
reconnection of Iranian banks to SWIFT with open channels/pipes with no water passing inside (Mehr News 
Agency April 17, 2016). Furthermore, the Iranian banking system is almost outdated as it was disconnected 
from the international financial system for years. Thus, the technical problems have also added to Iran’s 
difficulties in reengaging with SWIFT and foreign banks. 
 
2) Financing the deals: 
Despite the fact that prohibitions on import and export have been greatly lifted, Iran has grave difficulties in 
financing the purchases and also receiving the payments for exported goods and materials. For instance, 
some Iranians conducting business in Dubai assert that they are still unable to open letters of credit (LC) to 
finance their business deals (Arnold and Saul March 22, 2016). In another example, Iran has signed a deal 
with the airline Airbus to purchase 118 new airplanes. The deal is worth $27 billion, yet financing the deal is 
still challenging and there is a need for more serious cooperation from EU banks (Press TV Feb.16, 2016). 
 
3) Frozen assets: 
According to Valiollah Seif, the Governor of the Central Bank of Iran (CBI), “Three months after the 
implementation of the JCPOA, Iran has not been able to access 100 billion dollars of its assets that are 
confiscated abroad” (Mehr News Agency April 20, 2016). He affirms that “although Iran’s assets in foreign 
banks are supposed to be accessible, European banks are still worried about violating U.S. sanctions and 
facing its heavy penalties” (Ibid). The prohibition on transactions in US dollars is the main obstacle in Iran’s 
access to its assets. 
 
4) Trade partners: 
There are still many Iranian individuals and entities that are on the U.S., the EU and UK black lists. 
Therefore, it is an extremely difficult and complicated task for business firms and financial institutions to 
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reengage with Iran when Iran’s business environment is not transparent. It is necessary for such entities to 
ensure their business would not touch the designated individuals and entities, such as IRGC, which has a 
prominent role in Iran’s economy (Nasseri May 17, 2016). In sum, lack of transparency in doing business 
with Iran is one of the main challenges of compliance with sanctions relief. 
 
• Cases of Noncompliance 
In addition to compliance challenges, there are cases of clear noncompliance in the post nuclear deal era. For 
instance, the governor of Texas, Greg Abbott, has formally announced that Texas has no intention of 
complying with the nuclear accord, and will maintain all sanctions against Iran114. In his letter to President 
Obama who had requested all 50 states to review sanctions against Iran and not to interfere with the 
implementation of the JCPOA, Abbot asserts: 
“Because the Iran deal is fundamentally flawed and does not permanently dismantle Iran’s nuclear capability, 
Texas will maintain its sanctions against Iran… Further, because your administration has recklessly and 
unilaterally removed critical sanctions, I have called on the Texas Legislature to strengthen the Iran sanctions 
that Texas already has in place,”115 (The Jerusalem Post May 17, 2016). 
 
• What if Iran does not feel the benefits of sanctions relief? 
Given the challenges of compliance with sanctions relief, Iran is hardly receiving the expected economic 
benefits of the nuclear deal - something that would be a serious threat to the nuclear accord. Mohammad 
Javad Zarif warns “The JCPOA is in danger…Iranian people should feel the JCPOA as soon as possible, 
otherwise they may question the advantage of the nuclear deal” (Mehr News Agency April 20, 2016). He 
complains, “We have not gone through 30 months of the most compact negotiations to face a vain document” 
(Ibid). The Central Bank of Iran (CBI) Governor, Valiollah Seif , described Iran’s achievements of the 
nuclear accord at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in Washington: “Let me also give you a snapshot 
of what has happened over the last three months — the date of implementation of the JCPOA: almost 
nothing.” (Faghihi April 27, 2016). Both sides of the nuclear deal have recognized the danger of not 
benefiting from the accord. 
 
In sum, all the partners to the nuclear deal have to comply with not only the letter but also the spirit of the 
JCPOA. The U.S should especially avoid policies that would undermine the JCPOA and that would hinder 
                                                
114 Texas has economic significance: its ranking would be the 12th largest globally if it were a nation 	(The Jerusalem Post, May 17, 2016).  
115 Watch the video of Greg Abbott's explanation here:http://www.thepoliticalinsider.com/texas-just-flipped-obama-the-bird-on-iran-sanctions/; 
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the implementation of sanctions relief such as changes in the Visa Waver Program (VWP)116. The IAEA 
report acknowledges that Iran has complied with the first round of its nuclear obligations in accordance with 
the JCPOA.  And if the other sides of the nuclear deal do not fully comply with the accord and do not 
facilitate the sanctions relief implementation, the Rouhani government might unwillingly be swayed to 
reconsider Iran’s nuclear policy, something that hardliners on both sides along with global, regional, and 




















                                                
116 According to the VWP, citizens of 38 countries	(All	from	high-income	economies:	European states, Australia, Japan and South Korea), do 
not need to apply for a visa to travel to the U.S. However, according to recent changes anyone from the mentioned 38 countries who has traveled 
to Iran, Iraq, Syria and Sudan since 2011, are required to apply for a U.S. visa. The U.S. implemented the changes under the Visa Waiver 
Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015 (the Act), in January 21, 2016. Nonetheless, the U.S. may consider waiving 
the restriction for “Individuals who traveled to Iran for legitimate business-related purposes following the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (July 14, 2015)”(	"United	States	Begins	Implementation	of	Changes	to	the	Visa	Waiver	Program,"	,	
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/01/251577.htm.	 (U.S. Department of Sate:  January 21, 2016) 
The changes to the VWP is in noncompliance with the spirit of the nuclear deal, even considering the possible waiver, as it discourages 
individuals and entities to travel to Iran.  
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